Locken v. Loren Locken As Tr. of The Virgil
| Decision Date | 11 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 20100297.,20100297. |
| Citation | 797 N.W.2d 301,2011 ND 90 |
| Parties | David LOCKEN, Plaintiff and Appellantv.Loren LOCKEN as Trustee of the Virgil and Marjorie Locken Family Trust under the Trust Agreement dated December 27, 2002; Jon Locken and Loren Locken as Co–Personal Representatives of the Marjorie Locken Estate; Jon Locken and Loren Locken, as Co–Personal Representatives of the Virgil K. Locken Estate; Jon Locken, Inc.; Loren W. Locken, Inc.; Jon Locken; Loren Locken; Bernard Vculek as Trustee of the Bernhard L. Vculek Revocable Trust; Marlene Vculek as Trustee of the Marlene Vculek Revocable Trust; and the unknown spouses, the unknown heirs, administrators, executors, successors, devisees, legatees, assigns and personal representatives of any kind of all the above named defendants, and all other persons unknown claiming any rights, title or interest in, or lien or encumbrances upon the property described in the Complaint, Defendants and Appellees. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Sara Kaye Sorenson, West Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.Michael D. McNair, Fargo, N.D., for defendants and appellees.KAPSNER, Justice.
[¶ 1] David Locken appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his action to determine his ownership interest in a tract of land in Dickey County. He argues his claim is not barred by the statute of limitations for an action on a contract for deed under N.D.C.C. § 28–01–42 and, therefore, is not barred by the Marketable Record Title Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 47–19.1. We hold David Locken's claim is barred by the statute of limitations for an action on a contract for deed under N.D.C.C. § 28–01–42, because the due date of the last payment of the indebtedness secured by the contract for deed was when the contract was satisfied. We affirm.
[¶ 2] In February 1973, David Locken and his father, Virgil Locken, purchased a tract of land in Dickey County by contract for deed from Wanda Johnson and Ardys Sand. The contract for deed required Johnson and Sand to convey to Virgil and David Locken, or their assigns, a warranty deed upon full performance by the Lockens. The contract for deed was recorded on March 7, 1973, and identified a total consideration of $58,500, with a $12,000 down payment and yearly payments of $4,000 beginning on March 1, 1974, and thereafter until the balance of $46,500 plus interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum was paid in full. According to David Locken, the final scheduled payment on the contract for deed was due on March 1, 1998.
[¶ 3] In May 1974, David Locken and his wife assigned his interest in the contract for deed to his parents, Virgil and Marjorie Locken. In 1977, Ardys Sand, Wanda Johnson, and her husband, Robert Johnson, conveyed the land by warranty deed to Virgil Locken, individually. The warranty deed was recorded on March 8, 1978. Through a series of conveyances in 1980 and 1981, Virgil Locken gifted the land to all his children, except David Locken, by quitclaim deed, and those children's interests were reconveyed to the Virgil and Marjorie Locken Family Trust by quitclaim deed in 2002.
[¶ 4] Marjorie Locken died in December 2001, and her will specifically devised “all [her] right, title and interest” in the land to David Locken. Virgil Locken died in September 2006, and his will also specifically devised “all of [his] right, title and interest” in the land to David Locken. In July 2007, Loren Locken, as trustee of the Virgil and Marjorie Locken Family Trust, executed and recorded an affidavit of possession, stating “the Virgil and Marjorie Locken Family Trust is in possession of the ... real property and has an unbroken chain of title to such real property under deeds which have been of record more than 20 years.” In October 2007, the Virgil and Marjorie Locken Family Trust conveyed the land to Bernard Vculek, who then conveyed the land to himself, as trustee of the Bernard L. Vculek Revocable Trust, and to Marlene Vculek, as trustee of the Marlene Vculek Revocable Trust.
[¶ 5] In January 2008, David Locken brought this action against all persons claiming an interest in the land, alleging Marjorie Locken had a one-fourth interest in the land when she died and he was entitled to that interest as a specific devisee under her will. David Locken claimed Marjorie Locken's interest in the land stemmed from his 1974 assignment of his one-half interest in the 1973 contract for deed to Virgil and Marjorie Locken, which resulted in Virgil Locken owning an undivided three-fourths interest in the land and Marjorie Locken receiving an undivided one-fourth interest in the land. The defendants responded, contending David Locken's claim to the land was barred by the Marketable Record Title Act and was not subject to a statutory exception to the Act for claims on a contract for deed not barred by the statute of limitations.
[¶ 6] The district court granted summary judgment dismissal of David Locken's action, concluding his claim to the land was barred by the Marketable Record Title Act and was not subject to a statutory exception in N.D.C.C. § 47–19.1–11(1)(c) for claims on contracts for deed not barred by the statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. § 28–01–42, because the “due date” of the last payment on the indebtedness secured by the contract for deed was at least by March 8, 1978, when the contract sellers, Ardys Sand, Wanda Johnson, and Robert Johnson, delivered a warranty deed to Virgil Locken and the deed was recorded.
[¶ 7] The district court decided this case by summary judgment, which is a procedural device for promptly resolving a controversy on the merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that reasonably can be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. Schmidt v. Gateway Cmty. Fellowship, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 7, 781 N.W.2d 200. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if the issues in the case are such that resolution of any factual disputes will not alter the result. Id. A party moving for summary judgment must establish there are no genuine issues of material fact and the case is appropriate for judgment as a matter of law. Id. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the record. Id. The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal. Id.
[¶ 8] David Locken argues he has a valid claim to the land under the statute-of-limitations exception of the Marketable Record Title Act in N.D.C.C. § 47–19.1–11(1)(c). He argues the district court erred in deciding his January 2008, action is barred by the statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. § 28–01–42 for an action on a contract for deed, because he brought the action within ten years of the “due date of the last payment on the indebtedness” under the 1973 contract for deed, which he asserts was March 1, 1998. Relying on Langer v. Gray, 73 N.D. 437, 15 N.W.2d 732 (1944), he argues the term “due date” in N.D.C.C. § 28–01–42 means the date the last payment on the contract for deed was due under the contract and does not mean the date the last payment was actually made. The defendants respond that “due date of the last payment on the indebtedness” in N.D.C.C. § 28–01–42 means the date the last payment was actually made and the contract for deed was satisfied.
[¶ 9] The issues raised in this appeal involve the interpretation and application of the statute-of-limitations exception in the Marketable Record Title Act and the statute of limitations for actions on a contract for deed. The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal. Schmidt, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 7, 781 N.W.2d 200. Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature's intent, and we initially look to the language of the statute to determine intent. Id. at ¶ 14. Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless they are defined by statute or unless a contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1–02–02. Statutes are construed as a whole and are harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. N.D.C.C. § 1–02–07. The letter of a statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. N.D.C.C. § 1–02–05. “[I]f the language of a statute is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning or if adherence to the strict letter of the statute would lead to an absurd or ludicrous result, the court may resort to extrinsic aids to interpret the statute.” Stutsman County v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985). “ ‘A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to different, rational meanings.’ ” Sauby v. City of Fargo, 2008 ND 60, ¶ 8, 747 N.W.2d 65 (quoting Simon v. Simon, 2006 ND 29, ¶ 12, 709 N.W.2d 4). Section 1–02–39, N.D.C.C., lists extrinsic aids for construing ambiguous statutes:
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislation, may consider among other matters:
1. The object sought to be attained.
2. The circumstances under which the statute was enacted.
3. The legislative history.
4. The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects.
5. The consequences of a particular construction.
6. The administrative construction of the statute.
7. The preamble.
[¶ 10] The Marketable Record Title Act was enacted in 1951 to simplify and facilitate real estate title transactions by allowing persons to rely upon record title in dealing with the record title owner. See 1951 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 280, § 10 (codified at N.D.C.C. § 47–19.1–10). See generally James E. Leahy, The...
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