Local 860 Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Neff
| Decision Date | 17 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:20-CV-02714 |
| Parties | LOCAL 860 LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, On Behalf of Itself and Its Members, Plaintiff, v. TEREASE Z. NEFF, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Terease Z. Neff ("Ms. Neff"), the Honorable Thomas F. O'Malley ("Judge O'Malley"), and the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division (the "Juvenile Court") (collectively, "Defendants"). (Doc. No. 4.) Plaintiff Laborers' International Union of North America, Local 860 ("Local 860") filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on February 18, 2021, to which Defendants replied on March 11, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 6, 9.) For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 4) is GRANTED.
Ms. Neff is the Court Administrator of the Juvenile Court, and, in this role, she is responsible for all Juvenile Court operations, including the operations of the detention center, management, and staff. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 8.) Judge O'Malley is the Juvenile Court's Administrative Judge and acts as the administrator of the Juvenile Court's subdivisions and departments. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
In 2012, Local 860 became the exclusive bargaining representative for two bargaining units of Juvenile Court employees. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-14.) Subsequently, Local 860 and the Juvenile Court agreed to two collective bargaining agreements—the Courtside CBA and the Detention CBA (collectively, the "CBAs")—for the period of 2013 to 2015. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-13, 19-20.) The relationship between Local 860 and the Juvenile Court remained strictly contractual, however, as the employees working under both CBAs are not covered by either the National Labor Relations Act or the Ohio Collective Bargaining Act. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Local 860 and the Juvenile Court also later successfully negotiated new CBAs for the period of 2016 to 2019. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Specifically, the CBAs provided that they would remain in effect until December 31, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 21.) The CBAs also contained the following language:
[T]he Court agrees to recognize the Union and abide by the terms of this Agreement until such time as a successor agreement is negotiated between the parties, the Union disclaims interest, or the employees elect to decertify the Union as their exclusive bargaining representative upon the expiration of this Agreement.
(Doc. No. 1-1 at 5; Doc. No. 1-2 at 5.)
In 2019, Local 860 and the Juvenile Court began negotiations over successor contracts to the CBAs. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 22.) The parties continued to negotiate through late 2020, but they were unable to reach an agreement. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-40.) During this time, the Juvenile Court generally abided by the terms of the old CBAs, although there were several breaches that were remedied through the grievance process or otherwise resolved. (Id. at ¶ 41.)
However, on December 1, 2020, the Juvenile Court, at the direction of Ms. Neff and Judge O'Malley, informed its employees that there was no longer an agreement between the Juvenile Court and Local 860 and that the CBAs were no longer in effect. (Id. at ¶ 42.) As a result, Local 860's members lost the contractual rights and protections relative to their employment that were containedin the CBAs. For example, the Juvenile Court would no longer abide by the CBAs' terms regarding discipline, safety and health responsibilities, seniority rights, job bidding and transfer rights, increases for promotions, and time-off. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Instead, the Juvenile Court indicated it would treat Local 860's members as non-union employees. (Id. at ¶ 45.) The Juvenile Court also declared that it would no longer be deducting and remitting voluntary union dues, removed Local 860's bulletin boards, and informed Local 860 that it would no longer be processing grievances. (Id. at ¶¶ 43-50.)
On the same day as its announcement that the CBAs were no longer operative, the Juvenile Court, through Judge O'Malley in his official capacity as Administrative Judge, filed two complaints against Local 860 in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, seeking declaratory judgments that both CBAs were void and/or expired. (Doc. Nos. 4-1, 4-2.)1 In support, the Juvenile Court argued that the CBAs had expired according to their unambiguous terms, that the CBAs were illusory and void due to a lack of consideration, and that the perpetual nature of the CBAs violated Ohio public policy. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 9-11; Doc. No. 4-2 at 9-11.) In response, Local 860 filed counterclaims based on the Juvenile Court's alleged breach of the CBAs, moved to compel the arbitration of its grievances, and requested its own declaratory judgments regarding the CBAs. (Doc. Nos. 4-3, 4-4.) The state court actions, which have been consolidated, are still pending as of the date of this opinion.
On December 4, 2020, Local 860 filed a Complaint in this Court against Defendants, including Ms. Neff and Judge O'Malley in both their personal and official capacities,2 seeking damages and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.) Local 860 contends that Defendants' unilateral termination of the CBAs violated the Contracts Clause, constituted an unconstitutional taking without just compensation, deprived it of its property without due process, and violated its rights under the First Amendment. (Id. at ¶¶ 53-76.) In response, on January 19, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, requesting that all of the counts in Local 860's Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 4.) Local 860 filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on February 18, 2021, to which Defendants replied on March 11, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 6, 9.)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Gunasekara v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under this Rule, "a complaint must contain (1) 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,' (2) more than 'a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements,' and (3) allegations that suggest a 'right to relief above a speculativelevel.'" Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 570 (2007)).
The measure of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge—whether the complaint raises a right to relief above the speculative level—"does not 'require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
Consequently, examination of a complaint for a plausible claim for relief is undertaken in conjunction with the " Gunasekera, 551 F.3d at 466 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). Nonetheless, while "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Before reaching the merits of Local 860's claims, the Court will first address Defendants' argument that they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Specifically, Defendants assert that sovereign immunity precludes Local 860's claims against the Juvenile Court, as well as Ms. Neff and Judge O'Malley in their official capacities, because the Juvenile Court is an arm of the state of Ohio. (Doc. No. 4 at 11-14; Doc. No. 9 at 15-18.) In opposition, Local 860 asserts that the Juvenile Court is not an arm of the state because any money judgment against it would be paid by Cuyahoga County, not the state treasury. (Doc. No. 6 at 25-28.) Additionally, Local 860 argues that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar its requests for injunctive relief against Ms. Neff and Judge O'Malley in their official capacities. (Id. at 28.) The Court finds that the Juvenile Court is an arm of the state, and, therefore, Local 860's claims against the Juvenile Court are barred in their entirety, and its claims against Ms. Neff and Judge O'Malley in their official capacities are barred to the extent that they seek monetary relief.
Eleventh Amendment immunity "bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments by citizens of another state, foreigners or its own citizens." Thiokol Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted). "The amendment also bars suits for monetary relief against state officials sued in their official capacity." Id. However, it "does not preclude actions against state officials sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive or...
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