Lockridge v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 27 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:12-cv-4135-BN,3:12-cv-4135-BN |
| Parties | TAMMIE FAY LOCKRIDGE, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Plaintiff Tammie Fay Lockridge, appearing pro se, seeks judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons stated herein, the hearing decision is affirmed in all respects.
Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled due to a variety of ailments, including diabetes, abscess, glaucoma, hypertension, high cholesterol, arthritis, obesity, endometrial hyperplasia, hyperglycemia, anxiety, depression, polycystic ovarian syndrome, and degenerative hip disease. After her application for supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). That hearing was held on April 12, 2011. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 52 years old. She has a General Educational Development ("GED") high school equivalency degree and has past work experience as a driver, nurse's aide, and food server. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2002.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to SSI benefits. Although the medical evidence established that Plaintiff suffered severe impairments of diabetes, abscess, glaucoma, hypertension, high cholesterol, arthritis, obesity, endometrial hyperplasia, hyperglycemia, anxiety, depression, polycystic ovarian syndrome, and degenerative hip disease, the ALJ concluded that the combination of impairments did not meet or equal the severity of any impairment listed in the Social Security regulations. The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform heavy work with restrictions and that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform her past relevant work as a driver, nurse's aide, and server.
Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Appeals Council. The Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, and the ALJ's decision became final.
Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court. Plaintiff appears to argue that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's determination that she has not been under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, and specifically challenges his findings that (1) the record does not reflect an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the impairments listed in the Social Security regulations; (2) Plaintiff's allegations of functional limitations are not fully credible; and (3) Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work as a driver, nurse's aide, or server.
The Court determines that the hearing decision should be affirmed in all respects.
Judicial review in social security cases is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were used to evaluate the evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The Commissioner, rather than the courts, must resolve conflicts in the evidence, including weighing conflicting testimony and determining witnesses' credibility, and the Court does not try the issues de novo. See Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994). This Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's but must scrutinize the entire record to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports the hearing decision. See Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988).
A disabled worker is entitled to monthly social security benefits if certain conditions are met. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or last for a continued period of 12 months. See id. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation process that must be followed in making a disability determination:
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f); Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2007) (). The claimant bears the initial burden of establishing a disability through the first four steps of the analysis; on the fifth, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other substantial work in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Audler, 501 F.3d at 448. A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review isconclusive and terminates the analysis. See Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987).
In reviewing the propriety of a decision that a claimant is not disabled, the Court's function is to ascertain whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's final decision. The Court weighs four elements to determine whether there is substantial evidence of disability: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history. See Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174.
The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the facts relating to a claim for disability benefits. See Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. If the ALJ does not satisfy this duty, the resulting decision is not substantially justified. See id. However, the Court does not hold the ALJ to procedural perfection and will reverse the ALJ's decision as not supported by substantial evidence where the claimant shows that the ALJ failed to fulfill the duty to adequately develop the record only if that failure prejudiced Plaintiff, see Jones v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2012) - that is, only if Plaintiff's substantial rights have been affected, see Audler, 501 F.3d at 448. "Prejudice can be established by showing that additional evidence would have been produced if the ALJ had fully developed the record, and that the additional evidence might have led to a different decision." Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 n.22. Put another way, Plaintiff "must show that he could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the result." Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1996).
That Plaintiff is pro se in her appeal of the ALJ's decision imposes an additional layer of consideration for the Court. As other courts have recognized, a lay plaintiff is unfamiliar with legal terms of art such as "substantial evidence" and lacks expertise in the rules governing Social Security regulations. See Washington v. Barnhart, 413 F. Supp. 2d 784, 791 (E.D. Tex. 2006). Moreover, no statute, regulation, or court decision prescribes a precise analytical model for pro se actions seeking judicial review of adverse administrative decisions by the Commissioner. See Elam v. Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 746, 752 (E.D. Tex. 2005). More often than not, pro se litigants in Section 405(g) appeals invite the Court to re-weigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion than did the Commissioner, which the Court may not do. See Washington, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 791. Necessarily, the level of scrutiny rests in each reviewing court's sound discretion. See Elam, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 753. But several universal principles factor logically into that equation. Courts must construe pro se pleadings and arguments liberally in light of a party's lay status but must maintain their role as neutral and unbiased arbiters. That is, courts are not bound to "scour the record for every conceivable error," but fundamental fairness and interests of justice require that courts not disregard obvious errors, especially when a...
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