Lockett v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1935
• Docket Number: Nos. 71-73.,s. 71-73.
• Citation: 261 N.W. 306,272 Mich. 219
• Parties: LOCKETT v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN R. CO. HAWKINS v. SAME. PEARSON v. SAME.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

272 Mich. 219

261 N.W. 306

LOCKETT

v.GRAND TRUNK WESTERN R. CO.

HAWKINS

v.SAME.

PEARSON

v.SAME.

Nos. 71-73.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 3, 1935.

Actions by Budd Will Lockett, administrator of the estate of Nellie May Lockett, deceased, and by Viola Hawkins and Millie Pearson, against the Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company. Judgments for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Guy A. Miller, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

H. V. Spike and W. W. Macpherson, both of Detroit, for appellant.

John P. Mikesell and James F. Murray, both of Detroit, for appellees.

BUTZEL, Justice.

Caniff avenue in the city of Hamtramck runs east and west, and, as it approaches the city of Detroit from the east, it traverses a crossing at which defendant has five parallel railroad tracks, running in a northerly and southerly direction. On each side of the crosing, in the center of Caniff avenue and 15 feet from the tracks, defendant has erected a large steel mast or post 12 feet in height, set in concrete foundation, with cross-arms at the top to which are attached a series of lights that flash red and show the word ‘stop’ when a train is approaching. The lights flash only in the direction away from the crossing, and cannot be seen by one who has driven past them and onto the tracks. Between 12:30 and 1 p. m. on January 24, 1933, a bright, sunny day, Viola Hawkins, accompanied by Nellie May Lockett and Millie Pearson as guest passengers, drove her Ford sedan in a westerly direction toward the tracks. Mrs. Hawkins testified that as she approached the crossing she noticed that the signal lights were not flashing. She continued to watch the lights until she arrived at the crossing, when she stopped a few feet before the first track and looked and listened for a train. Her view to the north at this point was obstructed by a high board fence and also by a box car standing on the first track, so that she could not see more than a couple hundred feet in that direction. Not seeing or hearing anything, she started the car up again in first speed and proceeded across the tracks as fast as the car would go in first gear, without making any further observations. The car was struck on the fourth track by defendant's train coming from the north, and Mrs. Lockett was killed, while Mrs. Hawkins and Mrs. Pearson were severely injured. After crossing the first track, there was a clear and unlimited view of the tracks in either direction, and Mrs. Hawkins would have observed the train approachinghad she looked to the north at any time while traversing the distance of 37.5 feet from the first track to the point of collision.

The two survivors of the accident and the administrator of Mrs. Lockett's estate brought separate suits against the defendant, but the actions were combined and tried together in the lower court, resulting in verdicts against the railroad company for all three parties. The cases were also consolidated into one record and presented as one cause on appeal to this court. Negligence on the part of defendant was shown, in that the bell was not rung as the train approached the crossing. The important question on appeal, however, is whether plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in not looking for oncoming trains after the automobile had passed the first track, when they had an unobstructed view for a distance of 37.5 feet, in which the train could undoubtedly have been seen. Defendant contends that the trial court was in error in submitting this question to the jury.

We have repeatedly held that a person is guilty of contributory negligence if he fails to stop and look for oncoming trains at a railroad crossing. Davis v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 241 Mich. 166, 216 N. W. 424;Rosencranz v. Michigan Central R. Co., 244 Mich. 137, 221 N. W. 273;Laurain v. Detroit, T. & I. R. Co., 249 Mich. 630, 229 N. W. 423;Richman v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co., 254 Mich. 607, 236 N. W. 878. We have adopted in this State the rule set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 S. Ct. 24, 72 L. Ed. 167, 56 A. L. R. 645. We appreciate that in a later case, Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 292 U. S. 98, 54 S. Ct. 580, 78 L. Ed. 1149, 91 A. L. R. 1049, the rule as stated in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Goodman, supra, was limited somewhat, but the court, in commenting upon that case, observed that the result therein reached was undoubtedly correct; that the driver had a clear space of 18 feet before reaching the track, in which the train was plainly visible, and his failure to look after he had passed the obstruction and entered this zone of unobstructed vision constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law. The facts in the instant case are quite similar, except for the fact that we have here a case of a protected crossing.

It is true that we have held that a traveler approaching a protected crossing is entitled to place some reliance upon the indication of safety which the silence of the signal implies, and that the degree of care required of one approaching a crossing under such circumstances “* * * is only that which an ordinarily prudent man would use under such circumstances, and not the extreme care that would be required if there were no device there to indicate safety; and that whether proper care has been exercised under such circumstances is...