Locke v. Karass
Decision Date | 21 January 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 07–610.,07–610. |
Citation | 77 USLW 4064,555 U.S. 207,129 S.Ct. 798,172 L.Ed.2d 552 |
Parties | Daniel B. LOCKE et al., Petitioners, v. Edward A. KARASS, State Controller, et al. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
The collective-bargaining agreement between Maine and respondent local union, the exclusive bargaining agent for certain state employees, requires nonmember employees represented by the union to pay the local a “service fee” equal to the portion of union dues related to ordinary representational activities, e.g., collective bargaining or contract administration activities. That fee does not include nonchargeable union activities such as political, public relations, or lobbying activities. The fee includes a charge that represents the “affiliation fee” the local pays to the national union. But, it covers only the part of the affiliation fee that helps to pay for the national's own chargeable activities, which include some litigation activities that directly benefit other locals or the national itself, rather than respondent local. The petitioners, nonmembers of the local, brought this suit claiming, inter alia, that the First Amendment prohibits charging them for any portion of the service fee that represents litigation that does not directly benefit the local, i.e., “national litigation.” The District Court found no material facts at issue and upheld this element of the fee. The First Circuit affirmed.
Held: Under this Court's precedent, the First Amendment permits a local union to charge nonmembers for national litigation expenses as long as (1) the subject matter of the (extralocal) litigation is of a kind that would be chargeable if the litigation were local, e.g., litigation appropriately related to collective bargaining rather than political activities, and (2) the charge is reciprocal in nature, i.e., the contributing local reasonably expects other locals to contribute similarly to the national's resources used for costs of similar litigation on behalf of the contributing local if and when it takes place. Pp. 803 – 807.
(a) Prior decisions frame the question at issue. The Court has long held that the First Amendment permits local unions designated as the exclusive bargaining representatives for certain employees to charge nonmember employees a service fee as a condition of their continued employment. With respect to litigation expenses, the Court also held that a local could charge nonmembers for expenses of litigation normally conducted by an exclusive representative, including litigation incidental to collective bargaining, but said (in language that the petitioners here emphasize) that litigation expenses “not having such a connection with the bargaining unit are not to be charged to objecting employees.” Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 453, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 80 L.Ed.2d 428. Later, the Court held, with respect to the chargeability of a local's payment of an affiliation fee to a national, that the local “may charge objecting employees for their pro rata share of the costs associated with otherwise chargeable activities of its state and national affiliates, even if those activities were not performed for the direct benefit of the objecting employees' bargaining unit.” Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507, 524, 111 S.Ct. 1950, 114 L.Ed.2d 572. The Court added that the local unit need not “demonstrate a direct and tangible impact upon the dissenting employee's unit,” although there must be “some indication that the payment [say, to the national] is for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of their membership in the parent organization.” Ibid. However, the Lehnert Court split into three irreconcilable factions on the subject here at issue, payment for national litigation. Pp. 803 – 806.
(b) Because Lehnert failed to find a majority as to the chargeability of national litigation expenses, the lower courts have been uncertain about the matter. Having examined the question further, however, the Court now believes that, consistent with its precedent, costs of such litigation are chargeable provided the litigation meets the relevant standards for charging other national expenditures that the Lehnert majority enunciated. Under those standards, a local may charge a nonmember an appropriate share of its contribution to a national's litigation expenses if (1) the subject matter of the national litigation bears an appropriate relation to collective bargaining and (2) the arrangement is reciprocal—that is, the local's payment to the national affiliate is for “services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of their membership in the parent organization.” 500 U.S., at 524, 111 S.Ct. 1950. Logic suggests that the same standard should apply to national litigation expenses as to other national expenses, and the Court can find no significant difference between litigation activities and other national activities, the cost of which this Court has found chargeable. The petitioners' arguments to the contrary, which rest primarily on their understanding of Ellis and Lehnert, are rejected. Pp. 806 – 807.
(c) Applying Lehnert benefit by virtue of their membership in the national union. Ibid. Respondent local says that the payment of its affiliation fee gives locals in general access to the national's financial resources—compiled via contributions from various locals—which would not otherwise be available to the local when needed to effectively negotiate, administer, or enforce the local's collective-bargaining agreements. Because no one claims that the national would treat respondent local any differently from other locals in this regard, the existence of reciprocity is not in dispute. P. 807.
498 F.3d 49, affirmed.
W. James Young, Springfield, VA, for Petitioners.
W. James Young, Esq., Milton L. Chappell, Esq., Springfield, VA, Stephen C. Whiting, Esq., The Whiting Law Firm, P.A., Portland, ME, for Petitioners.
Jeremiah A. Collins, Washington, DC, for Respondents.
Jeremiah A. Collins, Robert Alexander Laurence Gold, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
The State of Maine requires government employees to pay a service fee to the local union that acts as their exclusive bargaining agent even if those employees disagree with, and do not belong to, the union. This Court has held that, in principle, the government may require this kind of payment without violating the First Amendment. See, e.g.,Railway Employes v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956) ( ); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977) (same); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507, 111 S.Ct. 1950, 114 L.Ed.2d 572 (1991) (same). At the same time, the Court has considered the constitutionality of charging for various elements of such a fee, upholding the charging of some elements ( e.g., those related to administering a collective-bargaining contract) while forbidding the charging of other elements ( e.g., those related to political expenditures). Compare, e.g.,Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984), with Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961).
In this case, a local union charges nonmembers a service fee that (among other things) reflects an affiliation fee that the local union pays to its national union organization. We focus upon one portion of that fee, a portion that the national union uses to pay for litigation expenses incurred in large part on behalf of other local units. We ask whether a local's charge to nonmembers that reflects that element is consistent with the First Amendment. And we conclude that under our precedent the Constitution permits including this element in the local's charge to nonmembers as long as (1) the subject matter of the (extralocal) litigation is of a kind that would be chargeable if the litigation were local, e.g., litigation appropriately related to collective bargaining rather than political activities, and (2) the litigation charge is reciprocal in nature, i.e., the contributing local reasonably expects other locals to contribute similarly to the national's resources used for costs of similar litigation on behalf of the contributing local if and when it takes place.
Maine has designated the Maine State Employees Association (the local union) as the exclusive bargaining agent for certain executive branch employees. A collective-bargaining agreement between Maine and the local requires nonmember employees whom the union represents to pay the local union a “service fee.” And that service fee equals that portion of ordinary union dues that is related to ordinary representational activities, e.g., collective bargaining or contract administration activities. In calculating the...
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4.28 - B. Constitutional Limitations
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