Loehr v. People

• Citation: 132 Ill. 504,24 N.E. 68
• Parties: LOEHR v. PEOPLE.
• Decision Date: 31 March 1890
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

132 Ill. 504

24 N.E. 68

LOEHR

v.PEOPLE.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 31, 1890.

Error to circuit court, McLean county; ALFRED SAMPLE, Judge.

Kerrick, Lucas & Spencer, for plaintiff in error.

E. H. Miner, State's Atty., and E. O'Connell, Asst. State's Atty., for defendant in error.

CRAIG, J.

Plaintiff in error and Ignatz Lederer were indicted under section 228 of the Criminal Code, which is as follows: ‘If any judge, justice of the peace, sheriff, coroner, clerk, recorder, or other public officer, or any person whatsoever, shall steal, embezzle, alter, corrupt, withdraw, falsify, or avoid any record, process, charter, gift, grant, conveyance, bond, or contract, or shall knowingly and willfully take off, discharge, or conceal any issue, forfeited recognizance, or other forfeiture, or shall forge, deface, or falsify any document or instrument recorded, or any registry, acknowledgment, or certificate, or shall alter, deface, or falsify any minute, document, book, or any proceeding whatever, of or belonging to, any public office within this state, the person so offending shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than seven years.’ 1 Starr & C. St. p. 803, § 228, (Rev. St. c. 38, § 176.) The indictment contained four counts. The first count charges that Ignatz Lederer and Harry Loehr, on the 5th day of February, 1889, in said county, ‘a record, to-wit, collector's book of Bloomington township, McLean county, and state of Illinois, for the taxes of the year 1888, belonging in the office of the county treasurer, to-wit, Lewis Ijams, county treasurer of McLean county, and state of Illinois, then and there unlawfully,’ feloniously, and maliciously, did corrupt, falsify, and alter, ‘contrary,’ etc. The second count, after the formal part: ‘A certain book, to-wit, the collector's book of Bloomington township, McLean county, state of Illinois, then and there feloniously, willfully, and maliciously did deface and falsify, contrary,’ etc. The third count, after the formal part: ‘A certain document, to-wit, the collector's book of Bloom ngton township, McLean county, Ill., for the taxes of the year 1888, belonging in the office of the county treasurer of McLean county, and state aforesaid, then and there unlawfully, feloniously, and maliciously did alter, deface, and falsify, contrary,’ etc. The fourth count, after the formal part: ‘A certain record, to-wit, the collector's book of Bloomington township, McLean county, Ill., for the taxes of the year 1888, in the office of the county treasurer and state aforesaid, then and there unlawfully and feloniously did alter, corrupt, and falsify, contrary,’ etc. Lederer pleaded guilty. The other defendant, Loehr, was tried by a jury, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and fixed the term of imprisonment at one year in the penitentiary. Upon the return of the indictment into court, plaintiff in error entered a motion to quash each count. The court overruled the motion, and the decision is relied upon as error.

Ignatz Lederer was elected collector of taxes in Bloomington township, McLean county, in the spring of 1888, to collect the taxes for that year. He employed the plaintiff in error as an assistant at a salary of $50 per month. They received the collector's book on the 4th day of January, 1889, and at once commenced collecting taxes, and held it until February 18, 1889. During the time the collector's book was in the hands of Lederer and the plaintiff in error, in a large number of instances the amount of taxes against persons was changed and the amount increased. Other changes were made in the tax-book, but it will not be necessary to refer to them here. The motion to quash was based upon the ground that the indictment was defective for the reason that it failed to set out facts from which it would appear to the court that the alleged corrupting, falsifying, altering, and defacings were in law alterations, within the meaning of the statute. It will be observed that the statute, in so far as it relates to the charge under consideration, declares: ‘If any judge * * * or other public officer, or any person whatsoever, shall * * * alter, corrupt, withdraw, falsify, * * * any record, * * * or shall knowingly and wilfully * * * deface or falsify any document, * * * book, or any proceeding whatever, of or belonging to any public office within this state, the person so offending shall be imprisoned,’ etc. The indictment states the offense in the terms and language of the statute which created the offense, which is all that seems to be designed by section 468 of the Criminal Code. That section declares: ‘Every indictment or accusation of the grand jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct which states the offense in the terms and language of the statutes creating the offense, or so plainly that the nature of the offense may be easily understood by the jury.’ Rev. St. (Ed. 1889) c. 38, § 408. In Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 468, where a party was indicted for obtaining money ‘by means and by use of the confidence game,’ and the indictment failed to set out or specify the means used, or what the defendant said or did, to obtain the money, the objection was made, as has been done here, that the indictment was defective because the elements constituting the offense have not been set out; but on the authority of Miller v. People, 2 Scam. 233, and Cannady v. People, 17 Ill. 158, the indictment was sustained. In Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 273, where a person was indicted for the crime of burglary, under a statute creating the offense, but the word ‘burglariously’ was omitted from the indictment, the indictment was sustained, the court holding that the statute is not limited to the Criminal Code as it existed when the statute was passed, but it is a general rule of criminal pleading, applicable to all cases within its terms, without regard to the date of the enactment of the statute under which the case may arise. Bishop, in his work on Criminal Procedure, (volume 1, § 611,) says: ‘Where the offense is purely statutory, having no relation to the common law; where, in other words, the statute specifically sets out what acts shall constitute the offense,-it is, as a general rule, sufficient in an indictment to charge the defendant with acts coming fully within the statutory description, in the substantial words of the statute, without any further expansion of the matter.’ See, also, the following cases, where the same doctrine is announced: McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 605;Cole v. People, 84 Ill. 216;Fuller v. People, 92 Ill. 182;People v. West, 106 N. Y. 293, 12 N. E. Rep. 610. In the case last cited it is said: ‘The indictment follows the language of the statute; and the general rule is well settled that an indictment for a statutory offense, and especially when the offense is a misdemeanor, charging the facts constituting the crime in the words of the statute * * *...