Locke v. BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF PALM BEACH CTY.

• Decision Date: 19 August 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-2273.,73-2273.
• Citation: 499 F.2d 359
• Parties: Eunice B. LOCKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF PALM BEACH COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

499 F.2d 359 (1974)

Eunice B. LOCKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF PALM BEACH COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 73-2273.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

August 19, 1974.

William M. Holland, West Palm Beach, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Beth L. Don, Atty., Washington, D. C., for the Commission (EEOC) amicus curiae.

Michael E. Jackson, Palm Beach, Fla., for defendants-appellees.

Before DYER, MORGAN and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

LEWIS R. MORGAN, Circuit Judge.

In December, 1972, Eunice B. Locke, plaintiff-appellant herein, filed a complaint in Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging that the Board of Public Instruction of Palm Beach County had discriminated against her because of her race and sex and in so doing had violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution, the guidelines set out in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District (5th Cir. 1970), 419 F.2d 1211, the Civil Rights Act of 1954, the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, as well as the guidelines as set out by various governmental agencies administering the above-mentioned statutes. Palm Beach County filed a motion to dismiss and a hearing was held. The district court, after hearing testimony and considering the record in the cause, denied plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff Locke appeals both portions of that order.

I. FACTS

The plaintiff-appellant, Eunice B. Locke, at the time of suit was a classroom teacher holding a continuing contract with the Board of Public Instruction of Palm Beach County. Plaintiff Locke was certified in French, English, Music Education, and Junior College. She had had a minimum of 12 years teaching experience, most of which involved the teaching of music. Mrs. Locke's basic duties involved classroom teaching; however, she received a special supplement to compensate her for extra duties she performed as music instructor for choral groups.

At the end of June, 1972, Mrs. Locke requested a leave of absence from her teaching position for the purpose of having a child. The school board, of course, granted this request and in addition sent Mrs. Locke a letter which reiterated the published policy of the school board as to maternity leave. That letter stated in part:

"According to the Board\'s policy on maternity leave of absence, `maternity leave of absence will be given to instructional personnel for the remainder of the school year. If there is a vacancy sooner for which an individual is considered qualified by the County Superintendent, duties may be resumed subject to a period of at least 90 days having elapsed since the birth of the child or if the time has not been 90 days, subject to the attending physician\'s statement certifying the person is able to resume work. If the school year closes without return to a position, every effort will be made toward placement the following year. In all instances of returning to employment it is necessary that a letter be submitted to the Superintendent stating that such is desired. Instructional personnel are not eligible to substitute when they are on any type of authorized leave\'."

On August 14, 1972, the regular school session started for Palm Beach County, and on August 21, Mrs. Locke gave birth to her child. Within a month of the birth of her child, Mrs. Locke requested that she be returned to her teaching position. This request was accompanied by a doctor's certificate.

It is important to note at this time that Palm Beach County for 17 years prior to 1972 had been involved in extensive litigation concerning integration of Palm Beach County schools' student bodies, administrators and teachers. In the fall of 1972, they were attempting to comply with the mandate of Singleton v. Jackson (5th Cir. 1970), 419 F.2d 1211, and the guidelines set down by the Office of Civil Rights and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare as to integration of their school system. In attempting to strictly comply with these various federal orders and mandates, Palm Beach County was forced to adopt a quota system as to the black to white ratio in not only student bodies, but also in faculties and administrations. There was a substantial reshuffling of faculty and administration at this time in order to meet these quotas.

As was stated above, within a month of the birth of her child, Mrs. Locke requested reinstatement in her old position. On September 22, 1972, she received a letter from the principal of the high school where she had taught the previous year. That letter stated:

I have received a copy of your recent letter to Mr. Early relative to your returning to the school system. Since I am not in compliance with our racial quota for instructional staff members, I have discussed with Mr. Harold Brake the possibility of transferring a white music teacher here and you replacing the transferred teacher. I will discuss this with other principals to see if we can expedite this matter for the children sorely need your services.

As it turned out, such a transfer did not take place and the only job opening the school system had at that time was that of an English teacher at a different junior high school. On October 9, 1972, Mrs. Locke was back at work, but at a different school and teaching English. Her base salary was the same, and she was offered a supplement if she would agree to do the same extra work she had done the previous year. The testimony at the hearing shows that Mrs. Locke refused the supplement saying that too much work was involved.

In December of 1972, Mrs. Locke filed suit in the district court alleging that because she was black and female she was discriminated against. The mechanics of this alleged discrimination involve the application of the various federal guidelines to the school at which Mrs. Locke had been teaching. Mrs. Locke asserts that because she is female and susceptible to pregnancy, and for that reason became pregnant, she was discriminated against when her old teaching position, due to her leave status, was declared vacant and the Board of Public Instruction manipulated that vacancy so as to comply with the various federal orders. This discrimination, Mrs. Locke alleges, violated not only her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but also her rights to equal employment and her rights as a woman.

Meanwhile, after the action had been filed in the Federal District Court, Mrs. Locke's husband, who is also an employee of the Board of Public Instruction of Palm Beach County, was assigned to a position some distance (40 to 50 miles) from the Locke's home and Mrs. Locke's prior teaching location.¹ Mrs. Locke then requested that she be transferred to a school closer to her husband's place of employment. She was then offered, as per her request, a position teaching music, and in addition was offered a supplement doing extra music work. She accepted and moved her family to Pahokee, where Mr. and Mrs. Locke and family now reside. There is no indication in the record of the court below or in the oral arguments before this court that the transfer of Mrs. Locke's husband was in any way related to Mrs. Locke's transfer, nor is there any such claim. Furthermore, a new maternity leave policy was adopted on December 12, 1972, and the old maternity leave policy which Mrs. Locke came under is no longer in effect. Also, although Mrs. Locke had a continuing contract with the school system, it was specifically stated therein that she was subject to transfer anywhere within that school district.²

It should be noted at this point that in her original complaint the only relief sought by Mrs. Locke other than money damages was an injunction restraining the school system from implementing its present leave policy against the plaintiff in a discriminatory manner, and in that vein it was requested that Mrs. Locke be returned to her former position as a music and vocal teacher. Since that time, as stated above, a new maternity leave policy has been adopted for Palm Beach County and Mrs. Locke has been assigned to a position where she is both a music and vocal teacher with supplement, as she was before. This assignment was at her own request.

II. MOOTNESS

It is the opinion of this court that the issues presented in this case as to the individual plaintiff, Mrs. Locke, are moot and the appeal as to her individually should be dismissed.

Although neither party has urged that this case is moot, resolution of the question is essential if federal courts are to function within their constitutional sphere of authority. It has frequently been repeated that federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them. Local No. 8-6, Oil Workers Union v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 80 S.Ct. 391, 4 L. Ed.2d 373 (1960). To be cognizable in a federal court a suit "must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relationships of parties having adverse legal interests.... It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief to a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). Mootness is a jurisdictional question because federal courts are not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions. United States v. Alaska S. S. Company, 253 U.S. 113, 40 S.Ct. 448, 64 L.Ed. 808 (1920). The federal courts impotence to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 84 S.Ct. 391, 11 L.Ed.2d 347 (1964); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d...