Lockwood v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 20 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | 6:16-CV-0648 (CFH) |
| Parties | STEPHEN LOCKWOOD, Plaintiff, v. COMM'R OF SOC. SEC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R. DOLSON
126 North Salina Street, Suite 3B
Syracuse, New York 13202
Counsel for Plaintiff
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.
STEVEN R. DOLSON, ESQ.
ANDREEA L. LECHLEITNER, ESQ.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by Stephen Lockwood ("Plaintiff") against the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or "the Commissioner") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 9, 11.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied, and Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. The Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff's disability benefits is affirmed, and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.
Plaintiff was born in 1964, making him 47 years old at the alleged onset date and 50 years old at the date of the ALJ's decision. (T. 33)1 Plaintiff reported graduating from high school. (Id.). The ALJ found he has past relevant work as a corrections officer, landscape laborer, and forklift operator. (Id. at 23). Generally, Plaintiff alleges disability consisting of injuries to his neck, lower back, bilateral hands, and shoulder.
Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on July 26, 2013, alleging disability beginning November 11, 2011. Plaintiff's application was initially denied on October 8, 2013, after which he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Plaintiff appeared at a video hearing before ALJ Lisa B. Martin on June 2, 2014. (T. 28-43). On October 27, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Id. 17-24.) On May 3, 2016, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff's request for review, adopting the majority of the ALJ's findings and rationale, but adding their own specific findings to support the presence of a substantial number of jobs that Plaintiff could perform when considering his change in age category during the relevant period. (Id. 1-8.)
(T. 19-20.) Sixth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has past relevant work, but is unable to perform any of those jobs with the above limitations. (T. 23.) Finally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not disabled at Step Five because he retains the ability to perform other work in the national economy as a retail clerk, new account clerk, and sub-assembler of small electrical parts. (T. 23-24.)
The Appeals Council granted review of Plaintiff's claim due to the ALJ's failure to discuss and account for Plaintiff's change in age category from a younger individual to an individual closely approaching advanced age during the period at issue. (T. 4-5.) The AppealsCouncil adopted the ALJ's findings related to Steps One through Four of the sequential evaluation, but modified the finding at Step Five, indicating that Plaintiff was not disabled either before or after the age change because he remained able to perform the light and sedentary occupations identified by the vocational expert and the ALJ. (T. 5-7.) The Appeals Council therefore concluded that Plaintiff had not been disabled at any time from his alleged onset date through October 27, 2014, the date of the ALJ's decision. (T. 7.)
Generally, Plaintiff asserts two arguments in support of his motion for judgment on the pleadings. First Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed harmful error in failing to address and resolve conflicts between the vocational expert's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("D.O.T."). (Dkt. No. 9, at 5-7 [Pl. Mem. of Law].) More specifically, Plaintiff argues that there was a conflict between a limitation for avoidance of all overhead reaching and the specification in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations ("S.C.O.") that the jobs identified by the vocational expert required the ability to reach frequently. (Id.) Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to solicit an explanation for the inconsistency between the RFC for lifting and carrying a maximum of 15 pounds occasionally with the definition of light work, which he asserts requires the ability to lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally. (Dkt. No. 9, at 7 [Pl. Mem. of Law].)
Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed harmful error in failing to consider or account for a statement from Nurse Practitioner Carmelita Woods, N.P., that Plaintiff had a 50 percent impairment of the right hand and 25 percent impairment of the left hand. (Dkt. No. 9, at 8 [Pl. Mem. of Law].)
Generally, Defendant asserts two arguments in support of her motion for judgment on the pleadings. In response to Plaintiff's first argument, Defendant argues that there was no conflict that needed to be resolved between the vocational expert's testimony and the D.O.T. and S.C.O. (Dkt. No. 11, at 15-21 [Def. Mem. of Law].) More specifically, Defendant argues that the vocational expert's testimony that she relied on her experience when forming her opinion provided a sufficient explanation as to any deviation from the D.O.T. and S.C.O. (Dkt. No. 11, at 16-17 [Def. Mem. of Law].) Defendant also argues that there was no conflict regarding overhead reaching despite the fact that the D.O.T. does not distinguish between overhead reaching and reaching in other directions because the narrative descriptions of the identified jobs do not indicate that overhead reaching is required in these jobs. (Dkt. No. 11, at 18-19 [Def. Mem. of Law].) Lastly, Defendant argues that, even if these conflicts did exist, the vocational expert provided an example of a sedentary job that would not be precluded by the conflicts, and so any errors would at most be harmless. (Dkt. No. 11, at 20-21 [Def. Mem. of Law].)
In response to Plaintiff's second argument, Defendant argues that the ALJ did not ignore Nurse Practitioner Woods' assessment related to manipulative limitations because she specifically indicated that she considered all the evidence in the record, and because she specifically cited to portions of other treatment notes in the same exhibit where Nurse Practitioner Wood's assessment is located. (Dkt. No. 11, at 6 [Def. Mem. of Law].) Defendant also argues that there is no indication that Nurse Practitioner Woods' assessment conflicts with the RFC, and that her statement is vague. (Dkt. No. 11, at 6-7 [Def. Mem. of Law].) Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not shown why the ALJ would have been required to rely on Nurse Practitioner Woods' assessment over the other evidence in the record. (Dkt. No. 11, at 7-15 [Def. Mem. of Law].)
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner's determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla," meaning that in the record one can find "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal citations omitted)). The substantial evidence standard is Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where there is...
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