Loeffler v. Modern Woodmen of Am.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1898
• Citation: 100 Wis. 79,75 N.W. 1012
• Parties: LOEFFLER v. MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

100 Wis. 79

75 N.W. 1012

LOEFFLER

v.MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 23, 1898.

Appeal from circuit court, La Crosse county.

Bill by Otto Loeffler against the Modern Woodmen of America. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Higbee & Bunge, for appellant.

Winter, Esch & Winter and J. G. Johnson, for respondent.

CASSODAY, C. J.

It appears from the record: That November 25, 1889, the defendant, an Illinois corporation, issued to the plaintiff its benefit certificate, to the effect that he was a member of the La Crosse camp, at La Crosse, while in good standing in the fraternity, and entitled to participate in its benefit fund to an amount not to exceed $3,000, which should be paid at his death to his wife, Dora, by its head camp, subject to all the conditions on the back of such certificate, and named in its fundamental laws, and liable to forfeiture if said neighbor should not comply with the conditions, laws, and such by-laws and rules as were or might be adopted by the head camp, or the local camp of which he was a member. That at the time of receiving such certificate the plaintiff was engaged in the clothing business. That at that time the defendant had a by-law to the effect that persons engaged in certain businesses or employments should not be admitted as members of the fraternity, among which were wholesalers and manufacturers of liquors. saloon keepers, and saloon bartenders, but providing that such by-law should not be construed as invalidating certificates issued prior to December 1, 1888. That July 1, 1892, the plaintiff engaged in the business of a wholesaler of liquors, as a stockholder, officer, and salesman of the Elliot-Loeffler Company, a corporation engaged in selling intoxicating liquors at wholesale in Wisconsin, and continued in such business until the time of the trial of this action, March 30, 1897. That November 15, 1892, such by-law was amended, so far as applicable to the plaintiff, so as to read, in effect, that persons engaged in certain businesses or employments should not be admitted as members of the fraternity, among which were wholesalers or manufacturers of liquors, saloon keepers, and saloon bartenders; that if, after a person had become a member of the fraternity, he should engage in any of such employments or occupations so enumerated, his certificate should be forfeited by such act, and the same should be null and void, but such amendment should not be construed as invalidating certificates issued prior to December 1, 1888. That from November 2, 1889, to March 6, 1896, the plaintiff continued to duly pay his assessments to the clerk of the Gateway City camp of the defendant, and that such assessments were received by such clerk, and duly transmitted to the proper officer of the head camp of the defendant, at Fulton, Ill. That by the provisions of the defendant's fundamental laws and by-laws the chief executive officer of the defendant, known as the “head consul” had power to decide all questions involving the construction of the laws of the order, and that his decision, when rendered, was final, and binding upon all officers and members of the order, subject to an appeal to the executive council, and from it to the head camp. That between February 17, 1896, and April 1, 1896, the clerk of the Gateway camp, mentioned, requested of the head consul of the defendant a decision as to whether the plaintiff could remain a member of the order after engaging in the prohibited occupation mentioned, and as to whether his membership had become forfeited by engaging in such prohibited employment, and as to whether the clerk should receive the dues and assessments of the plaintiff, whereupon the head consul decided and ruled that, the plaintiff being engaged in a prohibited occupation, his certificate had thereby become null and void, as provided by the fundamental laws of the defendant, and that the clerk should not receive the dues and assessments of the plaintiff. That April 1, 1896, and in accordance with such decision, the clerk refused to receive the dues and assessments of the plaintiff then and there tendered by the plaintiff, and has ever since, and still refuses to receive the dues and assessments of the plaintiff tendered. That April 30, 1896, the plaintiff requested from the head consul a decision as to whether he was engaged in one of the prohibited occupations,and as to whether his membership certificate thereby became null and void. That May 22, 1896, the head consul, in writing, decided and held that the plaintiff was engaged in a prohibited occupation, and that his certificate of membership had thereby become null and void, and that the clerk should no longer receive payments from him. That thereupon the local camp investigated the matter of the plaintiff being engaged in a prohibited occupation, and the action of the local clerk in refusing to receive payments from the plaintiff, and sanctioned, by resolution, the act of the clerk in refusing to receive such payments of the plaintiff. That there is a provision of the defendant's fundamental laws and by-laws by which appeals from the decision of the head consul can be taken to the executive council of the order, and from its decision to the head camp; the same being the supreme governing body of the order. That the plaintiff did not take any appeal from such decision of the head consul, or from the act of the local camp or of its officers, to the executive council or to the head camp of the order, or at all before, bringing this action, though the fact of the necessity of taking such appeal was brought to his notice. That the...