LOCAL 180 OF INT. U., UNITED A., A. & AI WKRS. v. JI Case Co.

• Decision Date: 22 July 1960
• Docket Number: No. 60-C-117.,60-C-117.
• Citation: 185 F. Supp. 130
• Parties: LOCAL 180 of the INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. J. I. CASE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

185 F. Supp. 130

LOCAL 180 of the INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. J. I. CASE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 60-C-117.

United States District Court E. D. Wisconsin.

July 22, 1960.

Max Raskin, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff.

O. S. Hoebreckx, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant.

GRUBB, District Judge.

On order to show cause filed by plaintiff why a temporary injunction should not be entered enjoining defendant from allegedly breaching or threatening to breach a collective bargaining agreement.

Local 180 of the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, (hereinafter called the "Union") entered into a collective bargaining agreement with defendant, J. I. Case Company, (hereinafter called the "Company") on May 5, 1958. This agreement contains provisions governing the qualifications and eligibility of employees for vacation pay. On December 29, 1959, the Union gave a sixty day notice to the Company that it proposed to modify the collective bargaining agreement, including the provisions relating to vacation pay. Pursuant to its terms which provide for termination of the agreement following the giving of said sixty day notice by either party, the contract expired on February 29, 1960, and the Union declared a strike against the Company. The strike continues to this date.

On July 11, 1960, the Company sent letters to the Union and the employees, wherein it informed them that the employees would have to return to work by July 25, 1960, to qualify for 1960 vacation pay.

The Union, by its amended complaint, alleges that the Company breaches or threatens to breach its promise as to vacation pay because the return to work requirement set forth in the Company letters of July 11, 1960, imposes a new qualification and condition of eligibility of the employees for vacation pay in violation of rights earned by and vested in said employees under the collective bargaining agreement of May 5, 1958.

The Union requests that the court declare the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract in respect to the provisions governing vacation pay; that the court enter a temporary injunction enjoining and restraining the Company from breaching or threatening to breach its obligation; and that the court enter a permanent injunction upon final hearing of the case. The Union rests jurisdiction on Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a), and relies on the Declaratory Judgment Act, Title 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201-2202, for its remedy.

The Union claims that the Company's promise to award vacation pay only to those employees who return to work by July 25, 1960, is an attempt to produce a back-to-work movement among the striking employees resulting in irreparable harm to the Union by disrupting the unity of the Union and its collective membership and discouraging Union members from carrying out pledged objectives.

The Company answered that it has discharged its obligations under the May 5, 1958, agreement in respect to 1958 and 1959 vacations and that it has no obligations under that agreement in respect to 1960 vacations. The Company also challenges the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case and contends there is no basis for the award of injunctive relief.

The first matter for determination on the order to show cause is whether or not the jurisdiction of this court extends to the suit. Section 301(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization, as there defined, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties. Under the federal law fashioned by the courts in applying this statute, the section creates jurisdiction in the district court to enforce by appropriate remedies contract...