Lockhart v. List

• Decision Date: 19 October 1995
• Citation: 542 Pa. 141,665 A.2d 1176
• Parties: Alix LOCKHART and William Lockhart, her husband, Appellants, v. Gerald LIST, t/d/b/a List Refuse Service, and Norman K. Allen, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1176

665 A.2d 1176

542 Pa. 141

Alix LOCKHART and William Lockhart, her husband, Appellants, v. Gerald LIST, t/d/b/a List Refuse Service, and Norman K Allen, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 19, 1994.

Decided Oct. 19, 1995.

Irving M. Portnoy, Mark E. Milsop, Evans, Portnoy & Quinn, Pittsburgh, for Appellants.

Robyn R. Gallitto, Charles W. Garbett, Luxenberg, Garbett & Kelly, P.C., Ellwood City, for Appellees.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION

CAPPY, Justice.

In this appeal we are asked to address the issues of whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine and whether the instruction given as to the assured clear distance ahead rule was improper.

The facts giving rise to the instant matter are as follows. On October 15, 1986, at approximately 8:45 a.m., Appellant, Alix Lockhart, was proceeding south on Cameron Road in Lawrence County en route to Slippery Rock State College where she was attending classes. At that time, she was proceeding downhill through a series of curves, commonly referred to as an "S-curve," and as she exited the final curve she encountered a garbage truck situated diagonally across her lane of travel. The garbage truck was being operated by Appellee Norman Allen who, at the time, was in the scope of his employment with Appellee Gerald List, t/d/b/a List Refuse Service. Upon seeing the garbage truck, Mrs. Lockhart applied her brakes but was unable to avoid colliding with the truck. She sustained serious injuries as a result of the accident. In addition, both her vehicle and the garbage truck were damaged.

Following the accident, Mrs. Lockhart and her husband initiated the instant negligence action against Appellees. It was the Appellees' defense that Mrs. Lockhart violated the assured clear distance ahead rule in failing to drive at a speed which would enable her to stop within her assured clear distance. Appellants countered that Mrs. Lockhart should be relieved of responsibility since the garbage truck presented a sudden emergency to which she reacted in a reasonable manner. The trial court instructed the jury on the assured clear distance ahead rule, but denied Appellants' request for a charge on the sudden emergency doctrine. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of the Appellees. In post-trial motions, Appellants complained, inter alia, that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the assured clear distance ahead rule yet refuse to instruct on the sudden emergency doctrine and further, that the instruction as given on the assured clear distance ahead rule was legally incorrect. The trial court denied Appellants' post-trial motions.

With respect to the first alleged error, the trial court found that the sudden emergency doctrine was not, in that court's opinion, a viable defense ever and that, even assuming its viability, the facts presented did not establish the basis for the sudden emergency charge since the garbage truck was itself not in motion at the time of the accident. As for the second alleged error, the trial court found that the instruction given was a complete and correct statement of the assured clear distance ahead rule.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. Initially, the Superior Court agreed that the sudden emergency doctrine was inapplicable here, one, because "as a matter of law, any emergency which arose was caused by Mrs. Lockhart driving her car at too great a speed to stop before crashing into List's truck" and two, because "Mrs. Lockhart provided no testimony to the effect that the garbage truck was in motion when it first came into her view." ¹ (memorandum opinion pp. 12-13). The Superior Court further held that the instruction given the jury on the assured clear distance ahead rule contained an accurate statement of the law. This appeal followed. We now reverse.

Appellants maintain in this appeal that the lower courts here misapplied the so called "static/moving" distinction as it relates to the sudden emergency doctrine and that the charge given with respect to the assured clear distance ahead rule was an incorrect statement of the law. The principles governing our review of such matters is well established. First, in reviewing a claim regarding error with respect to a specific jury charge, we must view the charge in its entirety taking into consideration all the evidence of record and determine whether or not error was committed and, if so, whether that error was prejudicial to the complaining party. Reilly by Reilly v. SEPTA, 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985). Error will be found where the jury was probably misled by what the trial judge charged or where there was an omission in the charge which amounts to fundamental error. Sweeny v. Bonafiglia, 403 Pa. 217, 169 A.2d 292 (1961); Voitasefski v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 363 Pa. 220, 69 A.2d 370 (1949). Additionally, in reviewing a claim regarding the refusal of a court to give a specific instruction, it is the function of this Court to determine whether the record supports the trial court's decision. The law is clear that a trial court is bound to charge only on that law for which there is some factual support in the record. Hamley v. George, 365 Pa. 543, 76 A.2d 181 (1950). We note further that it is not the function of the trial court in charging a jury to advocate, but rather to explain the principles of law which are fairly raised under the facts of a particular case so as to enable the jury to comprehend the questions it must decide. Hrivnak v. Perrone, 472 Pa. 348, 372 A.2d 730 (1977).

Both the assured clear distance ahead rule and the sudden emergency doctrine, which are most often employed in cases arising out of a motor vehicle accident, are well established in our case law. ² Given the fact specific nature of motor vehicle accident cases, however, the application of these two doctrines in our case law, either in isolation or in conjunction with each other, is somewhat varied rendering a precise and absolute rule of law thereon rather elusive. Accordingly, a review of the fundamentals of both doctrines is necessary before addressing the specifics of the instant matter.

The assured clear distance ahead rule, which is codified in the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361, requires a motorist to be capable of stopping within the distance that he or she can clearly see. See Springer v. Luptowski, 535 Pa. 332, 635 A.2d 134 (1993) and cases cited therein. ³ As this rule has been applied to hill crests and curves, this Court has made clear that a person may not enter blindly upon such topography, but must proceed slowly enough so as to avoid colliding with obstructions that may be on the roadway. This Court discussed the assured clear distance ahead rule at some length in Fleischman v. City of Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 429 (1957). Specifically, this Court noted:

"Assured clear distance ahead" means only what it says: a clear distance that is assured, that is, one that can reasonably be depended on. The rule does not mean that the motorist must carry in his mind every possible series of combinations which could conspire against him, and that he must transport ready-made solutions to overcome all fortuitous hazards which suddenly face him. Assured does not mean guaranteed. When a driver approaches the crest of a hill, there comes a moment when, because of the convexity of the highway, he has practically no guaranteed clear distance ahead, but he can reasonably be assured that no one will be insane enough to approach the crest of the road from the other side of the summit, using the contrary lane of travel. If such a predicament should develop and a collision result, the motorist on his own side of the thoroughfare cannot be declared guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law on the theory that he did not have an assured clear distance ahead.

Id. at 185-6, 130 A.2d at 431 (emphasis in the original). A sharp curve in the roadway presents similar problems; certainly a driver entering or exiting such a curve will often reach a point at which there is virtually no guaranteed clear distance ahead. The assured clear distance ahead rule if taken to the extreme would, under such circumstances, provide that any forward movement would violate the rule where a driver's vision is impaired by such topography. This would be an incorrect interpretation of the rule. The assured clear distance ahead rule has never been interpreted by this Court as imposing a duty upon a driver to anticipate any and all possible occurrences, however remote. Rather, a driver is required to anticipate only that which is reasonable. Schofield v. Druschel, 359 Pa. 630, 59 A.2d 919 (1948) (having one's car under control means that in any situation reasonably likely to arise, he will be able to stop his car before doing injury to any person or property); Long v. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., 335 Pa. 236, 5 A.2d 224 (1939) (driver of a vehicle is not under a duty to anticipate that the driver of a vehicle coming in the opposite direction around the curve would occupy the center of the highway in violation of the law of the road). In short, the assured clear distance ahead rule simply requires a driver to control the speed of his or her vehicle so that he or she will be able to stop within the distance of whatever may reasonably be expected to be within the driver's path. ⁴

The sudden emergency doctrine, on the other hand, is available as a defense to a party who suddenly and unexpectedly finds him or herself confronted with a perilous situation which permits little or no opportunity to apprehend the situation and act accordingly. Liuzzo v. McKay, 396 Pa. 183, 152 A.2d 265 (1959). The sudden emergency doctrine is frequently employed in motor vehicle accident cases wherein a driver was confronted with a perilous situation requiring a...