Loeckle v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. C98-3025-MWB.,C98-3025-MWB. |
| Citation | 59 F.Supp.2d 838 |
| Parties | Kathy L. LOECKLE, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Jean M. Baker, West Des Moines, IA, Michael J. Carroll of Coppola, Sandre, McConville & Carroll, P.C., West Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Mark W. Thomas, Marcy O'Brien of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
One of several issues raised by defendants' respective motions for summary judgment in this employment discrimination lawsuit is the relatively novel question of whether plaintiff was able to serve two masters — both defendant State Farm Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire And Casualty Company — and thus be able to assert that both defendants were her "employer" for the purposes of the three civil rights statutes at issue in this litigation.
Plaintiff Kathy L. Loeckle filed this employment discrimination lawsuit against defendants State Farm Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm Auto") and State Farm Fire And Casualty Company ("State Farm Fire"), on March 26, 1998. In her complaint, Loeckle claims that both State Farm Auto and State Farm Fire were her employers and asserts federal claims for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. as well as a pendant state law claim for violation of Iowa Code Ch. 216, the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA").
In Count I, Loeckle alleges that she was discriminated against based on a perceived disability, in violation of the ADA. In Count II, Loeckle asserts that defendants discriminated against her based on her age, in violation of the ADEA. Finally, in Count III, Loeckle alleges a pendant state law claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of a perceived disability, in violation of the ICRA. The defendants answered the complaint, generally denying Loeckle's allegations and raising a variety of affirmative defenses.
On April 1, 1999, State Farm Auto and State Farm Fire filed their respective motions for summary judgment. In its motion, State Farm Auto asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact and argues that it was not Loeckle's employer. As a result, State Farm Auto contends that Loeckle cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the ADEA, or the ICRA. Alternatively, State Farm Auto argues that Loeckle failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her discrimination claims because it was never named as a respondent in her administrative claim before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").
In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm Fire contends that Loeckle cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because Loeckle was not perceived as having a disability which substantially limited a major life activity. State Farm Fire also asserts that Loeckle is unable to demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her perceived disability. Alternatively, State Farm Fire contends that even if Loeckle is able to make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination, she is unable to show that its articulated reason for its action was a pretext for discrimination. State Farm Fire advances identical arguments against Loeckle's pendant state law claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of a perceived disability. Finally, State Farm Fire asserts that Loeckle is unable to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Alternatively, State Farm Fire contends that even if Loeckle is able to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, she is unable to demonstrate that State Farm Fire's articulated reason for its actions was a pretext for discrimination based on age. State Farm Auto filed a joinder to State Farm Fire's Motion For Summary Judgment. Loeckle filed a timely resistance to defendants' respective motions and asserts that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on her claims against both defendants.
The court heard telephonic oral arguments on defendants' respective motions for summary judgment on July 21, 1999. At the oral arguments, plaintiff Loeckle was represented by counsel Jean M. Baker, West Des Moines, Iowa, and Michael J. Carroll of Coppola, Sandre, McConville & Carroll, P.C., West Des Moines, Iowa. Defendants were represented by counsel Mark W. Thomas and Marcy O'Brien of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, Iowa. The parties have filed thorough briefs in support of their respective positions. Counsel were exceptionally well prepared for oral argument. The oral arguments were also spirited and very informative.
The court turns first to the standards applicable to motions for summary judgment, then to a discussion of the undisputed facts as shown by the record and the parties' submissions, and finally to the legal analysis of whether defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Loeckle's discrimination claims.
This court has considered in some detail the standards applicable to motions for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R.CIV.P. 56 in a number of decisions. See, e.g., Swanson v. Van Otterloo, 993 F.Supp. 1224, 1230-31 (N.D.Iowa 1998); Dirks v. J.C. Robinson Seed Co., 980 F.Supp. 1303, 1305-07 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Laird v. Stilwill, 969 F.Supp. 1167, 1172-74 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Rural Water Sys. # 1 v. City of Sioux Ctr., 967 F.Supp. 1483, 1499-1501 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Tralon Corp. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 812, 817-18 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Security State Bank v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A., 965 F.Supp. 1237, 1239-40 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 963 F.Supp. 805 (N.D.Iowa 1997). Thus, the court will not consider those standards in detail here. Suffice it to say that Rule 56 itself provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Rule 56. Summary Judgment
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon. ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a)-(c) (emphasis added). Applying these standards, the trial judge's function at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir.1996); Johnson v. Enron Corp., 906 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.1990). An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record. Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). As to whether a factual dispute is "material," the Supreme Court has explained, "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir.1995); Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 394.
Because this is an employment discrimination case, it is well to remember that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that "summary judgment should seldom be used in employment-discrimination cases." Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Johnson v. Minnesota...
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...deposition testimony can generate a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. See Loeckle v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp.2d 838, 856-58 (N.D.Iowa 1999) (holding that plaintiff's affidavit failed to fall within the exception stated in [Camfield Tires, Inc. v.......
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