Lodmell v. LaFrance, 36050.
Decision Date | 23 December 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 36050.,36050. |
Citation | 107 A.3d 975,154 Conn.App. 329 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Dean LODMELL, v. Joan LaFRANCE. |
Robert T. Rimmer, Old Saybrook, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Mathew P. Jasinski, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Ingrid L. Moll, Waterbury, for the appellee (defendant).
DIPENTIMA, C.J., and LAVINE and BEACH, Js.
The plaintiff, Dean Lodmell, appeals from the judgments of the trial court granting the motions filed by the defendant, Joan LaFrance, to dismiss his applications to vacate arbitration awards. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court, in dismissing his applications, improperly applied the prior pending action doctrine. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the plaintiff's appeal. In contemplation of marriage, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement (agreement) on November 22, 2000. They were married on November 25, 2000. Neither party contests the enforceability of the agreement. On March 15, 2010, the defendant commenced an action for dissolution of marriage. Section 16.20 of the agreement provides: In the dissolution action, the court, Malone, J., ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration on the matter of “the sale of the joint asset, a residential piece of real estate, and what procedures are to be followed, and what proceeds each party is entitled to from a sale.”1
The plaintiff filed an appeal to this court of Judge Malone's order and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. On November 16, 2011, this court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. See General Statutes § 52–263. The parties participated in a three day arbitration hearing in October, 2012, before Arbitrator Donna M. Wilkerson.
Wilkerson issued a partial award on November 9, 2012, which was modified on December 17, 2012, and a final award on December 17, 2012, which are both the subject of this appeal. After Wilkerson issued the partial award, the plaintiff filed an application to vacate the partial award on December 5, 2012, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52–418 and 52–420 and Practice Book § 23–1. Approximately one month later, on January 4, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for an order confirming the partial award in the dissolution action. In response to Wilkerson's December 17, 2012 final arbitration award, on January 14, 2013, the plaintiff filed on the civil docket an application to vacate in part that award. One day later, the defendant filed in the dissolution action a motion for order confirming in part, modifying in part, and vacating in part the final arbitration award. In essence, both parties sought to confirm or vacate the partial and final arbitration awards. The defendant sought to have the arbitration awards confirmed in part, modified in part, and vacated in part in the dissolution action, and the plaintiff commenced two separate actions to vacate the awards.
On January 15 and February 5, 2013, in the dissolution court, the plaintiff filed two objections to the defendant's motions to confirm the partial and final arbitration awards, respectively. Subsequently, on February 27, 2013, the defendant filed motions to dismiss both of the plaintiff's applications to vacate the arbitration awards. The plaintiff objected to the motions to dismiss five days later.
While the matters of confirming or vacating the arbitration awards were pending in both the dissolution court and on the civil docket, the plaintiff filed a motion to stay the proceedings on the arbitration awards in the dissolution court. On July 3, 2013, the dissolution court, Schofield, J., granted the stay as to the motions regarding the arbitration awards because the issue was “presently under consideration for judicial decision” on the civil docket.2 On August 21, 2013, the court, Adams, J., issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendant's motions to dismiss the plaintiff's applications to vacate the arbitration awards under the prior pending action doctrine.3 This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendant's motions to dismiss as a result of its misapplication of the prior pending action doctrine. We are not persuaded.
We first set forth the law regarding the prior pending action doctrine. (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Selimoglu v. Phimvongsa, 119 Conn.App. 645, 649, 989 A.2d 121, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902, 991 A.2d 1103 (2010).
The framework for our analysis of this appeal is found in Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009). (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 397–98, 973 A.2d 1229.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kleinman v. Chapnick, 140 Conn.App. 500, 506, 59 A.3d 373 (2013). Our analysis, therefore, is focused on whether the court properly determined that the actions were virtually alike and whether the court abused its discretion in dismissing the applications to vacate the arbitration awards. See id.
The plaintiff claims that the prior pending action doctrine is not applicable because “[t]he trial court's decision is a departure from earlier application of the prior pending action doctrine ... is unknown to the law and procedure relating to arbitration proceedings ... [and the plaintiff's] applications to vacate ... were insufficiently similar to the parties' divorce case to invoke the prior pending action doctrine.” The plaintiff further claims that even if the prior pending action doctrine does apply, good cause exists to allow the applications to vacate to proceed. The plaintiff's arguments do not persuade us that the actions are not virtually alike or that the trial court improperly applied the prior pending action doctrine.
In this case, Judge Adams examined the claims raised in the...
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