Local Union No. 98 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. LP

• Decision Date: 14 July 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-0815
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: LOCAL UNION NO. 98 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LP HERMAN COMPANY, LAWRENCE HERMAN, AND PHYLLIS DIVENTI, Defendants.

LOCAL UNION NO. 98 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OFELECTRICAL WORKERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LP HERMAN COMPANY, LAWRENCE HERMAN, AND PHYLLIS DIVENTI, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-0815

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

July 14, 2015

MEMORANDUM

BUCKWALTER, S. J.

Currently pending before the Court are the Motions by Defendants LP Herman Company and Lawrence Herman (collectively, "Defendants") and by Defendant Phyllis Diventi to Dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiffs Local Union No. 98, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW"); Trustees of the IBEW Local Union No. 98 Health and Welfare Fund; Trustees of the IBEW Local Union No. 98 Pension Fund; Trustees of the IBEW Local Union No. 98 Profit Sharing/Deferred Income Fund; Trustees of the IBEW Local Union No. 98 Joint Apprenticeship Training Trust Fund; Trustees of the IBEW Local Union No. 98 Labor-Management Cooperation Committee Fund; and Trustees of the IBEW Local Union No. 98 Scholarship Fund (collectively, "Plaintiffs") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For thefollowing reasons, Defendant Phyllis Diventi's Motion is granted¹ and Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Local Union No. 98, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("Local Union No. 98") is an unincorporated association, commonly known as a labor union, with a principal place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Additional Plaintiffs² are the Local Union No. 98 Health & Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Apprentice Training Fund, Profit Sharing/Deferred Income Fund, Labor-Management Cooperation Committee Fund, and Scholarship Fund (the "Multi-Employer Benefit Funds Plaintiffs"), which are multi-employer benefit funds established under § 302(c) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5), and § 3(3) and (37) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) and (37), and which have a principal place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 6.)

Defendant LP Herman Company is a Pennsylvania limited liability company with a principal place of business in Montgomeryville, Pennsylvania that engages in the business of providing electrical services to the consuming public and regularly conducts business or otherwise utilizes the marketplace of Philadelphia County. (Id. ¶ 8.) At all relevant times, Defendant LP Herman Company acted by and through its duly authorized employees, agents, workers, and/or representatives acting within the scope of their employment. (Id.)

Defendant Lawrence Herman is an adult individual with an address for service of process in Montgomeryville, Pennsylvania who was an agent, servant, employee, and principal of Defendant LP Herman Company and who acted within the course and scope of his employment with Defendant LP Herman Company. (Id. ¶ 9.) Defendant Lawrence Herman signed a Letter of Assent on behalf of Defendant LP Herman Company for labor agreements with Local Union No. 98 on September 5, 1989. (Id., Ex. A.) Defendant Lawrence Herman signed the Letter of Assent as the "Owner" of Defendant LP Herman Company. (Id.)

At all relevant times, Defendant LP Herman Company was a party to the multi-employer collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Local Union No. 98 and the Philadelphia division of the Penn-Del-Jersey Chapter, National Electrical Contractor's Association (the "Commercial Agreement"). (Id. ¶ 12.) The CBA was in effect from May 3, 2010 until April 20, 2013. (Id., Ex. B, Commercial Agreement, Art. I, Section 1.01.) Pursuant to the provisions of the Trust Agreements establishing the Health & Welfare Fund, the Pension Fund, the Apprentice Training Fund, and the Profit Sharing/Deferred Income Fund, at all relevant times, titles to all monies payable to those Funds were vested in the trustees of the Funds in trust as of the date the employer's obligation to submit contribution to the Funds arose. (Id. ¶¶ 12-18, Exs. C, D, E, F.) Pursuant to the provisions of the Trust Agreements establishing the Labor-Management Cooperation Committee Fund and the Scholarship Fund, as amended, at all relevant times, titles to all monies payable to those Funds become vested in the trustees of the Fund in trust as of the date the contributions are received. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18, Exs. G, H.)

Pursuant to Article II, Section 2.03(d) of the Commercial Agreement, Defendant LP Herman Company is obligated to furnish monthly reports to Local Union No. 98 listing the names of the members of the Union it employs and the number of hours of employment andgross earnings of each member. (Id. ¶ 19.) Pursuant to the Commercial Agreement, Defendant LP Herman Company agreed to participate in the Labor-Management Cooperation Committee Fund, the Health and Welfare Fund, the Pension Fund, the Profit Sharing/Deferred Income Fund, the Apprentice Training Fund, and the Scholarship Fund; comply with applicable provisions of the Trust Agreements establishing those Funds; and provide monthly contribution payments consistent with the terms of the various Trust Agreements and the Commercial Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22-25, 28; Compl. Ex. B, Commercial Agreement, Art. III, Sections 3.02-3.06, 3.09.) Pursuant to Article III, Section 3.07 of the Commercial Agreement, Defendant LP Herman Company is obligated to deduct an amount specified in the approved Local Union No. 98 By-Laws designated as Working Dues from the pay of each Local Union No. 98 member and remit the withholdings in lump sum monthly payments to the Financial Secretary of Local Union No. 98. (Id. ¶ 26.) Pursuant to the Commercial Agreement, Defendant LP Herman Company is obligated to deduct an amount specified as designated Vacation Fund and Job Recovery Fund account dues from the pay of each Local Union No. 98 member and remit the withholdings in lump sum monthly payments to the Financial Secretary of Local Union No. 98. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29, Ex. B, Commercial Agreement, Art. III, Section 3.08 and Appendix A.) Plaintiffs allege that, in spite of the above Agreements and provisions, and despite Plaintiffs' repeated demands, Defendant LP Herman Company has filed to timely remit contributions and deductions due and owing. (Id. ¶ 31.)

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this case on February 18, 2015. Defendant Phyllis Diventi filed a Motion to Dismiss Count V on April 16, 2015, and Defendants LP Herman Company and Lawrence Herman filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, III, IV, and VI of the Complaint on April 16, 2015. Plaintiffs filed a Response to Defendant Phyllis Diventi's Motion to Dismiss, inwhich they indicated that they did not oppose her Motion to Dismiss, on May 1, 2015. Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants LP Herman Company and Lawrence Herman on May 1, 2015, in which they indicated that they did not oppose Defendants' Motion with respect to Counts III, IV, and VI, but that they do oppose Defendants' Motion with respect to Counts I and II. The Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II by Defendants LP Herman Company and Lawrence Herman is now ripe for judicial consideration.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the United States Supreme Court recognized that "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. Following these basic dictates, the Supreme Court, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), subsequently defined a two-pronged approach to a court's review of a motion to dismiss. "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Thus, although "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 678-79.

Second, the Supreme Court emphasized that "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679. "Determining whether a complaintstates a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. A complaint does not show an entitlement to relief when the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id.; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232-34 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that: (1) factual allegations of complaint must provide notice to defendant; (2) complaint must allege facts suggestive of the proscribed conduct; and (3) the complaint's "'factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).

Notwithstanding these new dictates, the basic tenets of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review have remained static. Spence v. Brownsville Area Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.08-626, 2008 WL 2779079, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2008). The general rules of pleading still require only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and need not contain detailed factual allegations. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233. Further, the court must "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). Finally, the court must "determine whether, under any...