Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co.

• Decision Date: 19 September 1949
• Docket Number: No. 30634.,30634.
• Citation: 87 N.E.2d 625,403 Ill. 484
• Parties: LOCAL NO. 658, BOOT AND SHOE WORKERS UNION, et al. v. BROWN SHOE CO. et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

403 Ill. 484

87 N.E.2d 625

LOCAL NO. 658, BOOT AND SHOE WORKERS UNION, et al.

v.BROWN SHOE CO. et al.

No. 30634.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 19, 1949.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 1949.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery Couty; James G. burnside, judge.

Application to Director of Labor, by Local No. 658, Boot and Shoe Workers Union, and others, for unemployment compensation for members of the local who were employees of the Brown Shoe Company, a corporation. From judgment reversing decision of the Director of Labor ordering claims disallowed, the employer appeals.

Judgment reversed.

Baker, Lesemann, Kagy & Wagner, of East St. Louis, for appellant.

D. W. Johnston, of Taylorville, and C. C. Dreman, of Belleville, for appellees.

GUNN, Justice.

Appellee, a local union of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union, filed application for unemployment compensation with the Director of Labor on behalf of certain of its members who were employees of appellant, the Brown Shoe Company, a corporation. The capacity of the union as agent, to prosecute the claim, is not objected to by appellant. The loss of time for which compensation was claimed was from February 26, 1946, to March 1, 1946, both dates inclusive.

The claims deputy of the Illinois Department of Labor, who made the initial investigation, found that the stoppage of work on the part of the ‘production and maintenance’ workers, who were the workmen whose claims are here involved, was the result of a labor dispute, and that the unemployment was ‘due to’ the work stoppage. He likewise concluded that the persons whose claims are here disputed, viz., production and maintenance workers at appellant's factory, were ineligible for benefits under section 7(d) of the Illinois Unemployment Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 48, sec. 223.

The Director's representative on appeal then conducted a hearing at which both sides presented evidence. The evidence showed that appellant employed about 500 workmen at its Litchfield plant, of whom some 450 were production and maintenance employees. The manufacturing process was divided into nine departments where separate operations were performed in an assembly-line type of operation to produce the finished, manufactured shoes. Local 658 of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union had a contract with the company on behalf of the production and maintenance workers, all of whom were members of the union. All production and maintenance workers had previously been defined by the National Labor Relations Board as a unit appropriate for bargaining and were represented in that process by the union, their exclusive agent for that purpose.

Differences between the company and the union had arisen in January, 1946, over the question of repairing or correcting imperfectly manufactured parts of shoes and the pay for this work. It had previously been done by designated individuals in the department in which the defective operation had occurred. The company wanted each individual in a department to repair his own defective work. An increased rate of pay for this was proposed for a 30-to 90-day trial period, after which it was to be the subject of revision by negotiation. On the day this plan was instituted by the company, with the consent of the union, eighteen workers in the lasting department walked off the job when appointed by the employer as a ‘team’ to perform the work in their department under the new plan. The resulting bottleneck, or gap, in the production line made it necessary for the rest of the line to come to a halt as soon as it was cleared of shoes in various stages of completion. All other production and maintenance workers, including twenty-seven employees in the lasting department, other than the eighteen designated to work on the faulty shoes, remained at work. The evidence shows that the union may have been actively urging the eighteen workers in the lasting department to stay on the job, and to return to working pending further negotiations, after they had stopped work. It was found as a fact that the union had not authorized the eighteen men to walk off of the job.

Nevertheless, the work stoppage which was appreciable on Frbruary 26, became complete on March 1, with the continued absence of the workers in the one department. All workers, including the 18 lasters, returned to work on March 4, 1946. In his opinion, the Director's representative, who heard the evidence, says: ‘The work stoppage at this period of time was complete. That this pattern of events contains all of the essential ingredients of a labor dispute such as are required by any definition devised to date can hardly be challenged.’ The evidence shows that the company had orders, materials, and the ability to continue operations. The cessation of work was brought about from no other causes than the events above detailed.

The Director of Labor followed the recommendation of his representative who had heard evidence, and ordered that the claims be disallowed, incorporating in his written decision by reference, the report and opinion of his representative. An appeal was taken to the circuit court of Montgomery county, and the Director's decision was reviewed upon the record as it stood before appeal to the circuit court. The decision of the Director was there reversed, and the case is here on appeal from the circuit court's judgment.

The claims deputy found that the union was the sole representative in collective bargaining, and was recognized by the company as such, for all production and maintenance workers. He found that supervisory employees, foremen, engineers, office workers, and clerical help were excluded from membership in the union and were not represented by that organization. All of these latter were found to be relieved of ineligibility. The deputy stated, although he did not specifically include it in his separately labeled findings of fact, that all production and maintenance workers were of the same class as the eighteen lasters who withdrew their services in an effort to exert economic pressure and thus favorably resolve a labor dispute. This was his basis for concluding that the second part of the proviso was not met; that production workers were not relieved of ineligibility.

The Director adopted the written opinion and decision of his representative and found that there was a labor dispute, that the stoppage of work resulted from the labor dispute, and that all production workers were both ‘directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work,’ and ‘belonged to a grade or class of workers of which immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the Company's factory, some of whom were participating in and directly interested in said labor dispute.’

Section 7(d) of the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 48, par. 223) provides that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute ‘provided, that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown that (1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor disputewhich caused the stoppage of work and (2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were...