Loeb v. Jennings
Citation | 67 S.E. 101,133 Ga. 796 |
Parties | LOEB v. JENNINGS. [d1] |
Decision Date | 16 February 1910 |
Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Syllabus by the Court.
The charter of the city of Atlanta and the ordinances passed under it gave authority to the recorder, upon conviction of a person charged with keeping spirituous, fermented, or malt liquors for illegal sale, to sentence him to pay a fine of $500, and also to work on the streets and public places of the city for 30 days.
Where duly authorized by the municipal charter and ordinances, a sentence by a recorder which requires the person convicted of a violation of a penal ordinance to work on the streets or other public works of a city is not void or illegal on the ground that it is violative of paragraph 9, § 1, art. 1, of the Constitution of this state (Civ. Code 1895, § 5706) which declares that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
(a) It cannot be said, in view of the character of the offense committed, that the fine of $500 which was imposed was so excessive as to be unconstitutional.
The eighth amendment of the Constitution of the United States which provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" (Civ. Code 1895, § 6021), refers to powers exercised by the government of the United States and not to those of the individual states.
A sentence imposed on one convicted of violating a municipal ordinance, which required him to pay a fine and also to work on the streets or other public places of the city, was not violative of the provisions contained in the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States (Civ. Code 1895, § 6030), that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, *** nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
To punish such an offender by confining him at labor under municipal control is not obnoxious to the constitutional inhibition against involuntary servitude save as a punishment for crime after legal conviction therefor.
(a) Even if there were some acts of misconduct shown on the part of persons in charge of those convicted of violating municipal ordinances, the evidence was not such as to render the conviction or sentence illegal, or show that it was error on the part of the judge presiding at the hearing upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus to decline to discharge the applicant, who had been so convicted, from custody.
The provision of the Constitution of this state that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law" (Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 3) does not guarantee a trial by jury to one charged with the violation of a valid municipal ordinance; but he may be summarily tried and convicted, without a jury, in a police court having jurisdiction to try petty offenses against the peace, good order, and security of the municipality; and this is true, although, under such ordinance and the charter of the city, the offender is sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and also to work upon the streets or other public places of the city for 30 days.
Such a trial without a jury, and the sentence so imposed, are not violative of the provision of the Constitution of the United States (Amend. 14) which declares: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
Under the express provisions of Civ. Code 1895, § 5588, and Acts 1896, p. 42, § 5, a decision of the Supreme Court rendered since January 1, 1897, concurred in by six justices, can only be reversed by a concurrence of all six.
Habeas corpus by Samuel Loeb against Henry Jennings. Questions certified from the Court of Appeals. Questions answered.
The Atlanta city charter, as amended in 1874, Acts 1874, p. 120, § 16, provides that the mayor and council may prescribe, by ordinance, penalties for offenses against the ordinances of the city, and to punish offenders by fines not exceeding $500 and imprisonment in the calaboose not exceeding 30 days, and may enforce payment of fines by compelling offenders to work on the streets or public works of the city, and may compel offenders sentenced to imprisonment in the calaboose to labor on the public works or streets, to be regulated by ordinance. An ordinance provided that, when any person was convicted of an offense against the ordinances of the city before the recorder, it should be discretionary with the court to punish him by ordering him to work on the streets or public works of the city, and another ordinance provided that a person keeping intoxicating liquor for unlawful sale, upon conviction, should be fined not exceeding $500, or imprisonment not exceeding 30 days, either or both, in the discretion of the court. Held that the recorder, upon conviction of a person for such offense, could levy a fine of $500 and sentence the offender to work on the streets and public places of the city for 30 days.
The Court of Appeals certified to this court the following questions:
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Request your trial- Howden v. Mayor And Aldermen Of Savannah, 7966.
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Howden v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah
... ... unenforceable. Western, etc., R. Co. v. Young, 81 ... Ga. 397, 7 S.E. 912, 12 Am.St.Rep. 320; Loeb v ... Jennings, 133 Ga. 796, 67 S.E. 101, 18 Ann.Cas. 376. The ... reasonableness or unreasonableness of a city zoning and ... planning ... ...
- Loeb v. Jennings.&dagger
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Ashley v. City of Greensboro
...may be unreasonably administered to the injury of another, in which case its administration becomes void. Loeb v. Jennings, 133 Ga. 796, 67 S.E. 101, 18 Ann.Cas. 376; City Council of Augusta v. Loftis, supra; 37 Amer.Jur. 782, § 161; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. ......