Local 2839 of American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Udall, AFL-CIO
| Decision Date | 19 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | AFL-CIO,No. 18791,18791 |
| Citation | 111 N.M. 432,1991 NMSC 17,806 P.2d 572 |
| Parties | , 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2623 LOCAL 2839 OF AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Honorable Tom UDALL, Attorney General of the State of New Mexico, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
The Human Services Department (the department) and its local bargaining unit, Local 2839 (the Local), presented a collective bargaining agreement (the agreement) to the State Personnel Board (the board) for the board's approval. The board approved the agreement. Pursuant to Section 8(A) 1 of its Rules for Labor-Management Relations (RLMR), the board submitted the agreement to the attorney general. In a letter to the department's secretary, the attorney general's office disapproved of the agreement, contending that in twenty-seven specific respects the agreement was violative of state law as enunciated in (1) this court's opinion in Local 2238 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Stratton, 108 N.M. 163, 769 P.2d 76 (1989), (2) NMSA 1978, Sections 10-9-1 to -25 (Repl.Pamp.1990) ("the Personnel Act"), and (3) the RLMR.
In response to the attorney general's rejection of the agreement, Local 2839 filed an action for declaratory judgment in district court, naming the department and the attorney general as defendants, and seeking a declaration that the agreement was valid in its entirety. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted the Local's motion and denied the attorney general's motion. The court's judgment was based on two grounds: (1) collateral estoppel of the attorney general's defense to the Local's action; and (2), in the alternative, a finding that the twenty-seven challenged provisions of the agreement did not "violate or conflict with the State Personnel Act ..., the Personnel Board Rules, or the [RLMR]."
Insofar as collateral estoppel is concerned, the court found, in pertinent part, that:
--in Local 2238, both the district and supreme courts "actually and necessarily decided that the challenged provisions" of the collective bargaining agreement at issue in that case--involving the state highway department--"were legally sufficient and did not violate the Personnel Act * * *, the Personnel Board Rules or the [RLMR];"
--the twenty-seven provisions challenged by the attorney general in the case at bar were "strikingly similar, if not identical, to the contract provisions determined" to be "legally sufficient" by the district and supreme courts in Local 2238;
--the ultimate facts and issues to be decided in Local 2238 and the case at bar are identical;
--"the identity or privity of the Plaintiff" in Local 2238 and the case at bar "is unimportant as a matter of New Mexico law" (citing Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987));
--because the department's "ultimate interest" in the case at bar is identical to the Local's "there is identity of privity which meets due process requirements between" defendant in Local 2238 and defendant in the case at bar;
--the attorney general, defendant in both cases, "had a full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the issues raised in" Local 2238.
As to the issue of the legal sufficiency of the twenty-seven challenged provisions of the agreement, the district court merely ruled that consistent with Local 2238, the provisions "do not violate or conflict with the State Personnel Act * * *, the Personnel Board Rules, or the [RLMR]."
At the hearing on the motions, the Local had sought injunctive relief, which the court granted, in part, to the effect that the department was enjoined pending appeal "from failing to immediately implement" the terms of the agreement. The court ruled that, pursuant to SCRA 1986, 1-062, there would be no stay.
On appeal, the attorney general asserts three errors: (1) the district court erred in finding that none of the challenged twenty-seven provisions conflict with applicable law; (2) the court erred in finding that the attorney general was collaterally estopped to defend the action; and (3) the court erred in granting injunctive relief. As to the third issue, the attorney general contends that if he was right as to even one of the twenty-seven challenged provisions, the injunction should be dissolved until the agreement is amended to conform to law.
The Local argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the attorney general from contesting the Local's action. However, the Local argues, even if we do not agree with the district court's ruling on collateral estoppel, we should nonetheless agree with the district court that the challenged provisions of the agreement do not violate the Personnel Act, the Personnel Board Rules or the RLMR and thus affirm the judgment.
Insofar as the legal sufficiency of the twenty-seven challenged provisions of the agreement is concerned, the attorney general, among other objections, contends as follows:
(1) the agreement contains provisions pertaining to salary, compensation and classification of employees in violation of RLMR 7(B), which provides that "matters of salary" and "matters of classification" are to be excluded from collective bargaining negotiations;
(2) the agreement provides for the unlawful appropriation of money, including the establishment of a $20,000 counseling program that the legislature refused to fund, in violation of RLMR 7(G), which prohibits collective bargaining agreements from obligating state agencies to commit funds for purposes "for which funds have not been lawfully appropriated;"
(3) the agreement unlawfully expands the scope of collective bargaining agreements by requiring the parties to challenge disputed provisions of the agreement in the courts, when Local 2238 provides that such a collective bargaining agreement must be controlled by the Personnel Act, the board's rules, and any legislative changes;
(4) the agreement impermissibly defines management employees in such a way as to include them in the bargaining unit, when RLMR 5(F)(2) excludes management employees from bargaining units;
(5) the agreement's leave provisions clash with board rules 13.3(B) and (C) pertaining to the rights of an employee who takes leave to return to the same geographical location in which the employee lived before the leave;
In general, the attorney general finds in the challenged provisions a blanket violation of the principle we enunciated in Local 2238, to the effect that the board may not delegate to state agencies or employee unions the authority "to enact rules or agreements on those matters expressly placed within the purview of the Board's rule-making authority, i.e., wages, hiring, termination of employment * * *. " 108 N.M. at 169, 769 P.2d at 82.
estoppel
Insofar as the court's ruling on collateral estoppel is concerned, the attorney general argues that the court erred in concluding that the district and supreme courts actually and necessarily determined the legal sufficiency of the twenty-seven challenged provisions in Local 2238. The attorney general contends that only three of the twenty-seven provisions now before the court are similar to provisions of the highway department agreement challenged in Local 2238.
Further, the attorney general argues, in our decision in Local 2238, we did not rule on the legal sufficiency of the provisions challenged in that case. Thus, there was no "actual and necessary" ruling on that issue that can now serve as the predicate for a finding of collateral estoppel. Because we did not issue a holding on legal sufficiency in the case on appeal, any ruling by the lower court on legal sufficiency cannot be conclusive in the case at bar.
Because the court premised its grant of injunction on the conclusion that "[i]t is likely that [the Local] will succeed on the merits on appeal," and because, the attorney general argues, this conclusion was erroneous, the injunction should be dissolved and the Local should be required to conform the agreement with applicable law as construed by the attorney general.
The Local contends that we need not reach the argument on the legal sufficiency of the challenged provisions, because the court correctly applied the principles of collateral estoppel to the attorney general's attempted defense of the presentation action. The Local relies on several of our prior decisions 2 to argue that collateral estoppel applies when the same issue is litigated in both actions, the issue is actually, finally and necessarily decided in the first action, the party against whom estoppel is asserted is either identical to or in privity with the original party against whom the issue was previously decided, and that original party had a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue in the first action.
The Local argues that the court in Local 2238 actually and necessarily decided that the provisions of the agreement challenged in that case were legally sufficient. The Local points to language in the court's order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff-local in that case wherein the court ruled: "The proposed collective bargaining agreement does not violate the State Personnel Act, the Rules and Regulations of the State Personnel Board, nor the RLMR." (Local 2238, No. SF-87-1490(C), December 28, 1987.) The Local argues in addition that, for purposes of collateral...
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