Local No. 499, Bd. of Trs. of the Shopmen's Pension Plan v. Art Iron, Inc.
Decision Date | 22 January 2021 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:19 CV 2174 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Parties | LOCAL NO. 499, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SHOPMEN'S PENSION PLAN, Plaintiff, v. ART IRON, INC., et al., Defendants. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, the Board of Trustees ("Board") of the Shopmen's Local 499 Pension Plan ("the Plan"), brought suit, seeking to recover an assessment of withdrawal liability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Currently pending before the Court are the parties' briefs regarding the notice provision of 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b) (Docs. 36, 37) and Joint Stipulations of Uncontested Facts (Doc. 35).1 For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds the notice provided satisfies the statute and therefore DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or to Compel Proper Notice. (Doc. 36).
The Plan is a multi-employer pension plan under ERISA and the members of the Board are fiduciaries of the Plan. (Doc. 35, at ¶1). Art Iron, Inc. was one contributor to the Plan, under acollective bargaining agreement effective September 11, 2015. Id. at ¶6. Art Iron did not execute a new collective bargaining agreement, and ceased to be obligated to contribute to the Plan as of December 1, 2017. Id. at ¶7-8.
On January 24 and 25, 2018, Art Iron liquidated the majority of its operational assets. Id. at ¶9.
On July 30, 2018, a federal tax lien was filed against property located at 860 Curtis Street, Toledo, Ohio. Id. at ¶10. This property was Art Iron's principal place of business; it was owned by AI Real Estate, an Ohio LLC. Id. at ¶2-3. Defendant Robert Schlatter is the sole shareholder of Art Iron, Inc, and the sole member of AI Real Estate. Id. at ¶4. AI Real Estate was dissolved on November 6, 2019. Id. at ¶3.
Two events occurred on October 10, 2018. The Plan sent a letter to Art Iron, AI Real Estate, and Schlatter demanding payment of withdrawal liability in its entire amount by November 15, 2018. Id. at ¶12; see also Doc. 25-3 (letter). That same day, the Board adopted an amendment to the Plan regarding Employer Withdrawal Liability, which added a section entitled Article III, Employer Withdrawal Liability, and Section 1305(d), Default. Id. at ¶11.
On January 3, 2019, Art Iron requested review of certain issues related to the withdrawal liability and the demand letter. Id. at ¶13.
On September 19, 2019, the Plan instituted the instant action on the withdrawal liability. See Doc. 1.
"Withdrawal liability is a product of the MPPAA [Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act], 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1453, which amended ERISA to increase the financialliability of employers who withdraw from underfunded plans." CPT Holdings, Inc. v. Indus. & Allied Employees Union Pension Plan, Local 73, 162 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 725 (1984) (). "An employer's withdrawal liability is its proportionate share of the plan's unfunded vested benefits, that is, the difference between the present value of vested benefits (benefits that are currently being paid to retirees and that will be paid in the future to covered employees who have already completed some specified period of service, 29 U.S.C. § 1053) and the current value of the plan's assets." Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 609 (1993).
To begin, a provision of the MPPAA, entitled "Resolution of Disputes", requires certain disputes be resolved through arbitration:
29 U.S.C. § 1401(a). If no such arbitration proceeding is initiated, "the amounts demanded by the plan sponsor under section 1399(b)(1) of this title shall be due and owing on the schedule setforth by the plan sponsor" and "[t]he plan sponsor may bring an action in a State or Federal court of competent jurisdiction for collection." 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1).
The relevant statutes required a plan to, inter alia, provide notice to the employer of the assessed withdrawal liability and a demand for payment:
29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1).
The statute continues, providing a procedure for the employer to request review after receiving that notice:
29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2).
Finally relevant here is 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5), which provides:
29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5). As the Seventh Circuit described, this section provides two types of default - a "missed payment default" (subsection (A)) and an "insecurity default" (subsection (B)). Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. O'Neill Bros. Transfer & Storage Co., 620 F.3d 766, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2010). As set forth below, the "insecurity default" described by subsection (B) is at issue here.
The gist of the present dispute is whether the Plan's October 10, 2018 letter satisfies the "notice" requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds the Plan provided proper notice.
On October 10, 2018, the Plan wrote Art Iron "pursuant to Section 4219 of [ERISA] . . . to issue a demand to Art Iron, Inc. of its employer withdrawal liability in the amount of$1,185,785.00." (Doc. 25-3). The Plan demanded the entire amount by November 15, 2018 - citing 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5)(B)2 - and its belief there was a substantial likelihood Art Iron would be unable to pay the withdrawal liability in light of Art Iron's shutdown, liquidation of assets, and federal tax lien filed on the 860 Curtis Street property. Id. In response, Defendant Robert Schlatter sent a letter on behalf of Art Iron "request[ing] Review of the Plan Sponsor's Determinations." Id. Schlatter said Art Iron requested review and additional information "to corroborate or dispute [the Plan's] assertions." Id. Schlatter's letter listed five items for review, and requested specific documents; it did not challenge the sufficiency of the Plan's notice, the lack of a payment schedule, or the Plan's determination that Art Iron was in default. See id. The Plan did not respond.
The present dispute is whether the Plan's letter satisfied the notice provisions of § 1399(b), and thus triggered the timeframes in § 1401(a)(1) for requesting arbitration. Defendants contend it cannot, focusing on the words "schedule for liability payments" in § 1399(b)(1)(A). They assert the Plan's demand for the full amount of withdrawal liability - which cited § 1399(c)(5) - does not constitute the "notice" required by § 1399(b)(1) because it contained no schedule and demanded a single lump sum payment, rather than multiple payments. Therefore, Defendants argue, no timeframe for arbitration has yet been triggered. The Plan, on the other hand, asserts the letter satisfies the plain language of the statute, it was entitled - pursuant to § 1399(c)(5) - to request the full amount, and the time to arbitrate set forth in § 1401(a)(1) has expired.
Other courts have found an initial demand for a single lump sum payment of withdrawal liability is appropriate. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Dworkin, Inc., 2020WL 5365968, at *2 (N.D. Ill.) ( ); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. George Jones...
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