Loeffler v. City of Anoka

Decision Date12 January 2015
Docket NumberCivil No. 13–cv–2060 MJD/TNL.
Citation79 F.Supp.3d 986
PartiesJennie Marie LOEFFLER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ANOKA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Lorenz F. Fett, Jr., Sonia L. Miller–Van Oort, and Jonathan A. Strauss, Sapientia Law Group PLLC, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff.

Portia M. Hampton–Flowers, St. Paul City Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for Defendant City of St. Paul.

Timothy S. Skarda, Minneapolis City Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant City of Minneapolis.

ORDER

MICHAEL J. DAVIS, Chief Judge.

Based upon the Report and Recommendation by United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung dated December 19, 2014 [Docket No. 126], along with all the files and records, and no objections to said Recommendation having been filed, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

TONY N. LEUNG, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court, United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung, on alternative motions for judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, and motions to sever brought by Defendants City of St. Paul (“St. Paul”) (ECF No. 79) and City of Minneapolis (“Minneapolis”) (ECF No. 87) (collectively, “Cities”). These motions have been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a report and recommendation to the district court, the Honorable Michael J. Davis, Chief District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(b). (ECF Nos. 85, 92.)

A hearing was held. Sonia L. Miller–Van Oort appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 101.) Portia

Hampton–Flowers appeared on behalf of St. Paul. (Id. ) Timothy S. Skarda appeared on behalf of Minneapolis. (Id. )

Based upon the record, memoranda, and the proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant City of Saint Paul's Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings, Summary Judgment and Motion to Sever (ECF No. 79) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART AS MOOT, and Defendant City of Minneapolis's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Summary Judgment and Motion to Sever (ECF No. 87) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART AS MOOT.

II. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff brings claims under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; and common law based on accesses of her personal and private driver's license information. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 179–205, 224–77, ECF No. 1.) This action is one of several actions filed in this District alleging unlawful access of private data. See, e.g., Kiminski v. Hunt, File No. 13–cv–185 (JNE/TNL) (consolidated cases); Kost v. Hunt, File No. 13–cv–583 (JNE/TNL); Potocnik v. Anoka Cnty., File No. 13–cv–1103 (DSD/TNL) (Ltr. to Hon. Michael J. Davis, Mar. 25, 2014, listing pending DPPA cases (ECF No. 98)).

A. The Database & Records Maintained

On June 24, 2014, this Court issued a report and recommendation (“R & R”) regarding several dispositive motions filed by other defendants in this matter. (ECF No. 102.) The Court incorporates by reference Section II of the R & R addressing the nature of the database containing the information at issue and the records maintained therein; the extramarital affair of Plaintiff's then-husband and events leading to Plaintiff's discovery of the alleged impermissible accesses of her information; and the overall history of this litigation.

B. Accesses of Plaintiff's Information

Plaintiff alleges that [o]fficers employed by, licensed by, or otherwise accessing through the City of St. Paul impermissibly accessed [her p]rivate [d]ata four times,” and that [o]fficers employed by, licensed by, or otherwise accessing through the City of Minneapolis impermissibly accessed [her p]rivate [d]ata nine times.” (Compl. ¶¶ 81, 91.)

C. Litigation

Plaintiff's claims against the Cities arise under the DPPA, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and common law. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges the Cities violated the DPPA. (Id. ¶¶ 179–205.) In Count II, Plaintiff alleges, via § 1983, that individual employees of the Cities violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 206–23.) In Count III, Plaintiff alleges, via § 1983, that the Cities were aware of the widespread access of private data for personal use; such use was against regulations promulgated by the Cities; and the Cities' pervasive failure to take action to stop or prevent such use (including the failure to properly train, monitor, supervise, and properly discipline) amounted to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Id. ¶¶ 224–46.) Finally, in Count VI, Plaintiff alleges the Cities invaded her privacy under common law. (Id. ¶¶ 272–77.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Cities have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The granting of a 12(c) motion is appropriate when the movant has shown that “no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir.2008) (quotation omitted). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is treated under the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Bass, 998 F.Supp.2d at 818–19 ; accord Mitchell v. Aitkin Cnty., No. 13–cv–2167 (JNE/FLN), 2014 WL 835129, at *3 (D.Minn. Mar. 4, 2014). “To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir.2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). [A]lthough a complaint need not contain ‘detailed factual allegations,’ it must contain facts with enough specificity ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ United States ex rel. Raynor v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin., Corp., 690 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ([T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Similarly, [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court “view[s] all facts pleaded by the nonmoving party as true and grant[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of that party just as it would in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Poehl, 528 F.3d at 1096 ; see Rasmusson, 991 F.Supp.2d at 1070.

IV. MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Plaintiff's allegations against the Cities encompass three types of defendants: the Cities themselves; their employees, including law enforcement; and supervisors employed by the Cities. (Compl. ¶¶ 31, 38, 44–46.) As noted earlier, Plaintiff alleges that [o]fficers employed by, licensed by, or otherwise accessing through [the Cities] impermissibly accessed [her p]rivate [d]ata.” (Id. ¶¶ 81, 91; see also id. ¶ 136.) Plaintiff alleges that there were four accesses by St. Paul and nine2 by Minneapolis. (Id. ¶¶ 81, 91.) Plaintiff alleges that such accesses occurred by “view[ing her p]rivate [d]ata from her [s]tate-issued driver's license including her home address, color photograph or image, date of birth, eye color, height, weight and driver identification number.” (Id. ¶ 96.) Plaintiff alleges that these accesses occurred by entering her name into the database, “not her license plate number, to look up her private, personal information.” (Id. ¶ 137.) Plaintiff alleges that the “accesses were impermissible, meaning that the [Cities] had no law-enforcement reason for accessing the information” and that the [Cities'] employees “accessed the information for personal reasons completely unrelated to their position as law-enforcement officers.” (Id. ¶ 95; see id. ¶¶ 158, 188–90.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Cities' supervisors “should have monitored, prevented and stopped the unauthorized access [of Plaintiff's] information” by the Cities' employees. (Id. ¶ 139.) Plaintiff also alleges that the Cities and their supervisors “permitted, condoned, or acquiesced in this illegal access to Plaintiff's private information, and knew or should have known that it was occurring.” (Id. ¶ 145; see also id. ¶¶ 144, 192.) Because the Cities' arguments for judgment on the pleadings are identical, the Court will analyze them together. (See St. Paul's Mem. in Supp. at 1, ECF No. 82; Minneapolis's Mem. in Supp. at 1, ECF No. 89.)

A. Statutes of Limitation

The Court begins with the Cities' argument that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred.3 (St. Paul's Mem. in Supp. at 4; Minneapolis's Mem. in Supp. at 4.) “A court may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) as barred by the statute of limitations if the complaint itself establishes that the claim is time-barred.” Illig v. Union Elec. Co.,

652 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir.2011). The Cities point out that “the Complaint contains no reference to the actual date or dates to which the St. Paul [and Minneapolis] entries are attributed.” (St. Paul's Mem. in Supp. at 7; Minneapolis's Mem. in Supp. at 6.)

As this Court previously observed in its R & R, attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit A is a copy of an audit...

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