Lockhart v. State
| Decision Date | 25 March 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 973S184,973S184 |
| Parties | Curtis LOCKHART, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Lee J. Christakis, Gary, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Alan L. Crapo, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant was indicted for murder in the second degree, convicted thereof in a trial by jury and sentenced. Various post-conviction proceedings followed with which we are not here concerned. Ultimately, the filing of a belated motion to correct errors was permitted and the motion overruled. The correctness of that ruling is now before this Court in these proceedings. The motion assigned, as grounds therefor, the erroneous admission of evidence, the insufficiency of the evidence and ineffective representation by counsel.
In this appeal, the defendant has expressly acknowledged that the assignments of error regarding the admission of evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence are without merit, and they are waived under AP Rule 8.3. The sole question before us, then, is whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to grant relief, which could only have been a new trial, by reason of the ineffective representation by the court appointed pauper counsel.
Our task herein has been simplified by an acknowledgment by the defendant of effective representation throughout the proceedings, until the State rested its case. It is his contention that the failure of his trial counsel to put him upon the witness stand to make a claim of self defense, in the face of the State's evidence, was an error of such magnitude as to render the conviction a mockery of justice.
The record of the trial proceedings discloses that the State proved a prima facie case by two witnesses, one of whom was the female companion of the deceased at the time he was killed. The companion testified that the defendant approached the deceased from behind, while she and the deceased were walking, threw the deceased to the ground and got on top of him and when the defendant got up, the deceased had been stabbed with a knife. The State's other eyewitness testified on direct examination that the first thing he saw was the defendant and the deceased scuffling, but on cross-examination he testified that the defendant approached the deceased and his companion from behind and called to them, whereupon they stopped and he then approached them face to face. He further testified, at this point, that prior to any act of violence by the defendant, the deceased was cursing the defendant and grabbed him and that the defendant pushed the decedent up against a parked car. The parties then struggled together, and the defendant struck the deceased, and they fell to the ground, after which the witness' view was obscured. After the State rested its case, the defendant's attorney introduced evidence showing that the deceased had been previously convicted of manslaughter and thereupon rested his case without further evidence.
The defendant has cited us no authority supporting his claim. He has cited only Beck v. State (1974), Ind., 308 N.E.2d 697, a case when reasserted the time worn statement that there is a presumption that an attorney has discharged his...
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Davis v. State
...that presumption. Meyers v. State (1975), Ind. 321 N.E.2d 201; Maxwell v. State (supra); Colvin v. State (supra); Lockhart v. State (1975), Ind., 324 N.E.2d 811; Haddock v. State (supra); Beck v. State (supra); Lowe v. State (1973), Ind., 298 N.E.2d 421; Blackburn v. State (1973), Ind., 291......