Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Emp. of America, 9959

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: SPEAR; Frankfurter; McQUADE
• Citation: 93 Idaho 294,460 P.2d 719
• Parties: , 72 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2703 Wilson P. LOCKRIDGE, Plaintiff-Respondent Cross-Appellant, v. AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, an International Labor Union, and Northwest Division 1055 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, a regional division of the International Union, Defendants-Appellants.
• Docket Number: No. 9959,9959
• Decision Date: 15 October 1969

Page 719

460 P.2d 719 93 Idaho 294, 72 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2703 Wilson P. LOCKRIDGE, Plaintiff-Respondent Cross-Appellant,
v.
AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, an International Labor Union, and Northwest Division 1055 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, a regional division of the International Union, Defendants-Appellants. No. 9959. Supreme Court of Idaho. Oct. 15, 1969.

[93 Idaho 295]

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McClenahan & Greenfield, Boise, Earle W. Putnam, Cole & Groner, Washington, D. C., Bailey, Swink, Haas, & Malm and Seagraves & Lansing, Portland, Or., for appellant.

Anderson, Kaufman, Anderson & Ringert, Boise, for respondents.

SPEAR, Justice.

This is the second appearance of this cause before this court. See Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. El. Ry. & M. C. Emp., 84 Idaho 201, 369 P.2d 1006 (1962). The issue presented is the same: 'Does the National Labor Relations Act pre-empt state court jurisdiction over the question of whether a union member has been improperly expelled from membership in the union for alleged non-payment of dues in violation of the contractual relationship between the two?' Appellant union urges that seven decisions subsequent to the previous Lockidge decision require reversal of that decision. Appellant points particularly to Local 100 of United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 83 S.Ct. 1423, 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963); Local No. 207, International Ass'n etc. Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 83 S.Ct. 1429, 10 L.Ed.2d 646 (1963); Cox's Food Center, Inc. v. Retail Clerks U. Loc. No. 1653, 91 Idaho 274, 420 P.2d 645 (1966); and Day v. Northwest Division 1055, et al., 238 Or. 624, 389 P.2d 42 (1964). It is the opinion of this court that the issues in this case are identical to those presented in International Ass'n. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 78 S.Ct. 923, 2 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1958), and as such require an affirmance of the decision below. However, since the decisions in Borden and Perko have to some extent impaired the vitality of Gonzales, we feel that further elaboration of the facts and law relied upon must be made and the scope of Lockridge limited as set forth herein.

Wilson P. Lockridge was born October 15, 1915. He had a limited education, completing his formal education at the conclusion of the 8th grade. Between the ages of approximately fourteen and twenty-two, he was employed on his father's farm. Thereafter, from 1937 until May 1943 he drove truck for a creamery. In May of 1943 respondent Lockridge went to work for Union Pacific Stages, driving a bus. At that time he also became a member of the appellant union. In 1945 Lockridge began working for Greyhound Corporation or a subsidiary thereof which acquired Union Pacific Stages. Thereafter Lockridge was continually a member of the union and employed by Greyhound until November 2, 1959. On November 11 or 12, 1959, after returning from a hunting trip, Lockridge was informed that his membership in the union had been terminated and a request had been made by the union to representatives of Greyhound that his employment be [93 Idaho 296]

Page 721

terminated. The contents of this letter, dated November 2, 1959, is set forth as follows:

'Mr. W. H. Egger, Regional Manager

Eighth and Stewart Streets

Seattle, Washington

Dear Mr. Egger:

Mr. Elmer J. Day and Mr. W. P. Lockridge are not in good standing in our Union. They have suspended themselves from membership so in compliance with Section 3 of Contract B, I am asking that you remove them from employment.

Sincerely,

/s/ C. A. BANKHEAD

C. A. Bankhead

Financial Secretary'

At that time a contract existed between appellant and Greyhound which contained the following pertinent provision referred to in the Bankhead letter:

'3. Membership in and Recognition of the Association, Grievances and Arbitration: (a) All present employees covered by this contract shall become members of the ASSOCIATION not later than thirty (30) days following its effective date and shall remain members as a condition precedent to continued employment. This section shall apply to newly hired employees thirty (30) days from the date of their employment with the COMPANY.'

The pertinent part of the Union's Constitution and General Laws, provided as follows:

'DUES, SUSPENSIONS AND REINSTATEMENTS

'Sec. 91. All dues, * * * of the members of this Association are due and payable on the first day of each month for that month, * * * They must be paid by the fifteenth of the month in order to continue the member in good standing. * * * A member in arrears for his dues, * * * after the fifteenth day of the month is not in good standing * * * and where a member allows his arrearage in dues, fines and assessments to run into the second month before paying the same, he shall be debarred from benefits for one month after payment. Where a member allows his arrearage for dues, fines and assessments to run over the last day of the second month without payment, he does thereby suspend himself from membership in this Association, * * * Where agreements with employing companies provide that members must be in continuous good financial standing, the member in arrears one month may be suspended from membership and removed from employment, in compliance with terms of the agreement.' (Emphasis added.)

It is obvious from a reading of the materials quoted above, that Lockridge was not subject to suspension or dismissal from the union for non-payment of October dues on November 2, 1959. It is equally obvious that Mr. Bankhead confused Section 3 of Contract B, the only one applicable to Lockridge with Section 3 of Contract C, which provided for suspension of members not in good standing. ¹

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At this point it is interesting to note the results of the divergent remedies which were sought by the two suspended members. Day immediately filed an unfair labor practice charge with the N.L.R.B. Seattle Regional Office. Lockridge began petitioning the union for redress of his grievances. Day's petition was rejected by the regional director of the N.L.R.B.. ²

Lockridge's appeal was rejected by the union. ³

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The basis for the Regional Director's decision is not too clear, but it is obvious that the union had terminated Lockridge's membership. On the other hand, Greyhound, by letter of February 2, 1960, obviously felt obligated to withhold employment from Lockridge until his membership status in the union was restored. Thus Lockridge (and Day for that matter) could not be employed by Greyhound until restored to membership. At this point it must have been clear to both men that they would not obtain relief from either the union, the employer or the N.L.R.B. Therefore, they each turned to their respective state courts. After the jury had returned a verdict in Day's favor, the union appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment in Day v. Northwest Division 1055, et al., 238 Or. 624, 389 P.2d 42 (1964), stating that the subject-matter had been pre-empted and that Borden and Perko were controlling. The United States Supreme Court denied review.

Appellant's position may be summarized by three contentions: (1) Congress has pre-empted all state court jurisdiction over union-member relationships since it has comprehensively regulated the field. (2) There was no unfair labor practice because Lockridge's dismissal from the union and consequently from employment was in accord with union rules and the contract and therefore was protected by the proviso to sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and sec. 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act ⁴ and at the very least there would be no cause of action. (3) If this was not a proper dismissal in accordance with union rules and the contract, then the dismissal was in violation of 8(b)(1)(A) generally and 8(b)(2) in particular and therefore an unfair labor practice. In other words, a union cannot, first of all and in general, impair the right [93 Idaho 299]

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of an employee to either join or refrain from joining a union, in violation of 8(b) (1)(A) and, second of all, in particular, a union cannot cause the employer to discriminate against an employee by having the former terminate the latter's employment for some reason other than non-payment of regular dues, in violation of 8(b)(2). The union then argues that since the trial court found Lockridge had paid his dues on time the union necessarily committed an unfair labor practice. Therefore, since San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959) held that conduct which was arguably an unfair labor practice was preempted, the union's conduct in this case being certainly an unfair labor practice must be pre-empted. We shall deal with each of these contentions in order.

(1) There is total pre-emption of the field.

This proposition is not true. Appellant's argument on this point sweeps with too wide a broom. We find under part (3) hereinafter that this court has jurisdiction over the particular subject matter of this particular suit, and it necessarily follows that the broad proposition of total pre-emption, which appellant argues here, is not valid.

(2) This was a proper dismissal and therefore protected activity.

This argument, too, can be summarily dismissed because appellnt has conceded on this appeal that it did not dismiss respondent in accordance with either union rules or the contract with Greyhound. Furthermore, appellant did not seriously contend otherwise in the court below since its arguments were almost exclusively directed toward the court's jurisdiction with respect to service of process and subjectmatter jurisdiction. Finally, it is readily apparent, on the basis of those portions of the labor contract and the union constitution hereinbefore cited, that this is a position which is untenable. The...