Locke v. the United States

Decision Date16 February 1813
Citation7 Cranch 339,11 U.S. 339,3 L.Ed. 364
PartiesLOCKE v. THE UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Absent. TODD, J.

ERROR to the sentence of the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland, which condemned the cargo of the schooner Wendell, belonging to Locke, the Claimant, as forfeited to the United States.

The libel contained 11 counts.

The 1st count charged that the goods between the 1st of June, 1808, and the day of filing the libel, at Boston, with intent to transport them to Baltimore, without a permit from the collector and naval officer of the port of Boston, were clandestinely laden on board the schooner Wendell, a vessel enrolled and licensed according to statute, whose employment was not then confined to the navigation of bays, sounds, rivers and lakes within the jurisdiction of the United States, nor exempted from the obligation of giving bond according to the provisions of the statute (the embargo law.)

The 2d count charged that the goods being of foreign growth and manufacture and subject to the payment of duties, between the 1st of May, 1808, and the day of filing the libel were unladed without the authority of the proper officers of the customs, from on board some vessel to the attorney unknown, after she had arrived within four leagues of the coast of the United States, the said vessel being then bound from some foreign port or place, (to the attorney unknown,) to the United States.

The 3d count charged that the goods being of foreign growth and manufacture and subject to duties, were, without any unavoidable accident, necessity or distress of weather, unladen without the authority of the proper officers of the customs.

The 4th count charged that the goods, being of foreign growth and manufacture, and subject to the payment of duties imposed by the laws of the United States between the 1st of May, 1804, and the day of filing the libel, were imported from some foreign port or place to the attorney unknown, into some port of the United States to the said attorney unknown, in a certain vessel to the said attorney unknown, and were afterwards and before filing the libel unladed at the said last mentioned port from the said vessel without a permit from the proper officers of the customs of the last mentioned port.

The 5th count charged that the goods were imported into Boston and were falsely, and by a false name and denomination entered at the custom house of the port of Boston.

The 6th count charged that they were imported into a port of the United States, to the attorney unknown, and were falsely, and by a false name and denomination, entered at the custom house of such port.

The 7th count stated that the goods were of the manufacture of Great Britain, and were imported into New York, between the first of March, 1808, and the day of filing the libel, from some foreign port or place to the attorney unknown.

The 8th count stated that they were so imported into Boston.

The 9th count stated them to have been so imported into Philadelphia.

The 10th count averred them to have been so imported into Baltimore.

The 11th count stated them to have been so imported into some port of the United States, to the attorney unknown.

The 1st count was under the embargo law.

The 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th and 6th counts were under the collection law.

The other counts were under the non-importation acts of 18th April, 1806, Vol. 8, p. 80and 19th Dec. 1806, Vol. 8, p. 219.

HARPER, for the Appellant.

The first count, under the embargo act is understood to be abandoned.

The 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th counts, are under the non-importation acts of 18th April, and 19th December, 1806. There is no evidence of the importation of the goods since the 2d Monday in December, 1807, the time when those laws began to operate.

The 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th and 6th counts are under the general collection law of 2d March, 1799, Vol. 4, p. 325, &c. The 5th and 6th however, charge acts not forbidden by the law—so that the charges are reduced to those contained in the 2d, 3d and 4th counts.

The 2d and 3d counts are under the 27th sec. of the collection law, Vol. 4, p. 324. These counts are defective in not averring that the unlading was before the vessel had 'come to the proper place for the discharge of her cargo,' which is an essential ingredient in the offence described in that section. And all the counts are defective in not stating where, how, when, and from what ship the goods were unladen. These defects are as fatal in a libel as in an indictment or declaration. There is no authority for making a distinction. But if some latitude be allowed in libel, yet it ought to be certain to a common intent in these respects.

If the libel be sufficient, yet it is not supported by proof. There is no evidence of the time when the goods were landed so as to show it to be contrary to law.

But it was said in the Court below, that the onus probandi was on the Claimant by the express provision of the statute, Laws United, States, Vol. 4, p. 391, sec. 71, the words of which are 'If the property be claimed by 'any person, in every such case the onus probandi shall 'be upon such Claimant; but the onus probandi shall 'lie on the Claimant only where probable cause is shewn 'for such prosecution.' Probable cause is prima facie evidence, and whenever that is shown, the onus probandi falls of course upon the other party. A contrary construction would be against the common principles of law. What you charge, you must prove. Innocence is always to be presumed until there be at least prima facie evidence of guilt. This construction is fortified by the 43d section of the collection law. Vol. 4, p. 350. Which provides that if distilled spirits, wines and teas be found unaccompanied by a certificate of importation, it shall be presumptive evidence that the same are liable to forfeiture. This presumptive evidence can be no other than probable cause of seizure: and probable cause must mean presumptive evidence. In the present case there is no such probable cause. The circumstances which are supposed to excite suspicion, are 1. That there was a variance in the manifest 2. That the names of the shippers and consignees were fictitious 3. That there was no proof of their entry into Boston, and 4th that the original marks had been effaced upon many of the packages.

It is not stated where this manifest was found. The variance is very trifling. There could have been no fraud upon the United States intended by using ficititious names, because the goods were as liable to seizure as if they had been shipped in the name of the Claimant. It was done to screen the goods from his creditors, he being in embarrassed circumstances at that time—as appears from the deposition of W. French. The want of a certificate of entry is only evidence that they might have been improperly imported, not that they were. The erasure of the original marks could not screen the goods from seizure—part of the original marks remained. None of these circumstances constitutes that prima facie evidence which throws the burthen of proof upon the Claimant. But this provision respecting the onus probandi applies only to the importer himself and as to him it is not unreasonable—he knows where to look for the evidence of their correct importation. But it is unreasonable to apply the rule to a purchaser. It would in many cases be impossible for him to obtain the necessary evidence. There is no evidence that the Claimant was the importer of these goods.

PINKNEY, contra.

There is some ground to say that these goods ought to be condemned under the non-importation act of 1806. It is clearly proved that they are of British manufacture; they must therefore have been imported—and some of the articles appeared to be of a very recent fabric. These circumstances connected with the total want of proof on the part of the Claimant, create very strong suspicions, if they do not amount to positive proof.

But under the collection law, especially upon the 4th count, which is founded on the 50th section of that act, the case is quite clear.

It is not necessary in a libel for unlading contrary to law to state from what vessel, nor at what time, nor in what place, the goods were unladen. It would generally be impossible to prove the circumstances; and if averred, they must be proved. Suppose that the Claimant had confessed that the goods were smuggled, but had not said in what vessel, nor when, nor where—the evidence of his confession would have been sufficient to condemn the goods although he had omitted to state these immaterial circumstances. It is sufficient to aver that they were landed from some vessel, and at some place within the United States, unknown to the prosecutor, and within the time when the law was in force. The Claimant has sufficient notice that the United States mean to rely on the general ground of suspicion, and on the shifting the onus probandi, and must come prepared to remove the suspicion. Of what use is the provision respecting the onus probandi, if the...

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