Lockridge v. State, 275S38
| Citation | 263 Ind. 678,338 N.E.2d 275 |
| Decision Date | 08 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 275S38,275S38 |
| Parties | Perry DeWayne LOCKRIDGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Harry L. Zerbe, Lawrenceburg, Charles A. Thompson, Columbus, Ohio, Bobby Jay Small, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
The Appellant, Perry DeWayne Lockridge, stands convicted of the first degree murder of his brother, William Lockridge. Evidence at trial revealed that the two brothers lived with their father in Lawrenceburg, Indiana. On the evening of November 13, 1972, the two brothers argued over a stereo speaker. Following this argument, the Appellant went to another room of the family home and obtained a shotgun. He returned upstairs, shot and killed his brother.
The Appellant was arrested shortly after the Killing. On November 14, 1972, Judge Lester G. Baker of the Circuit Court of Dearborn County determined that jurisdiction over the Appellant should be acquired by the Juvenile Court and authorized the county probation officer to so petition the Juvenile Court. The appellant was then fifteen years old. That same day the probation officer petitioned the Juvenile Court to take jurisdiction. The prosecutor of the Seventh Judicial Circuit petitioned the Juvenile Court to waive jurisdiction and transfer the Appellant to regular criminal court.
Pauper counsel was appointed for the Appellant by the Juvenile Court on November 17, 1972. On that same day an insanity plea was filed on behalf of the Appellant by his attorney. A hearing on waiver of jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court was held on November 17, 1972, with the court withholding its ruling on the petition to waive jurisdiction until the Appellant could be psychologically evaluated. Following examination of the Appellant by court-appointed and defense psychiatrists, a hearing on the sanity of the Appellant was held March 20, 1973.
On April 3, 1973, the Appellant filed a Motion for Civil Commitment. On April 16, 1973, this motion was denied and the Appellant was ordered transferred to regular adult criminal court. An indictment against the Appellant for first degree murder was issued on April 24, 1973. On June 1, 1973, a defense Motion for Continuance was granted. On November 6, 1973, the trial court heard evidence on the Appellant's competency to stand trial. The Appellant was found not competent to cooperate with counsel and stand trial. He was committed to Beatty Memorial Hospital until February 5, 1974. On that date, the court found the Appellant competent to stand trial and ordered him returned to Dearborn County.
Trial was commenced on June 11, 1974. The jury returned its verdict of guilty on June 21, 1974. A Motion to Correct Errors was filed on August 29, 1974. From the denial of that motion on November 21, 1974, the Appellant now presents this appeal.
The Appellant's first contention of error is that the trial court in which he was convicted was without jurisdiction over him because of an invalid waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court. In this case the validity of this waiver of jurisdiction is not important. In a sense, the Juvenile Court could not invalidly waive that which it did not have.
Ind.Code § 33--12--2--3 (Burns 1975) provides that a juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction, absent waiver, in all cases in which a child is alleged to be delinquent, dependent, or neglected. The term 'Delinquent Child' was defined at the time of trial to mean, among other things, a child under eighteen years of age who 'commits an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment.' Ind.Code § 31--5--7--4 (Burns 1973).
This court has interpreted 'punishable by death or life imprisonment' to 'apply to crimes for which the death penalty is possible.' Cummings v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 701 at 706, 251 N.E.2d 663 at 666--667. The statutory scheme at the time of the Appellant's trial thus removed from the juvenile system individuals under eighteen years of age charged with a crime carrying by statute a possible death sentence. This definition of jurisdiction remained valid regardless of whether or not that penalty could constitutionally be carried out. Martin v. State (1974), Ind., 314 N.E.2d 60. Such was the case with the Appellant's charge of first degree murder. Under such circumstances jurisdiction is not placed in the juvenile court in the first instance, but in regular criminal court.
'(A) prosecutor cannot seek nor the grand jury return, an indictment, nor may the prosecutor file an affidavit in a court of criminal jurisdiction against any person known to be under eighteen years of age unless the case is within the statutory exceptions.' State ex rel. Atkins v. Juvenile Court of Marion County (1969), 252 Ind. 237 at 242--243, 247 N.E.2d 53 at 56. This case falls within the statutory exceptions and the trial court thus validly acquired jurisdiction through the Appellant's indictment for first degree murder. The Juvenile Court could have no jurisdiction upon the return of the indictment against the Appellant.
The Appellant's second allegation of error concerns the admission into evidence of statements made by the Appellant to police officers and the prosecuting attorney. It is contended that these statements were made without full compliance with the advisement requirements of Miranda v. Arizona as applied to juveniles in Lewis v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138. The Lewis decision provides that a juvenile's statement or confession cannot be used against him at trial unless he and his parent or guardian were informed of the rights being waived and unless the juvenile was given an opportunity to confer with his parent, guardian, or attorney regarding that waiver.
Before addressing the merits of this issue, we must confront the fact that the Appellant did not object at trial to the admission of this evidence. We do not consider this issue waived because the Appellant presented to the court prior to trial a motion in limine which, in part, asked that the Appellant's pre-trial statements be excluded. This part of the Appellant's motion was overruled. Objection at trial would have been desirable, but the issue was so thoroughly argued and the Court's ruling was so specific that further objection may be considered fruitless. The issue was included in Appellant's Motion to Correct Errors and we find it preserved for appeal.
We find, however, that the Appellant's contention is without merit. The statements by the Appellant to police officers were made shortly after his arrest, while he was being driven from the scene of the crime in a police car. As related by one of the patrolmen at trial, the Appellant's statements were as follows:
'A. * * * We didn't really question him but Deputy Ashley asked him why he had done it. I don't recall his answer. One time he said--'Only an animal would do something like this.'
Q. What else did he say?
A. He said--'I will get the electric chair for this' and I remember trying to quiet him down at that time and I said--'We haven't given any body the electric chair since the early 1950's.' I wasn't sure but I made the statement to him. Then he said--'What will happen if I act insane' and we kind of left that unanswered.
Q. Was there anything else said between that time and the time you finally arrived at the Sheriff's office?
A. I don't believe so. We never said too much. * * *'
The Appellant had been read his Miranda warnings after his arrest, before making these statements. While there was not a parent or guardian present, we find neither this nor the presence of warnings controlling. Rather, we find that this exchange was not a custodial interrogation within the contemplation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and Lewis v. State, supra. These cases do not require the exclusion from evidence of volunteered statements such as those made here. Moreover, these comments were more than covered by other statements made the next day. These later statements were also admitted into evidence and rendered any error harmless.
The later statements were made at a true custodial interrogation of the Appellant conducted at the office of the prosecuting attorney. Present with the Appellant were the prosecutor, two policemen (one of whom was a friend of the Appellant's family), the county probation officer, the Appellant's sister, and the Appellant's father. Before any questions were asked, the Appellant was again advised of his constitutional rights in the presence of all attending. The Appellant indicated that he understood those rights.
This procedure complied with the requirements of Lewis v. State, supra. The Appellant urges that he was provided with no true opportunity to confer with his father, but we can not agree. As a practical matter, repeated interruptions by police advising the Appellant to take such opportunity would have apparently had the same result since the record reveals that the Appellant's father volunteered answers himself during this questioning. More generally, this entire inquiry went far to avoid the oppressive inquisitorial procedure which Miranda, Lewis and similar cases have sought to prevent. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Constitution of the State of Indiana requires more of the State than was provided here.
The trial court refused to read to the Jury Defendant's Tendered Instruction No. 1:
'You are instructed that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity means that the accused will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the Department of Mental Health is satisfied and the Court is satisfied that the accused has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others.'
The Appellant contends that the trial court's...
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