Lockwood v. Lockwood
Decision Date | 13 April 1897 |
Citation | 67 Minn. 476,70 N.W. 784 |
Parties | LOCKWOOD v LOCKWOOD ET UX. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
(Syllabus by the Court.)
1. A married woman can maintain an action against persons who wrongfully entice her husband from her and alienate his affections, and thereby cause a separation between them.
2. Evidence considered, and held sufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff, and that the amount of the verdict is not excessive.
Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; C. B. Elliott, Judge.
Action by Mae Alice Lockwood against John E. Lockwood and wife. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Koon, Whelan & Bennett, for appellants.
Welch, Hayne, Hubachek & Conlin, for respondent.
This action was brought against John E. Lockwood and Mattie Lockwood, husband and wife, to recover damages for the alleged alienation by them of the affections of Edwin L. Lockwood, their son, from his wife, the plaintiff, Mae Alice Lockwood, and for her consequent loss of his support, protection, and society. The answer of the defendants was a general denial, and upon trial to a jury the plaintiff had a verdict for $15,000; and, defendants' motion for a new trial having been denied, they bring this appeal. All the parties have resided in the city of Minneapolis for many years. At the time of plaintiff's marriage she was 30 years old, and her husband's age was 35. They were married on the 8th day of November, 1894, and the separation took place on the 25th or 26th day of September, 1895. The defendant John E. Lockwood is the president of the Union Iron Works, in the city of Minneapolis, and the son, Edwin L. Lockwood, is the secretary and treasurer of the company. The elder Lockwood lives in a very nice home, and has horses and carriages, and everything necessary to live comfortably. The marriage of Edwin L. Lockwood and this plaintiff took place at the home of a mutual friend, without the knowledge of the defendants. The plaintiff's husband has always lived with his parents. On the day of his marriage he announced it in a note written to his parents, and the father, by note, invited him and his wife to come to his home and live; stating therein, also, that he was surprised, but pleased, to hear of their marriage, and that he always had great respect for the plaintiff. The next day the plaintiff and her husband went to defendants' house to reside, and resided there until their separation in the month of September, 1895. Previous to the time of her marriage, plaintiff had supported herself by her own labor as a dressmaker, and for several weeks at a time, in the spring and fall, for three years previous to her marriage, had worked as dressmaker for the defendants at their home, where she first met her future husband. The character and reputation of the plaintiff stand unchallenged. Nowhere, either in the record or in the argument of counsel, is it assailed in the slightest degree. Therefore want of good character formed no basis for the unfortunate family difficulties resulting in the bringing of this action, and which the defendants' counsel strenuously contends cannot be maintained by the plaintiff, as wife of Edwin L. Lockwood, even if the conduct of the defendants was the primary cause of alienating his affections from plaintiff, and depriving her of his support, protection, and society.
1. At common law the husband had a right of action for damages against third persons for alienating the affections of the wife, enticing her away, and depriving him of her society; but whether the wife had this right at common law against third persons for alienating the affections of her husband, enticing him away from her, and thus depriving her of his society, protection, and support, we do not deem material in this case. It is ruled in some jurisdictions that she has no such right, while in others it is held that she may maintain such action upon common-law principles. The question has never been passed upon by this court either as a common-law or statutory right. But upon an examination of our statutes we find that many of the disabilities under which married women labored at common law have been removed. The letter and spirit of these laws tend strongly to place the wife upon an equality with the husband, as respects her property and personal rights. If, therefore, there is any authority under the statute to enforce her rights in regard to such matters by proceedings in her own name, independently of her husband, we need not seek in the principles of the common law for authority to uphold her right to maintain this action. Equality of right ought to give equality of remedy. If there are exceptions, we see no grounds upon which they should be applied in a case of this kind, where the rights and remedies of the parties should be reciprocal. In the case of Warren v. Warren, 89 Mich. 123, 50 N. W. 842, it is well said by the court: Our constitution (article 1, § 8) provides that every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character. Unless there is some plain provision of law to the contrary, a married woman should receive the same protection of all her rights as a woman which her husband does as a man; and for any injury sustained to her reputation, person, property, character, or any natural right, she should have the same right to appeal, in her own name alone, to the courts of law or equity, for redress and protection, that her husband has to appeal in his name alone. What rights has he to protect? His reputation, person, property, character, and his natural rights. She has the same right. Is her right to the conjugal society of the husband one that comes within the letter and spirit of existing laws? In the case of Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 Atl. 1027, it is said: The husband's right of action does not rest upon the ground of loss of service, but upon the loss of conjugal society or consortium arising by virtue of the marriage contract. Bigelow, Torts, 153. Jaynes v. Jaynes, 39 Hun, 43, in which it is also said “that such a right was a property right, but, if it be not property in the sense in which the word ‘property’ is used in the statute cited, it is a personal right; and as the statute extends to all injuries, whether to property, person, or character, it seems sufficiently competent to embrace an injury to the right in question.” See, also, Warren v. Warren, 89 Mich. 123, 50 N. W. 842, to the same effect. In Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17, it was held that such an interference with the rights of the wife was a violation of her natural rights. We approve of these decisions as being sound law as well as good sense.
To a great extent, the statute has broken down the legal fiction that the husband and wife were one, and hence, in actions of wrong done to her property or person, she is placed upon the same plane as the husband. Under our statutes relating to the rights of married women, they can own all classes of property, and receive the rents and profits of the same, free from the control of the husband. Actions may be brought by and against a married woman in relation to her sole property in the same manner as if she was unmarried. She may also maintain actions for personal wrongs done her, and the damages received would belong to and be her personal property. She is not liable for the debts of her husband, nor is the husband liable for any debts or contract of the wife, except for necessaries furnished her after marriage. The whole tenor of our statute relating to the rights of a married woman shows the tendency to abrogate the common-law unity of husband and wife, and, if the common law ever stood in the way of her maintaining an action of this kind, she has, by statutory enactments, been emancipated from its thralldom, and stands upon grounds more in accord with enlightened thought and natural justice. Upon reason, a wife ought to be entitled to maintain such an action. Bigelow, Torts, 153. In note 2, p. 267, of Cooley on Torts, the author says: “We see no reason why such an action should not be supported where by statute the wife is allowed, for...
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