Locke v. Shore, Case No. 4:09cvl93-RH/WCS.
| Citation | 682 F.Supp.2d 1283 |
| Decision Date | 04 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:09cvl93-RH/WCS. |
| Parties | Eva LOCKE et al., Plaintiff's, v. Joyce SHORE et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
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Clark M. Neily, Paul Michael Sherman, William H. Mellor, Arlington, VA, Daniel Jon Woodring, Woodring Law Firm, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff's.
Jonathan Alan Glogau, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants.
OPINION ON THE MERITS
Under Florida law, a person must have a license in order to "practice" nonresidential "interior design." A person may provide residential interior design services without a license but may not advertise or hold herself out as an "interior designer." The Plaintiff's assert that "interior design," as defined by the governing statute, includes many activities for which a state may not constitutionally require a license, and that a state may not constitutionally ban truthful commercial speech advertising a person's lawful "interior design" activities. By agreement, the case is under submission as if tried on the paper record. This order upholds the properly-construed ban on practicing nonresidential interior design without a license but holds unconstitutional the ban on an unlicensed residential designer's truthful representation that she is an "interior designer."
The Plaintiff's Eva Locke, Patricia Anne Levenson, and Barbara Banderkolk Gardner are unrelated individuals with education and training in interior design. They have provided residential interior design services in Florida and wish to provide commercial interior design services. Each wishes to market herself as an "interior designer." The plaintiff National Federation of Independent Business is a national trade association and advocacy group with Florida members who at least arguably provide "interior design" services.
The defendants are members of the Florida Board of Architecture and Interior Design, the agency with authority to enforce the statutes at issue. The Plaintiff's have sued the defendants in their official capacities. The defendants are represented by the Attorney General—the state's chief legal officer—who has the constitutional prerogative and duty to speak for the state. For ease of reference, this order often refers to the defendants' contentions as those of "the state."
The Plaintiff's seek declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a variety of constitutional provisions: the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause. The defendants have acknowledged the Plaintiff's' standing to raise these claims and have joined issue on the merits.
The two sides filed and briefed cross-motions for summary judgment. After oral argument, they agreed to have the case treated as fully tried on the merits based on the written record, including the declarations of the various witnesses. This order sets forth the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and directs the entry of an appropriate judgment, just as would have occurred following a traditional trial with live witnesses.
Florida, like most or all other states, licenses architects. An applicant for a license must meet education and training requirements and must pass an examination. There are some functions that only a licensed architect may perform. Certifying the plans for a typical commercial building is an example. Licensing the architect helps ensure that a building will not fall down in ordinary use or even in a hurricane.
Florida, like only two other states, also licenses interior designers. An applicant for a license must meet education and training requirements and must pass an examination. The state asserts that recognizing interior design as a profession separate from architecture reduces the regulatory burden in an important respect: services that can safely be provided and certified by a properly trained interior designer need not be performed or supervised by an architect. Thus an architect must design load-bearing walls to ensure that the building will not fall down, but a properly trained interior designer can locate a fixture in a manner that complies with accessibility codes. The state says recognizing this new category of licensed professional in the field of architecture and design is similar to the prior emergence of the physician's assistant and nurse practitioner in the medical field. And the state says the interior designer, like the physician's assistant or nurse practitioner, should be licensed in order to promote competence. It is an argument that a reasonable legislature might or might not accept and that most apparently have re jected. Still, accepting the argument is within the wide range of discretion that the Constitution affords a state legislature.
The Plaintiff's say, though, that this statute is constitutionally deficient. They say the statute sweeps far too broadly, that it requires a license to perform ordinary tasks that nobody could rationally believe should be subject to licensing, and that it draws irrational distinctions. The plaintiff's say the statute thus violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. They say the statute regulates speech without a sufficient justification and thus violates the First Amendment. They say the statute is impermissibly overbroad and vague. And they say the statute violates the Commerce Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause because any risk to the public from allowing an unlicensed person to practice nonresidential interior design is insufficient to justify the statute's burden on interstate commerce and an individual's right to pursue a livelihood. This order addresses each of these contentions in turn.
The prohibition on practicing interior design without a license provides:
(1) A person may not knowingly:
...
(b) Practice interior design unless the person is a registered interior designer unless otherwise exempted herein....
§ 481.223, Fla. Stat.1 A "registered interior designer" is one with a Florida license. § 481.203(9). The exemption of primary interest is for residential services: the statute does "not apply" to a person "who performs interior design services... for any residential application."
§ 481.229(6)(a). In short, a person may not "practice" nonresidential "interior design" without a license. A violation of this provision is a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in custody. § 481.223(2).
The statute defines "interior design" by saying first what the term "means," and then what it "includes":
"Interior design" means designs, consultations, studies, drawings, specifications, and administration of design construction contracts relating to nonstructural interior elements of a building or structure. "Interior design" includes, but is not limited to, reflected ceiling plans, space planning, furnishings, and the fabrication of nonstructural elements within and surrounding interior spaces of buildings. "Interior design" specifically excludes the design of or the responsibility for architectural and engineering work, except for specification of fixtures and their location within interior spaces.
§ 481.203(8), Fla. Stat, (emphasis added).
The statute is not a model of clarity. Picking and choosing words from the definition, the Plaintiff's say the statute prohibits a wedding planner from sketching a suggested layout of tables for a reception, because a sketch is a "drawing" and tables are "furnishings." The Plaintiff's say the statute prohibits a college student in a design class from drawing a floor plan as a course assignment, because it is a "drawing" as part of a "study." The Plaintiff's conjure additional examples that they say demonstrate the absurd reach of the statute. The state readily agrees that a statute of this breadth would be absurd. But the state says this statute does not go this far. The state has it right.
[11 First, the definition itself prohibits nothing. It is simply a definition. The substantive provision is § 481.223(l)(b), which prohibits the "practice" of nonresidential interior design by an unlicensed person. A wedding planner does not "practice" interior design by suggesting the layout of tables for a reception, and a student does not "practice" interior design by taking a class. Indeed, one Florida court has suggested that one does not "practice" architecture by preparing building plans, even for a paying client, on a single, "isolated" occasion. See Gaisford v. Neuschatz, 201 So.2d 635, 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) (). One need not go this far to recognize that to "practice" interior design means to provide services to a design client, with or without compensation. This is a substantial limitation on the statute's scope.
Second, the definition of "interior design," as set out in § 481.203(8), is not so broad as the Plaintiff's claim. The first sentence says what the term "means." It means "designs, consultations, studies, drawings, specifications, and administration of design construction contracts relating to nonstructural interior elements of a building or structure." § 481.203(8), Fla. Stat, (emphasis added). That is the whole definition. The concluding phrase "relating to nonstructural interior elements of a building or structure" modifies each of the listed items. "Interior design" thus encompasses only items "relating to nonstructural interior elements of a building or structure." A fixture ordinarily is a "nonstructural interior element of a building or structure." A table or other piece of stand-alone furniture ordinarily is not.
To be sure, the second sentence of § 481.203(8) lists items that the term "interior design" "includes." The term includes "reflected ceiling plans, space planning, furnishings, and the...
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