Locklear v. Stinson, 92801

• Decision Date: 18 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 92801,92801
• Citation: 411 N.W.2d 834,161 Mich.App. 713
• Parties: Harriet LOCKLEAR, Personal Representative of Jerry Locklear, Deceased; Harriet Locklear, Graddie Locklear, Terry Locklear and Graddie Locklear, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John Joseph STINSON, Defendant, and Arcade Saloon, Inc., a Michigan corporation, d/b/a Arcade Saloon and Van Dyke Sports Center, a Michigan corporation, d/b/a Butterfly Suite Disco, Defendants- Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 834

411 N.W.2d 834

161 Mich.App. 713

Harriet LOCKLEAR, Personal Representative of Jerry Locklear, Deceased; Harriet Locklear, Graddie Locklear, Terry Locklear and Graddie Locklear, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John Joseph STINSON, Defendant, and Arcade Saloon, Inc., a Michigan corporation, d/b/a Arcade

Saloon and Van Dyke Sports Center, a Michigan

corporation, d/b/a Butterfly Suite

Disco, Defendants- Appellants.

No. 92801.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 17, 1987.

Denied July 21, 1987.

Released for Publication Sept. 18, 1987.

Romain, Donofrio, Kuck & Egerer, P.C. by David S. Robinson, Jr., Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Law Offices of Michael J. Brochert by David S. Anderson, Birmingham, for Arcade Saloon, Inc., and Van Dyke Sports Center.

Before DANHOF, C.J., and DOCTOROFF and GREEN, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants appeal by leave granted from the circuit court's order denying their motion for partial summary disposition as to plaintiffs' premises-liability claim, MCR 2.116(C)(8).

The basis for plaintiffs' complaint is an incident that occurred on October 1, 1984, in and around defendants' bar. Plaintiffs allege that the decedent, Jerry Locklear, and defendant John Stinson were business invitees of defendant bar and became involved in an altercation while inside the bar. Plaintiffs allege that employees of the bar, acting with actual notice of this dispute, ejected Stinson from the bar but allowed him to wait in the parking lot for the decedent.

When the decedent left the bar, he and Stinson allegedly continued the altercation, after which the decedent fled in his car with Stinson chasing him in his own vehicle.

The decedent's car collided with that of a third party on Van Dyke Avenue. Stinson stopped at the scene and the confrontation between the two men allegedly resumed, whereupon the decedent allegedly stabbed Stinson with a knife, fled in his vehicle, and became involved in a fatal crash.

Defendants' summary disposition motion was based on the premise that no duty was owed to the decedent as a business invitee since he had left the bar's premises when the fatal accident occurred.

The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that the claim he recognized as viable was the alleged breach of duty owed to the decedent while he was on the premises, that being his ejection from the bar into a dangerous situation in the parking lot about which defendants knew or should have known. We reverse.

In reviewing a grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court is obligated to accept as true all well-pled facts and to determine whether plaintiffs' claim, on the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery. The motion it tests the genuineness of a claim or defense by challenging the legal, not factual, adequacy of the pleadings. Bolton v. Jones, 156 Mich.App. 642, 647-648, 401 N.W.2d 894 (1986).

A prima facie case of negligence requires proof of four elements: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 437, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977), reh. den. 401 Mich. 951 (1977). The primary element with which we are concerned here, that of "duty," has been defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct towards another. Hetterle v. Chido, 155 Mich.App. 582, 587, 400 N.W.2d 324 (1986). Whether the law will impose such an obligation depends upon the relationship between the actor and the injured person. Moning, supra, 40 Mich. at pp. 438-439, 254 N.W.2d 759. Determining whether there exists a duty under a particular set of circumstances requires an examination of the reasonableness of the risk created by the defendant's conduct. Meyers v. Robb, 82 Mich.App. 549, 553, 267 N.W.2d 450 (1978), lv. den. 403 Mich. 812 (1978).

The question whether a duty exists is one of law for the court's resolution. Sponkowski v. Ingham Co. Rd. Comm., 152 Mich.App. 123, 127, 393 N.W.2d 579 (1986). In a negligence case, summary disposition is properly granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) if it is determined as a matter of law that defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. New Hampshire Ins. Group v. Labombard, 155 Mich.App. 369, 371, 399 N.W.2d 527 (1986).

It is undisputed that the decedent was defendants' business invitee. A business invitor owes a duty to invitees to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, exercising due care to prevent situations which it knows or should know might result in injury. Askew v. Parry, 131 Mich.App. 276, 278-279, 345 N.W.2d 686 (1983).

In Gorby v. Yeomans, 4 Mich.App. 339, 343, 144 N.W.2d 837 (1966), this Court articulated the duty of a bar to its customers when it adopted the following rules of liability:

"The duty of a tavern keeper to protect a patron from injury by another arises only when...