Locklear v. Nash

Decision Date11 April 1963
Docket Number7 Div. 591
Citation152 So.2d 421,275 Ala. 95
CourtAlabama Supreme Court
PartiesJames Luther LOCKLEAR, as Adm'r, v. T. R. NASH et al.

Keener & Keener and Hugh Reed, Jr., Centre, for appellant.

Jack Livingston, Centre, and Dortch, Allen & Meighan, Gadsden, for appellees.

MERRILL, Justice.

This suit arose from a collision between two trucks, each traveling in the same direction on a county highway in Cherokee County. The tendencies of plaintiff's (appellant's) evidence was that his vehicle was traveling in the right lane of traffic, that defendants' truck struck appellant's truck in the rear, thereby causing injuries to appellant's son, who died as the result thereof.

The tendencies of defendants' (appellees') evidence was that appellees' truck was attempting to pass appellant's truck when appellant, without giving a signal, turned left in front of appellees' truck and into its path of travel. Verdict and judgment were for defendants.

Assignment of error 1 is that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. Ground 27 of the motion reads: 'For that the Court erred in overruling plaintiff's objections to the defendant offering of certain portions of a statement allegedly made by Lillie Bradley in the presence of Thomas E. Callin.'

During the cross-examination of plaintiff's witness, Lillie Bradley, she was questioned as to some statements she made in the presence of Callin, a court reporter who took the statements in shorthand, on the day the accident occurred. These statements were in conflict with her testimony on direct examination. The witness first testified that she remembered Callin coming to her store and taking her statement, but as soon as she was asked specifically about any statement, her consistent testimony on cross and re-direct examination was that she did not remember making the statement or 'a thing about it.'

Appellant argues that the predicates for the questions to the witness Bradley were not laid in substantially the same form as the alleged contradictory statements testified to by Callin when he was called as a witness. We are not directed to any particular question, but are referred to '(Tr. 58 through Tr. 60 and Tr. 104 through Tr. 107),' and to plaintiff's objections '(Tr. 107 through Tr. 112).' This is not specific enough for us to search out every question in the predicate and every statement made by the witness Callin. We list only one question propounded to Mrs. Bradley and one to Callin:

'Q (to Mrs. Bradley) I will ask you if you recall making this statement in response to this question; 'Did it appear that the Chevrolet truck was turned left or pulled off in the opposite lane of travel to make a turn?' Answer, Yes, after he had done crossed over there, the cab had already got, I would say off of the highway before he hit him, I would say the cab was off the highway when he hit the back end of the truck.' Question, 'You say the front half of the Chevrolet truck that Mr. Locklear was driving would have been--'Answer, 'On the dirt road.' Do you recall making that statement?

'A No, I don't.

* * *

* * *

'Q (to Callin) I will ask you if Mrs. Bradley made this statement to you 'Yes after he had done crossed over down there the cab had already got--I would say off of the highway before he hit him, I would say the cab was off of the highway when he hit the back end of the truck.' Question; 'You say the front half of the Chevrolet truck that Mr. Locklear was driving would have been--?' Answer; 'On the dirt road.' Did she say that?

'A Yes sir.'

It is evident that the predicate and the statement of the impeaching witness are so near identical or substantially the same as to come within the rule of Bridges v. State, 225 Ala. 81, 142 So. 56, and Couch v. Hutcherson, 243 Ala. 47, 8 So.2d 580, 141 A.L.R. 697, which states that to impeach a witness by showing contradictory statements, the statement must be called to his attention in substantially the form as made to the impeaching witness.

Assignment of error 13 charges error in giving charge 33 at the request of appellees, which reads:

'If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that plaintiff, James Luther Locklear failed to give continuously a signal of his intention to make a left turn during the last 100 feet before turning, then I charge you that he was guilty of negligence, and if that negligence on his part proximately contributed to the injuries complained of in the complaint, then I charge you that plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this case, and your verdict should be for the defendants.'

In brief appellant 'contends that the recitals of said charge were abstract and harmful to plaintiff's case, and he submits that this case should be reversed, Lassetter v. King, 249 Ala. 422, 31 So.2d 588.' That case holds that a charge that merely has a tendency to mislead the jury does not, if given, present error to reverse; but the giving of a charge which must necessarily have misled the jury is fatal error. We do not consider charge 33 to be so abstract or misleading as to constitute reversible error. The remedy is to request an explanatory charge. Roan v. Smith, 272 Ala. 538, 133 So.2d 224(8); Mobile Light & R. Co. v. Nicholas, 232 Ala. 213, 167 So. 298; Dowdell v. Beasley, 17 Ala.App. 100, 82 So. 40, cert. denied Ex parte Beasley, 203 Ala. 696, 82 So. 893.

Moreover, the trial court had charged the jury orally that 'if a person is intending to turn to the left in the direction which he is proceeding, he shall give a signal continuously for the last one hundred feet before he reaches...

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17 cases
  • Hobbs v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • May 26, 1981
    ...19, 20 and 24. Charges numbered 9, 10 and 23 were not hypothesized upon the evidence and were properly refused. Locklear v. Nash, 275 Ala. 95, 152 So.2d 421 (1963). Jury charge number 12 was properly refused as an incorrect statement of applicable legal principles. Kuczenska v. State, Ala.C......
  • Humphrey v. Boschung
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • September 30, 1971
    ...that the charge did in fact mislead the jury to the appellant's prejudice. Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23; Locklear v. Nash, 275 Ala. 95, 152 So.2d 421. See Blair v. St. Margaret's Hospital, 285 Ala. 636, 235 So.2d 668; Knabe v. State, 285 Ala. 321, 231 So.2d 887; Farr v. Bla......
  • Gilmer v. Salter
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • May 15, 1970
    ...25, rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686; Prince v. Bryant, 274 Ala. 134, 145 So.2d 837; Locklear v. Nash, 275 Ala. 95, 152 So.2d 421; Deamer v. Evans, 278 Ala. 35, 175 So.2d 466. Likewise charge 3 is improper because of employing the conditional clause 'if the......
  • Chambers v. Culver
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • January 18, 1973
    ...25, rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686; Prince v. Bryant, 274 Ala. 134, 145 So.2d 837; Locklear v. Nash, 275 Ala. 95, 152 So.2d 421; Deamer v. Evans, 278 Ala. 35, 175 So.2d 466; Barnes v. Haney, 280 Ala. 39, 189 So.2d During the trial the appellant sought to ......
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