Local Union No. 328 v. Armour and Company, Civ. A. No. 1258.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1968
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1258.
• Citation: 294 F. Supp. 168
• Parties: LOCAL UNION NO. 328, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Plaintiff, v. ARMOUR AND COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

294 F. Supp. 168

LOCAL UNION NO. 328, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Plaintiff, v. ARMOUR AND COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 1258.

United States District Court W. D. Michigan, Northern Division.

November 1, 1968.

Morse & Kleiner, by Edward M. Smith, Grand Rapids, Mich., and Goldberg, Previant & Uelmen, by John S. Williamson, Jr., Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff.

Foster, Campbell, Lindemer & McGurrin, by John L. Collins and David C. Coey, Lansing, Mich., for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KENT, Chief Judge.

THE COURT: This is an action for injunctive relief instituted by the union representing certain of the employees of the defendant, Armour and Company, for the purpose of preventing the closing of the defendant's distribution plant in Marquette.

The plaintiff relies upon the collective bargaining agreement which was entered into in April, 1968, and which continues in effect for three years.

It appears that there are three of the defendant's employees who are members of the plaintiff union who would be affected by the closing of the Marquette distribution plant, which closing is scheduled for November 2, tomorrow, and which was announced to the employees affected by the closing on October 21, 1968, and to the union, itself, on October 17, 1968.

The plaintiff relies upon certain terms of the contract; specifically, Section 4 of Article II, relating to the jurisdictional rules, on the theory that closing of the Marquette distribution plant and utilizing common carriers to perform the work presently being performed from the Marquette distribution plant is a violation of Section 4 of Article II, which provides, in part:

"The Employer agrees" that it will not "permit their employees or persons other than the employees in the bargaining units here involved to perform work which is recognized as the work of the employees in said units."

The union also relies upon Article XXIV, which relates to the changing of operations which would affect the wages, hours and working conditions, or result in a reduction of employment opportunity for members of the union and which requires that the subject matter be discussed between the employer and the union prior to effectuating such a change.

It is claimed by the union that there was no such discussion.

The first and great hurdle is the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Title 29, U.S.C.A., Section 101, which, by its terms, states that:

"No court * * * shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. * * *"

And Section 113 of Title 29 defines a labor dispute and when a case shall be deemed to grow out of a labor dispute.

The really amazing part of this whole case is that no one has been able to come up with any decision which is directly in point. And that is truly amazing, because it would appear to one who had been engaged in this kind of work to any extent at all that there should have been a similar situation presented to another court on an appellate level.

We are not satisfied that any case has been presented which fits into this picture.

There are a number of other cases: Allied Oil Workers Union v. Ethyl Corporation, 5 Cir., 341 F.2d 47, which was a suit for interpretation of a contract even though there was no compulsory arbitration provision, and in which action a declaratory judgment was sought. In our opinion, the case is not, in the general sense, applicable to the situation here.

There is a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Retail Clerks Union Local 1222 v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 327 F.2d 442; but that is not a suit for an injunction in the ordinary sense, although it does result in a mandatory injunction because it requires an employer to comply with the terms of a labor-management agreement.

At page 446, Judge Duniway, speaking for the Court, cites Lincoln Mills and points out that in that decision, 353 U.S. 448, at page 451, 77 S.Ct. 912, at page 915, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking of Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, says:

"`* * * authorizes federal court's to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements.'"

And then there is a further quotation from the Lincoln Mills case relating to the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

In the Retail Clerks Union v. Alfred M. Lewis, Circuit Judge Duniway has very carefully examined all of the cases decided up to the time that the opinion was written and reached the conclusion that the trial court had jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to grant any of the relief prayed for in the complaint; the trial court, speaking through Judge Mathes, a highly-respected District Judge, having dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.

There are a number of other cases, all cited by Judge Duniway, which point out the jurisdiction of the court in regard to actions in which there is an arbitration clause in the labor-management agreement.

There can be no question, in the opinion of this Court, that the determination of the meaning of the labor-management agreement in question is a matter within the jurisdiction of this Court, as pointed out in International Union, United Auto., etc., Local 391 v. Webster Electric Company, a decision of the Seventh Circuit, 299 F.2d 195.

Another decision which is very carefully written and which covers a similar matter is Local Division 1098, Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. of America v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 225 F.Supp. 28, a 1963 opinion by Judge Alexander Holtzoff in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. And that is a case which appears to be closer to being in point than any other decision which has been cited.

Counsel for the defendant has cited numerous cases in support of its position that there is no jurisdiction in this Court under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But, like the cases cited by the plaintiff, each is distinguishable from the matter which is now before the Court. And while all of the opinions make very interesting reading, they do not serve the purpose of furnishing to this Court any real authority which can lead us to the correct answer.

There can be no question, under the Lincoln Mills decision, but what a District Court has authority to entertain an action for injunctive relief to require, in that case, an employer, to comply with...