Loch View, LLC v. Town of Windham

• Decision Date: 04 February 2020
• Docket Number: HHDCV196109120
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Loch View, LLC v. Town of Windham et al.

Loch View, LLC v. Town of Windham et al.

No. HHDCV196109120

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford

February 4, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Budzik, Matthew J., J.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Budzik, J.

Defendants Town of Windham, Chandler Rose, Town Assessor, and Gay A. St. Louis, Town Collector of Revenue (collectively "Windham") move to dismiss^[1] the amended complaint of Loch View, LLC based on the prior pending action doctrine. Windham claims that Loch View’s complaint alleging a depravation of due process under the state constitution resulting from Windham’s breach of a tax fixing agreement is virtually the same claim Loch View is making in a case that has been pending since 2016. See Lochview, LLC v. Town of Windham, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. HHB-CV16-6034996-S (the "2016 case"). Loch View objects to Windham’s motion and responds that because its claim in this case is based on constitutional violations, rather than contractual violations, its claim in this case is sufficiently dissimilar from its claims in the 2016 case to avoid the preclusive effects of the prior pending action doctrine. Because the court concludes that both cases require resolution of the same underlying rights and factual claims, specifically whether Windham properly exercised its rights under the tax fixing agreement, the court concludes that both of Loch View’s cases are virtually identical and, under the circumstances of this case, warrant dismissal of this case under the prior pending action doctrine. The court’s reasoning is set forth below.

FACTS

On July 2, 2009, Loch View and Windham entered into a written tax fixing agreement whereby Windham agreed to set municipal taxes on two parcels of property on Main Street in Windham at a discounted rate in exchange for Loch View taking over the properties and investing a certain amount of money into the redevelopment of those properties. To ensure that Loch View is meeting its obligations under the tax fixing agreement, the agreement requires Loch View to provide periodic reports and documentary evidence to Windham demonstrating that Loch View is in fact making the required investments in the properties. The tax fixing agreement provides Windham with the right to cancel the tax fixing agreement and recoup any tax benefits provided to Loch View should Windham determine that Loch View is not living up to its investment commitments. In 2016, Windham determined that Loch View was not living up to its obligations under the tax fixing agreement and therefore Windham sought to exercise what Windham viewed as its right to retroactively reassess the relevant properties in order to recoup the tax benefits provided to Loch View under the agreement. Thereafter, Lock View filed suit challenging Windham’s termination of the tax fixing agreement and its attempt to retroactively assess the relevant parcels. See Lochview, LLC v. Town of Windham, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. HHB-CV16-6034996-S. Count three of Loch View’s operative complaint in the 2016 case alleges that Windham "breached the [tax fixing] Agreement ... by retroactively terminating the agreement after its expiration and imposing assessments on the subject Properties for the entire period of the [tax fixing] Agreement." See Fifth Amended Compl., Count III, ¶14. In this matter, Loch View’s one-count complaint alleges a violation of Section 10 of the Connecticut Constitution because Windham’s reassessment of the properties is retaliatory and "is in violation of the terms of the tax fixing agreement." See Am. Compl., Count One, at ¶¶9-10.

LEGAL STANDARD

"The policy behind the prior pending action doctrine is to prevent unnecessary litigation that places a burden on our state’s already crowded court dockets. The rule, however, is not one ‘of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law ...’ Accordingly, the existence of claims that are virtually alike does not, in every case, require dismissal of a complaint." (Internal citations omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 396 (2009); see also Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 247 Conn. 196, 216-17 (1998).

In making its decision of whether to apply the prior pending action doctrine, "the trial court must determine in the first instance whether the two actions are: (1) exactly alike, i.e., for the same matter, cause and thing, or seeking the same remedy, and in the same jurisdiction; (2) virtually alike, i.e., brought to adjudicate the same underlying rights of the parties, but perhaps seeking different remedies; or (3) insufficiently similar to warrant the doctrine’s application. In order to determine whether the actions are virtually alike, we must examine the pleadings ... to ascertain whether the actions are brought to adjudicate ‘the same underlying rights’ of the parties ... If the two actions are exactly alike or lacking in sufficient similarities, the trial court has no discretion. In the former case, the court must dismiss the second action, and in the latter instance, the court must allow both cases to proceed unabated. Where the actions are virtually, but not exactly alike, however, the trial court exercises discretion in determining whether the circumstances justify dismissal of the second action." (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., supra, 292 Conn. at 397-98.

The applicability of the prior pending action doctrine does not turn on whether the two actions seek the same remedy, but on "wheth...