Loder v. McKinney

• Decision Date: 13 September 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:11–CV–979–WKW [WO].
• Citation: 896 F.Supp.2d 1116
• Parties: Charelle LODER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Reese McKINNEY, Jr., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

896 F.Supp.2d 1116

Charelle LODER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Reese McKINNEY, Jr., Defendant.

Case No. 2:11–CV–979–WKW [WO].

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Northern Division.

Sept. 13, 2012.

Alan B. Howard, Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, New York, NY, Daniel Werner, James M. Knoepp, Southern Poverty Law Center, Atlanta, GA, Mary C. Bauer, Samuel J. Brooke, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Sigfredo Rubio, Rubio Law Firm, PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs.

John Mark Englehart, Englehart Law Offices, Henry Lewis Gillis, Tyrone Carlton Means, Thomas Means Gillis & Seay PC, Montgomery, AL, Frederic Allen Bolling, Thomas Means Gillis & Seay PC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W. KEITH WATKINS, Chief Judge.

This case is brought by several individuals who challenge Defendant Probate Judge Reese McKinney's marriage license policy. Plaintiffs contend that the policy requires applicants to present proof of legal residence in the United States and a valid Social Security card in order to receive a marriage license. Plaintiffs allege that this denies the right of marriage to certain non-citizens and to United States citizens whose intended spouse is unable to provide the required documentation. Plaintiffs seek prospective relief through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due process and equal protection. Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the policy. The case is pending on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 19), which is opposed (Doc. # 24). Defendant has replied (Doc. # 26). The motion has been fully briefed and is ready for resolution. After careful consideration of the parties' briefs, arguments, and the applicable law, the Motion to Dismiss is due to be denied.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 2201–02. Personal jurisdiction and venue are not contested, and there are adequate allegations in support of both.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge his policy regarding marriage licenses. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction asserts either a facial or factual challenge to the complaint. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta–Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir.2007) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.1981)¹); accord Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir.1990). Defendant has made a facial attack on the Complaint, asserting that Plaintiffs have not alleged an adequate basis for subject matter jurisdiction because they lack standing to challenge his policy. See Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1227 n. 14 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that standing “raises an even more basic question of jurisdiction that cannot be waived and goes to the very heart of the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III”).

A facial attack challenges the complaint on its face and “require[s] the court merely to look [to] see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction.” McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529). In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Kendall v. Thaxton Rd., LLC, 443 Fed.Appx. 388, 391–92 (11th Cir.2011) (unpublished); cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 & n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (distinguishing between the motion to dismiss stage, at which well-pleaded allegations establishing injury in fact, causation, and redressability suffice, and a plaintiff's burden of proof at trial). The Supreme Court of the United States has said in the context of a standing determination that “[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” United States v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 881 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994)).

III. BACKGROUND

In Alabama, no person may formally marry without a license. Ala.Code § 30–1–9. Alabama Code § 22–9A–17 requires the probate judge to prepare and forward a completed marriage license form to the Bureau of Vital Statistics. The probate judge must complete the marriage license “upon the basis of information obtained from the parties to be married.” Ala.Code § 22–9A–17(b).

The Complaint alleges that as Probate Judge of Montgomery County, Defendant has adopted and implemented a marriage licensing policy that states in relevant part: “Non-citizens of the United States must provide proof of legal presence in the United States in the form of valid immigration documents or passport.” (Doc. # 1 (“Compl.”) at 11–12.) Neither the Code of Alabama nor the Alabama Constitution requires applicants to provide proof of legal presence in the United States to secure a marriage license. The Alabama Attorney General has explicitly stated that “a marriage license can be issued to an applicant who is not a United States citizen.” (Compl. at 10.)

This lawsuit was filed by couples who reside in Alabama and desire to obtain a license to marry in Montgomery County, but are barred from doing so based on an inability to provide the required documentation. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has adopted a policy that requires applicants for marriage licenses to show proof of legal residence in the United States before they can receive a marriage license. Plaintiffs allege that they are otherwise qualified to receive a marriage license and intend to be married. Plaintiffs request to represent a putative class of all persons in Alabama who seek a marriage license, but who cannot receive one based on an inability to provide the documentation required by the probate court. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. In response to the Complaint, Defendant filed the instant Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss.

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant makes three arguments in support of his Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss, all of which involve Plaintiffs' standing to bring this suit. First, Defendant contends that the lawsuit should be dismissed because Plaintiffs' characterization of the policy is erroneous. Defendant urges the court to adopt a reading of the policy that would not require non-citizen applicants to show proof of legal presence in the United States. Defendant argues that under this reading, Plaintiffs have not been denied the right to marry and, thus, have not been injured and have no standing to challenge the policy. Defendant further contends that Plaintiffs lack standing because they have not applied for a marriage license in Montgomery County and therefore have not been injured. Finally, Defendant argues that because common-law marriages are recognized in Alabama, Plaintiffs have not suffered an injury in fact.

The requirement of Article III standing is both a constitutional limitation on federal court jurisdiction and a prudential limitation on its exercise. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). This case concerns constitutional standing. Constitutional standing requires that Plaintiffs have a “ ‘personal stake in the outcome’ in order to ‘assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues' necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional questions.” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)).

The test for evaluating constitutional standing includes three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir.1994) (citing E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979, 984 (11th Cir.1990)). An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ ” Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). “Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. 1917). The burden is on the party invoking federal jurisdiction to demonstrate each element of standing. Bischoff v. Osceola Cnty., Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir.2000).

Plaintiffs have alleged each of the three elements of Article III standing: (1) actual injury, in that they are barred from obtaining a marriage license under Defendant's policy; (2) that their injury is traceable to Defendant's policy; and (3) that their injury would be redressed by the relief requested, namely an injunction against enforcement of Defendant's policy and a declaration that the policy is...