Lofquist v. Errickson

• Decision Date: 29 October 1894
• Citation: 152 Ill. 456,38 N.E. 908
• Parties: LOFQUIST v. ERRICKSON et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

152 Ill. 456

38 N.E. 908

LOFQUIST

v.ERRICKSON et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 29, 1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Knox county; A. A. Smith, Judge.

Creditors' bill by J. E. Errickson and others against Olaf Nelson and Nels Lofquist. Complainants obtained a decree. Defendant Lofquist appeals. Affirmed.

EQUITY SUIT-REVIEW ON APPEAL-PRESUMPTION.

Where an equity case is heard on oral evidence in open court and the evidence is conflicting, the decree will not be reversed, as unsupported by the evidence, unless clearly erroneous.

M. J. Dougherty, for appellant.

Thompson & Shumway, for appellees.

BAKER, J.

Appellees Errickson and Larson and J. P. Anderson & Bro. filed a creditors' bill against Olaf Nelson and appellant, Nels Lofquist, in the circuit court of Knox county, to the October term thereof, 1892, to set aside a conveyance dated August 24, 1891, made by Olaf Nelson to Nels Lofquist, conveying to the latter the east half of lot 10, in block 2, in Peck & Wood's addition to the city of Galesburg, and to subject the property to the payment of executions issued on judgments obtained by appellees against Nelson for debts that he owed prior to the making of the deed. The ground on which this relief was prayed was that the conveyance to Lofquist was fraudulent, and was made with the purpose of hindering and delaying Nelson's creditors. The judgments in question were obtained against Nelson,-one by Errickson & Larson, on July 9, 1892, for $236.25; the other, by J. P. Anderson & Bro., on the same day, for $94.50. Default was entered against defendant Nelson, and the cause proceeded to trial against defendant Lofquist. The decree was for the complainants, finding the allegations of the bill to be true, and setting aside the conveyance to Lofquist, and ordering the property to be sold to pay complainant's said judgments. From that decree, appellant prosecutes this appeal.

The testimony introduced at the hearing was quite voluminous and quite conflicting. The discussion of it in detail would serve no useful purpose. That produced by appellees is sufficient to sustain the decree. The presumption is in favor of the validity and correctness of the decree that was entered. And although this presumption is ordinarily allowed to prevail only in a sort of qualified way in a chancery suit, yet here is superadded the fact that the witnesses were examined in open court before the chancellor, and he had better opportunities than we of correctly...