Lockhart v. Carlyle

• Decision Date: 25 June 2019
• Docket Number: WD 81952
• Citation: Lockhart v. Carlyle, 585 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. App. 2019)
• Parties: Cindy LOCKHART, et al., Appellants, v. Susan CARLYLE, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

585 S.W.3d 310

Cindy LOCKHART, et al., Appellants,

v.Susan CARLYLE, Respondent.

WD 81952

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Opinion filed: June 25, 2019

Application for Transfer Denied October 29, 2019

J. Kirk Rahm, Warrensburg, for Appellants.

Benjamin M. Fletcher, for Respondent.

Before Division Three: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

EDWARD R. ARDINI, JR., JUDGE

Cindy Lockhart and Dennis Lockhart ("the Lockharts") filed suit in the Circuit Court of Johnson County against Susan Carlyle ("Carlyle") alleging the wrongful death of their son, Tyler Lockhart, based on a theory of negligent entrustment of a vehicle. The Lockharts alleged that Carlyle, with knowledge that her adult son, Richard (Nick) Gallagher ("Gallagher"), was incompetent to drive an automobile on the public highways due to habitual recklessness, supplied Gallagher a vehicle that he negligently operated resulting in a crash that killed Tyler Lockhart, who was a passenger in the vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Carlyle. The Lockharts appeal. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Gallagher is Carlyle’s adult son. After graduating from high school, Gallagher moved from Missouri to Texas to help care for his grandparents.¹ While living in Texas, Gallagher was arrested for drug possession and domestic violence and spent time in both jail and rehabilitation. Gallagher lived in Texas for five or six years before moving back to Missouri to live with Carlyle.

Since his return to Missouri, Carlyle has furnished Gallagher with a place to live, food, utilities, and a cell phone. Gallagher has been employed only sparingly during this period having worked for Carlyle Van Lines for about a month in addition to performing other miscellaneous jobs such as snow removal and car repair.

Gallagher has been charged with numerous criminal offenses since his return to Missouri, several relating to the operation of a motor vehicle.² In relation to these charges, Carlyle has provided the financial means for Gallagher to retain legal counsel, post bond, and satisfy fines and court costs.

On January 8, 2016, Gallagher travelled to Kansas with Carlyle and Tyler Lockhart to purchase a 2003 Acura. A bill of sale reflects that the Acura was sold to Gallagher for $ 1,500.00.³ A few days later, the vehicle was insured through a policy with American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin paid for by Carlyle that listed both Carlyle and Gallagher as the insureds. Gallagher registered the vehicle in his name, and only his name appeared on the title.

On March 8, 2016, Gallagher had a court appearance scheduled in Grundy County, Missouri. Gallagher departed Carlyle’s home for Grundy County in the Acura accompanied by Tyler Lockhart. Shortly thereafter, at approximately 7:00 a.m., the Acura was involved in an accident. According to the Highway Patrol’s Incident Report, the vehicle was traveling northbound on Route 23 in an unincorporated area of Johnson County at an estimated speed of at least 87 miles per hour when Gallagher lost control and ran off the east side of the road. The vehicle flipped several times ejecting both Gallagher and Tyler Lockhart. Tyler Lockhart was killed. Gallagher was injured, but survived.

The Lockharts filed a Petition for Wrongful Death against Gallagher on April 12, 2016. The Lockharts settled their claim against Gallagher and filed an amended petition naming Carlyle as the defendant. The amended petition alleged that Carlyle was negligent in supplying Gallagher with the Acura based on Gallagher’s history of reckless driving. Carlyle moved for summary judgment, arguing that the uncontroverted facts showed that she did not own or have control over the use of the Acura and thus could not be deemed to have entrusted it to Gallagher as a matter of law. The trial court granted summary judgment. The Lockharts appeal.

II. Standard of Review

"Whether the circuit court properly entered summary judgment ‘is purely an issue of law which th[e c]ourt reviews de novo. ’ " Smock v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. , 567 S.W.3d 211, 217 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting Hill v. Ford Motor Co. , 277 S.W.3d 659, 664 (Mo. banc 2009) (additional citation omitted)). "When considering an appeal from a summary judgment, we review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, and we afford that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Fouts v. Regency North Acquisition, LLC , 569 S.W.3d 463, 465-66 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (citations omitted). A defending party can demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment by exhibiting facts negating any of the plaintiff’s necessary elements. Parr v. Breeden , 489 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Mo. banc 2016) (citation omitted). "[W]e will affirm the grant of a summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fouts , 569 S.W.3d at 466 (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

The Lockharts allege that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, asserting that "someone who controls whether a habitually reckless driver owns or drives a car has sufficient control over the car to be negligent for supplying the car to that driver." The Lockharts argue that Carlyle’s conduct in "paying for the car, acquiring insurance for the car, and insisting that [Gallagher] drive a low-value car" provided a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a fact-finder could conclude that Carlyle entrusted the 2003 Acura to Gallagher. Carlyle counters that she did not own or otherwise possess the authority to exert control over the use of the vehicle and thus cannot be deemed to have entrusted it to Gallagher.

"Negligent entrustment is a variant of the common law tort of negligence." Hays v. Royer , 384 S.W.3d 330, 333 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). Under a theory of negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must prove:

(1) the entrustee was incompetent by reason of age, inexperience, habitual recklessness or otherwise; (2) the entrustor knew or had reason to know of the entrustee’s incompetence; (3) there was entrustment of the chattel; and (4) the negligence of the entrustor concurred with the conduct of the entrustee to cause the plaintiff’s injuries.

Id. (quoting Hallquist v. Smith , 189 S.W.3d 173, 175-76 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006) ).

The negligent entrustment doctrine is patterned after two sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: sections 308 and 390. See Hays , 384 S.W.3d at 335, 337. Section 308 states:

It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308 (1965). Comment a of this section notes that "[t]he words ‘under the control of the actor’ are used to indicate that the third person is entitled to possess or use the thing or engage in the activity only by the consent of the actor, and that the actor has reason to believe that by withholding consent he can prevent the third person from using the thing or engaging in the activity." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308 cmt. a.

Section 390 is a "special application" of section 308. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 cmt. b. Section 390 states:

One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 390.

Carlyle’s motion for summary judgment specifically focused on negating the third element of a negligent entrustment cause of action by arguing there had been no "entrustment" of the 2003 Acura by Carlyle to Gallagher.⁴

The chattel at the heart of this case is a 2003 Acura that was involved in the tragic accident that took the life of Tyler Lockhart. As part of their negligent entrustment claim, the Lockharts must establish that Carlyle entrusted the Acura to Gallagher. In this regard, we are principally focused on the level of dominion enjoyed by Carlyle over the vehicle—either through an ownership interest in the vehicle or by her authority to control its use. It is undisputed that Carlyle did not legally own the vehicle, as only Gallagher’s name appeared on the vehicle’s title. Consequently, in order to defeat summary judgment, the Lockharts were required to bring forward evidence that, if believed by the fact finder, would establish that Carlyle had a level of control over the Acura that was of a sufficient nature to support a finding that she entrusted it to Gallagher. After a review of the record before us, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Carlyle.

Due to Carlyle’s lack of an ownership interest in the Acura, this case differs from the typical negligent entrustment case wherein an individual permits use of their property by a third party while continuing to maintain control over the chattel. As a result, the Lockharts understandably focus on the circumstances attendant to Gallagher’s acquisition of the Acura with particular emphasis on the financial role played by Carlyle in that purchase and, relatedly, Gallagher’s general financial dependence on Carlyle. Undoubtedly, Carlyle’s financial assistance was critical to Gallagher’s purchase of the Acura. Nevertheless, Carlyle was neither the buyer nor the seller of the Acura and the record contains no basis from which we can discern that she possessed any legal rights or control over the vehicle either before, or upon completion, of the sales transaction....