Local 248 UAW v. Natzke

• Decision Date: 31 October 1967
• Citation: 36 Wis.2d 237,153 N.W.2d 602
• Parties: , 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2439, 56 Lab.Cas. P 12,251 LOCAL 248 UAW, Respondent, v. Benjamin NATZKE, Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 602

153 N.W.2d 602

36 Wis.2d 237, 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2439,

56 Lab.Cas. P 12,251

LOCAL 248 UAW, Respondent, v. Benjamin NATZKE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oct. 31, 1967.

John A. Keck, james Urdan, Milwaukee, for appellant.

Zubrensky, Padden, Graf & Bratt, Milwaukee, for respondent.

CURRIE, Chief Justice.

As a result of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., ⁶ the appellant employee is now relying upon these three contentions:

(1) That state courts are without jurisdiction to entertain an action, such as the instant one, for collection of a fine imposed upon a union employee who returns to work during a strike, because it would constitute coercion of the employee in his exercise of a right protected by sec. 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. ⁷

(2) The enforcement of such a fine by state court action is contrary to state labor policy.

(3) Such enforcement is not authorized by the union membership contract.

At the last oral argument counsel for appellant expressly abandoned any issue with respect to the factual determination that appellant was a full union member at the time he returned to work during the strike.

Interference with Sec. 7 Rights

N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. held that the instant plaintiff union, which threatened and imposed reasonable fines, and brought suit for their collection, upon members who had crossed the union's picket line to work during an authorized strike against their employer, did not commit the unfair labor practice under sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act ⁸ of engaging in conduct 'to restrain or coerce' employees in the exercise of their right guaranteed by sec. 7 to 'refrain from' concerted activities. ⁹ Nonetheless, appellant argues that a state court's enforcement of those fines would coerce the employees in the exercise of their sec. 7 rights. We disagree.

Appellant relies heavily on Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. etc., (Bus. Employees) v. Wis. Employment Relations Board ¹⁰ which held void Wisconsin's Public Utility Anti-Strike Law ¹¹ that forbade strikes against public utilities and provided for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes in the public utility industry. The basis of the decision was that the act infringed upon the sec. 7 right of employees to engage in concerted activities. Appellant points out that the court reached this conclusion although there was no express provision is sec. 8 of the National Labor Relations Act making the state's activities under its Public Utility Anti-Strike Law an unfair labor practice. Upon this premise it argues that it is immaterial that an action in state court to collect the instant fine has been ruled not to be an unfair labor practice on the part of plaintiff union in N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. In other words, appellant's position is that while that decision makes it clear that it is not unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act for plaintiff to seek to collect the fine, the state would be coercively interfering with appellant's sec. 7 protected rights if it, through its courts, enforced such collection.

We deem this to be a wholly illogical argument. If it is not an unlawful interference with appellant's sec. 7 protected rights for the union to seek collection of the fine as part of its permitted internal discipline procedures, we cannot perceive how it is unlawful for a state court to make that attempted collection effectual. The Bus Employees Case dealt with a situation where the state itself was directly interfering with sec. 7 protected rights. It had nothing to do with assisting a union by effectuating an internal disciplinary procedure which had been rules lawful by the United States Supreme Court.

If the courts of this state are barred from enforcing collection of the instant fine, it is not because such enforcement constitutes a violation by the state of appellant's sec. 7 protected rights, but because of federal preemption over the collection process. This latter point will be dealt with in connection with our consideration of the next issue to be considered.

Alleged Violation of State Labor Policy

Defendant asserts that enforcement of the fines would violate state labor policy as determined by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Local 248, U.A.A. & A.I. Workers of America, AFL-CIO, ¹² Joseph Carey et el. v. Lodge 78, International Association of Machinists ¹³ and Globe Union, Inc. v. Tool & Die Makers Lodge 78, International Association of Machinists. ¹⁴

In the last footnote to Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., it is stated:

'Not before us is the question of the extent to which union action for enforcement of disciplinary penalties is preempted by federal labor law. * * *' ¹⁵

Merely because the United States Supreme Court may have left this issue undecided does not mean that Wisconsin is free to interpose a labor policy, with respect to employees engaged in interstate commerce which is in direct conflict to that enunciated by NLRB. Until such time as the United States Supreme Court has spoken with finality on the issue, Wisconsin, under the rule of preemption laid down in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council Millmen's Unions v. Garmon, ¹⁶ must defer to decisions of the NLRB which have held that state court enforcement of such fines is protected by the proviso to sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act. ¹⁷

In Garmon the court stated:

'At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board. What is outside the scope of this Court's authority cannot remain within a State's power and state jurisdiction too must yield to the exclusive primary competence of the Board * * *.

'* * * When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.

'* * * If the Board decides, subject to appropriate federal judicial review, that conduct is protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end, and the States are ousted of all jurisdiction * * *.' ¹⁸

We interpret the words 'ousted of all jurisdiction' appearing in the last quoted sentence, in the light of the NLRB's decisions in these union fine cases, as not meaning that state courts are without jurisdiction to enforce collection of the fine, but rather that state courts are without jurisdiction to enforce any state policy which is at variance with the one enunciated by NLRB. ¹⁹ As will be seen, NLRB decisions make it clear that court enforcement of the instant fines is consonant with federal labor policy as determined by that board.

In Local 248, U.A., A. & A.I.W. v. Wis. E.R. Board ²⁰ this court inferred from several cited decisions that the NLRB had interpreted the proviso of sec. 8(b)(1)(A) as having the effect of making the enforcement by a union of a fine authorized by its own constitution and by-laws a protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act. No longer is it necessary to resort to inference. In Local 248, U.A.A. & A.I.W. ²¹ the NLRB held the very union activity involved in the instant case 'was protected by the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.' ²²

The NLRB adhered to its decision in Local 248, UAW, even though it had been reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. ²³

This court considers itself bound by the Board's interpretations of the effect of the proviso of sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court has not held them to be erroneous.

Union Membership Contract

In International Assoc. of Machinists v. Gonzales ²⁴ the United States Supreme Court stated, 'This contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union widely prevails in this country * * *.' ²⁵ This court has consistently held that a union's constitution and by-laws constitute a contract between the union and its members, which contract may be enforced in state courts. ²⁶

Appellant does not take issue with this but contends that because the instant union membership contract only specified the remedies of expulsion or suspension for the nonpayment of fines, that such remedies are to be exclusive. ²⁷ Therefore, it is argued that court action to enforce the fine will not lie.

We consider particularly apposite the statement made by Mr. Justice Brennan by way of footnote in his opinion for the court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.:

'It is suggested that while such provisions for fines and expulsion were a common element of union constitutions at the time of the enactment of § 8(b) (1), such background loses its cogency here because such provisions did not explicitly call for court enforcement. However the potentiality of resort to courts for enforcement is implicit in any binding obligation. Surely it cannot be said that the absence of a 'court enforceability' clause in a contract of sale implies that the parties do not foresee resort to the courts as a possible means of enforcement. It is also suggested that court enforcement of fines is 'a rather recent innovation.' Yet such enforcement was known as early as 1867. Master Stevedores' Assn. v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1 (N.Y.).' ²⁸

It is not clear that the above quoted statement had the approval of Mr. Justice White, so as to represent the view of a five-member majority of the United States Supreme Court. ²⁹ Nevertheless, its logic appeals to us as being sound. The reference to a contract of sale makes it clear that Mr....