Locke v. Saffle
Decision Date | 31 January 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 00-6210,00-6210 |
Citation | 237 F.3d 1269 |
Parties | (10th Cir. 2001) WENDELL LOCKE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JAMES SAFFLE, Respondent-Appellant |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA. (D.C. No. 98-CV-1176-C)
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Patrick T. Crawley, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellant.
Vance William Armor, Attorney at Law, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellee.
Before HENRY, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.1
Petitioner-Appellee Wendell Locke, a state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on August 24, 1998. The government responded with a motion to dismiss on the ground that Mr. Locke's petition was time barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). After the motion was denied, the government asked the district court to stay the order; it also asked permission to file an immediate appeal. The district court granted both requests. The government then sought this court's permission to file an immediate appeal, which was also granted. Consequently, we now consider the government's contention that Mr. Locke's petition was not timely filed. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.
Mr. Locke was convicted in Oklahoma County District Court of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of use of a vehicle to facilitate the intentional discharge of a firearm. Mr. Locke subsequently brought an appeal before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals the court of last resort in the state which affirmed the conviction on August 1, 1997. See generally Locke v. State, 943 P.2d 1090 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). Mr. Locke did not seek direct review of his case before the United States Supreme Court, nor did he seek post-conviction relief in state court.
On August 24, 1998, Mr. Locke filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The government moved to dismiss on the basis that the petition was time barred under 2244(d)(1)(A), but the district court denied the motion. The district court noted that, in prior cases, this court had addressed the issue of timeliness and that, in those cases, inconsistent results had been reached. See Aplt's Br., Ex. C, at 2 ( )[hereinafter Dist. Ct. Order]. Among those cases, however, there was only one published opinion, Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 1999), and, under Rhine, Mr. Locke's petition was timely filed.
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Locke argues that this interlocutory appeal is improper because the government is seeking "to enlarg[e] its own rights or lessen[] the rights of its adversary absent a cross appeal." Aple's Br. at 4. We find this argument to be without merit, and so the only issue remaining is whether Mr. Locke's petition was timely filed pursuant to 2244(d)(1)(A). Because the parties do not dispute the facts, we have before us a purely legal question, and thus we review the matter de novo. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, (10th Cir. 2000).
Section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that
[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . . The limitation period shall run from the . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). According to the district court, Mr. Locke had until October 29, 1998, to file his petition. The district court arrived at this date in the following manner: (1) on August 1, 1997, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the state court of last resort, affirmed Mr. Locke's conviction; (2) ninety days later i.e., on October 30, 1997 Mr. Locke's time to seek direct review before the United States Supreme Court expired, see U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13; (3) Mr. Locke's conviction was thereby final on October 30, 1997, at least for the purposes of 2244(d)(1)(A); and (4) consequently, the one-year limitation period began to run on October 30, 1997.
The government argues that, as a matter of law, the district court erred in determining the day by which Mr. Locke's petition had to be filed. More specifically, it argues that the district court improperly calculated the date on which Mr. Locke's conviction was final by including the ninety days during which Mr. Locke could have filed (but did not) a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. According to the government, Mr. Locke's conviction was final on August 1, 1997, the day that Mr. Locke had exhausted his state remedies. In short, the government's contention is that "direct review" as used in 2244(d)(1)(A) only means review within the state court system; review by the United States Supreme Court is not counted. The government grounds its argument on two premises: (1) The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") was enacted to accelerate the habeas process; and (2) AEDPA is focused on the exhaustion of state remedies.
We are not persuaded by the government's argument. We note first that, in Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d at 1153, we stated that for purposes of 2244(d)(1)(A) "the judgment is not final and the one-year limitation period for filing for federal post-conviction relief does not begin to run until after the United States Supreme Court has denied review, or, if no petition for certiorari is filed, after the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court has passed." Id. at 1155 (emphasis added); see also Habteselassie v. Novak, 209 F.3d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) ().
Of course, this statement in Rhine was technically dicta, the holding of the case dealing with 2244(d)(2) instead of 2244(d)(1)(A),2 and therefore we are not bound by it. Still, we find the statement to be instructive; at the very least, it cannot be ignored, especially in light of Habteselassie, see id., and further in light of United States v. Burch, 202 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2000). In Burch, this court addressed the issue of timeliness under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Like 2244, 2255 is a habeas statute but, while 2244 applies to prisoners held in state custody, 2255 applies to prisoners held in federal custody. In discussing the issue of timeliness under 2255, this court held that, "if a prisoner does not file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court after [his] direct appeal, the one-year limitation period begins to run when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires." Id. at 1279. Since the ninety-day period is included with respect to federal prisoners, we see no reason not to do the same with respect to state prisoners, see id. at 1278 () especially since 2244 contains language that suggests the period should be counted and 2255 does not. Compare 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) () (emphasis added), with 28 U.S.C. 2255(1) ().
Finally, we note that the circuit courts that have explicitly ruled on the issue of timeliness under 2244(d)(1)(A) are in accord with Rhine; that is, all have held that "the period of 'direct review' in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition." Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 281 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1998) ().
We agree with the reasoning employed by our sister circuits, in particular, that used by the Eighth Circuit in Smith. In Smith, the respondent argued, as the government does here, that a conviction becomes final on the day state court review is concluded; in other words, "direct review" as used in 2244(d)(1)(A) does not include review by the United States Supreme Court. The Eighth Circuit rejected the respondent's argument, stating the following:
Review of a state criminal conviction by the Supreme Court of the United States is considered direct review of the conviction. Moreover, there is a well-established body of federal case law that...
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