Locust Club v. Hotel and Club Emp. Union, Local No. 568, AFL-CIO
| Decision Date | 21 October 1959 |
| Citation | 155 A.2d 27,397 Pa. 357 |
| Parties | LOCUST CLUB, Appellant, v. HOTEL AND CLUB EMPLOYEES' UNION, LOCAL NO. 568 AFL-CIO, and Lawrence Stoltz. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert H. Kleeb, Kenneth Souser, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Edward Davis, Philadelphia, for appellees.
Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R JONES, COHEN and McBRIDE, JJ.
The Locust Club is a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation organized and operated for the purpose of maintaining a clubhouse and for the promotion of friendship and good citizenship. It operates a bar and restaurant for the pleasure and accommodation of its approximately 30 members and the use thereof by non-member guests is merely incidental. It is not engaged in any industry, commerce, or business separate and apart from the maintenance of the club. The Union is an unincorporated labor organization, its membership being composed in part of cooks, waiters, bartenders, waitresses bus help, dishwashers, bell men and linen room attendants, i e., the same job classifications as those of the persons employed by the club. It represents as bargaining agent such employees of 31 hotels and 2 clubs which are similar to the Locust Club. Lawrence Stoltz is the President and Business Manager of the Union.
In August, 1956, the Union made a demand upon the club for recognition as collective bargaining agent of the club's employees claiming to represent the majority thereof. The club refused. Thereupon the Union, on or about October 18, 1956, caused some employees of the club to strike and has since that time caused the clubhouse to be picketed by varying numbers of persons. It was stipulated that at the time the strike was called and the picketing commenced, the Union represented 12 of a total of 19 employees of the club such as would have constituted an appropriate bargaining unit; that 10 of the 19 employees never participated in the strike; that the 9 employees who did participate in the strike have all been replaced by the club. The various legends of the picket signs have indicated that a strike was in progress, that the club's employees are not members of the union, and also contained the statement 'Union requests your cooperation'.
The request of the club for a preliminary injunction restraining the picketing was refused by Judge Griffiths, the Chancellor, and although the club took an appeal it was later withdrawn. Stipulations of fact were entered into and the matter was decided by the Chancellor on final hearing. The Chancellor filed an adjudication denying injunctive relief and dismissed the complaint. On exceptions his findings were sustained by the court en banc, consisting of Griffiths and Chudoff, JJ. Presisting Judge Hagan dissented.
It is conceded by both parties that the questions before this Court are purely legal since the essential facts are not in dispute. Those questions are twofold: (1) Does the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, [1] apply so as to oust the jurisdiction of the court below to grant an injunction? and (2) Assuming it does not apply, was it error under the circumstances of this case to refuse an injunction?
The legislature has ordained in the Labor Anti-Injunction Act that the courts of Pennsylvania are without jurisdiction to grant a temporary or permanent injunction 'contrary to the public policy declared in this act' or 'in a case included within this act'. 43 P.S. § 206d. The Act stated the public policy of the Commonwealth to be that '* * * the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment * * *' 43 P.S. § 206b.
A is one which grows out of a 'labor dispute' as defined thereon. A 'labor dispute', as stated in 206c(a)(b) and (c), exists where 'the case involves persons who are engaged in a single industry, trade, craft or occupation, or have direct or indirect interests therein,' or concerns 'the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment or concerning employment relations or any other controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer or employe * * *' [2]
The word 'employer' includes a corporation not for profit. [3] The term 'employe' includes all natural persons who perform service for other persons. [4]
We have held in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Overbrook Golf Club, 385 Pa. 358, 123 A.2d 698, that a club is not an employer within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act [5] and hence may not be compelled by the Labor Relations Board to recognize the union or to engage in a collective bargaining agreement with it. That, however, does not mean that the club is prohibited from doing so unless that would be unlawful or constitute an unfair labor practice. It does not follow that the club is not covered by the provisions of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act. That point was not involved in the Overbrook case.
Both acts were passed at the same session of the legislature. Nevertheless, we may not overlook obvious differences in language, particularly in the coverage section; all provisions of each statute must be read so as to effectuate the intention of the legislature.
We are obliged to hold that since the word 'employer' in Section 206c of the Pennsylvania Anti-Injunction Act specifically includes corporations not for profit the Locust Club is an employer within the meaning of that act. It remains to inquire, therefore, whether the present case is a labor dispute as that term is used in the Labor Anti-Injunction Act.
The court below, on sufficient evidence, found as follows:
'The employees of the Club are in direct competition with the employees doing similar work at hotels and restaurants affecting the labor market and the plaintiff is engaged in the respective trades and occupations of its employees so engaged.'
In respect of the club the Chancellor stated, in the adjudication:
'* * * It operates a barber shop in competition with outside shops for the trade of its members. It also operates a restaurant in competition with other restaurants and hotels for the trade of its members for lunches and dinners. No doubt many of its members partake of their downtown, weekday lunches almost exclusively at the club to the loss of such business by other downtown city hostelries. The fact that the restaurant is operated at a loss does not gainsay the simple truth that the club is in the business of selling meals to its members. Many business houses have at times operated at a loss, but such a fact does not, as a chameleon, change the nature of its business by the color of the ink used in its final entry on the balance sheet. Furthermore dues of members are intended to implement such facilities afforded the membership.
We believe the plaintiff is in as much a trade or occupation as any other restaurant or barber shop. * * *'
The court held, therefore, that it lacked the power to grant an injunction because of the provisions of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act.
The club relies upon Western Pennsylvania Hospital v. Lichliter, 340 Pa. 382, 17 A.2d 206, 132 A.L.R. 1146, in which we held that neither the Labor Relations Act nor the Labor Anti-Injunction Act applied to such a hospital. Here, however, it is obvious that the operation of a club, such as the present one, is different from the operation of a hospital so far as concerns the effect of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act. The court below has pointed out the ways in which the activities of this club, with its bar, barbershop and restaurant, partakes of the nature of any other restaurant or hotel except that overnight accommodations are not provided. The fact that its clientele is limited to its membership constitutes a difference in degree and not in kind. The controlling feature is that the employees of the non-profit club perform the identical wageearning duties performed by other employees in profit-making establishments such as hotels and restaurants and thus are engaged in an occupation which gives both an interest in their mutual wages or working conditions. To analogize the operation of this social club to the operation of a charitable hospital, which deals with the health and indeed the life of the general community, would be to prefer shadow to substance.
The relief sought in the present case is against the Union and through it against its membership. Thus this is a controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer and employee and is by definition a 'labor dispute' within the meaning of that term in the Labor Anti-Injunction Act. The Act was a procedural statute designed to protect workmen. The Labor Relations Act was primarily intended to deal with labor disputes by an administrative agency; the Labor anti-Injunction Act was a specific limitation upon the power of courts. That the two are related do not make them necessarily coextensive.
It remains to consider the point raised by the club, that although the union at the time of the strike represented a majority of the employees, it did not do so at the time this suit was instituted. [6] The Chancellor, while recognizing that the Locust Club could not be prevented from replacing the striking employees by administrative or legal procedures, held that this condition should not be...
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