Lockwood v. W.R. Grace & Co.
Decision Date | 03 August 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 94-371,94-371 |
Citation | 272 Mont. 202,900 P.2d 314 |
Parties | Ruth L. LOCKWOOD, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Darrell W. Lockwood, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. W.R. GRACE & COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Tom L. Lewis, Great Falls, for appellant.
Gary L. Graham; Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, for respondent.
Ruth Lockwood appeals from orders of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, granting W.R. Grace & Company's motion to dismiss her complaint with prejudice and denying her motion to alter or amend the judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that Gidley v. W.R. Grace & Co. does not permit Lockwood to escape the exclusivity of the Occupational Disease Act of Montana?
2. Did the District Court err in granting Grace's motion to dismiss and in denying Lockwood's motion to alter or amend?
Darrell Lockwood (Darrell) worked for W.R. Grace & Company (Grace) in its vermiculite mine and mill for approximately ten years until he retired in 1984. Six years later, he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, an asbestos-specific cancer of the lining of the lungs. Darrell died in 1991. Ruth Lockwood (Lockwood), Darrell's widow, submitted a claim for beneficiaries' occupational disease benefits with Crawford & Company (Crawford), the adjuster for Grace's Occupational Disease Act of Montana (MODA) insurer. Crawford denied the claim on the basis that the three-year statute of limitations contained in § 39-72-403, MCA (1983), had run. Lockwood did not formally file a claim or petition for MODA benefits after Crawford's denial.
Lockwood filed survival and wrongful death actions against Grace. Grace moved to dismiss Lockwood's complaint. It asserted that, taking Lockwood's allegations as true, her complaint stated an occupational disease claim for which compensation under the MODA was the exclusive remedy pursuant to § 39-72-305, MCA (1983). After full briefing and oral argument, the District Court granted Grace's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that Gidley v. W.R. Grace & Co. (1986), 221 Mont. 36, 717 P.2d 21, does not preserve Lockwood's common law actions and thereby allow her to avoid MODA exclusivity.
Lockwood subsequently moved to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 59(g), M.R.Civ.P. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that Lockwood's complaint was insufficient to avoid MODA exclusivity via allegations that Grace committed an intentional tort. Lockwood appeals.
of the Occupational Disease Act of Montana?
The MODA generally provides for compensation by an employer to an employee disabled by reason of occupational disease arising out of the course of employment. See, e.g., §§ 39-72-302 and 39-72-401, MCA. It applies to all employers and employees subject to Montana's Workers' Compensation Act. Section 39-72-301, MCA. The MODA statutes in effect on an employee's last day of work govern resolution of an occupational disease claim. Gidley, 717 P.2d at 22. Because Darrell's last day of employment with Grace was in 1984, the 1983 version of the MODA is applicable here.
Section 39-72-305(1), MCA (1983), provides that the right to recover compensation for an employment-related occupational disease, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive remedy against a properly insured employer. In granting Grace's motion to dismiss, the District Court concluded that Lockwood's claim "is governed exclusively by the Occupational Disease Act."
Lockwood argues that, under Gidley, her causes of action are not barred by the MODA exclusivity provision. Her reliance on Gidley is misplaced.
The sole issue on appeal in Gidley was whether the MODA constituted the exclusive remedy for the widow of a deceased Grace employee's cancer-related death where the occupational disease allegedly was not discovered until after the MODA statute of limitations had run. The 1977 MODA statutes were applicable and our resolution of the issue turned on the proper interpretation of §§ 92-1308 and 92-1331, R.C.M. (1977). Section 92-1308, R.C.M. (1977), provided that the MODA was the exclusive remedy for employment-related occupational diseases "against the employer electing to be bound by and subject to this act ...;" § 92-1331, R.C.M. (1977), barred common law actions for employment-related occupational diseases "excepting for those employees not eligible for compensation under the terms of this act, or who reject coverage of this act...." Gidley, 717 P.2d at 22.
Concluding that the two statutes were at least ambiguous, if not contradictory, we looked to the legislative history of the MODA and to § 92-1368, R.C.M., which provided that the MODA was to be liberally construed. Gidley, 717 P.2d at 23. Applying the MODA statutes to the facts, we determined that the deceased employee's occupational disease claim was barred by the MODA statute of limitations and, therefore, that the employee was "not eligible for compensation" under the MODA. On that basis, we held that the common law right of action was preserved under § 92-1331, R.C.M. (1977), and that the MODA did not constitute the widow's exclusive remedy. Gidley, 717 P.2d at 23-24.
Our decision in Gidley was dependent upon the ambiguous and contradictory statutes at issue there. Section 92-1331, R.C.M. (1977), was repealed in 1979. Section 92-1308, R.C.M. (1977), was amended in 1979 and recodified as § 39-72-305, MCA, which in the version applicable here states only that the MODA is the exclusive remedy against a properly insured employer for an occupational disease arising from employment. See § 39-72-305(1), MCA (1983). Thus, while Gidley and the present case share factual similarities, Gidley has no application here and does not support Lockwood's argument that her causes of action are preserved and are not barred by § 39-72-305(1), MCA (1983).
We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that Gidley neither preserves Lockwood's common law actions nor permits her to escape the exclusivity of the Occupational Disease Act of Montana. Issues relating solely to whether Lockwood's MODA claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations are not properly before us in this action and must await resolution in the event Lockwood litigates a MODA claim.
Grace premised its motion to dismiss on the exclusivity of the MODA remedy. Lockwood's opposition to the motion largely tracked Grace's arguments, although she presented the allegations of her complaint at some length. The District Court granted Grace's motion and dismissed Lockwood's complaint with prejudice, concluding that Lockwood's claim is governed exclusively by the MODA.
Lockwood subsequently moved the court to alter or amend its order of dismissal. She argued, in pertinent part, that her complaint alleges facts bringing the action within the "intentional and active injurious conduct" exception to exclusivity. The District Court denied Lockwood's motion on the basis that the allegations in her complaint were insufficient to avoid exclusivity as a matter of law.
Our standard in reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., is clear:
Boreen v. Christensen (1994), 267 Mont. 405, 408, 884 P.2d 761, 762 (citation omitted). The determination that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a conclusion of law. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Boreen, 884 P.2d at 762 (citation omitted).
Prior to scrutinizing the allegations at issue here, it will be helpful to review our recent cases holding that, in limited circumstances involving intentional harm, exclusivity can be avoided. In Great Western Sugar Co. v. District Court (1980), 188 Mont. 1, 7, 610 P.2d 717, 720, we explained that the intentional harm which creates the exception to exclusivity is harm which the employer "maliciously and specifically directed at an employee, or class of employee[,] out of which such specific intentional harm the employee receives injuries as a proximate result." Great Western, 610 P.2d at 720. Incidents resulting in employee injury which involve any lesser degree of intent to harm not directed specifically at the injured employee cannot provide a basis for recovery against the employer. Great Western, 610 P.2d at 720. Because only negligence, albeit wanton or malicious negligence, was alleged in Great Western, we held that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the employer and that the complaint must be dismissed. Great Western, 610 P.2d at 719-20.
We revisited the Great Western principles in a summary judgment context in Noonan v. Spring Creek Forest Products (1985), 216 Mont. 221, 700 P.2d 623. There, the employee alleged an intentional tort against the employer. Relying on Great Western, the district court concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the harm suffered was maliciously and specifically...
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