Loft v. Stationary Eng'rs, Local 39 PTF, LLC

• Decision Date: 31 March 2015
• Docket Number: Case No.: 14–CV–00817–LHK
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Charles Loft, Plaintiff, v. Stationary Engineers, Local 39 PTF, LLC, Defendant.

87 F.Supp.3d 1138

Charles Loft, Plaintiff

v.Stationary Engineers, Local 39 PTF, LLC, Defendant.

Case No.: 14–CV–00817–LHK

United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division.

Signed March 31, 2015

Robert David Baker, Robert David Baker, Inc., San Jose, CA, for Plaintiff.

Stewart Weinberg, Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld A Professional Corporation, Alameda, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 35

LUCY H. KOH, District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Stationary Engineers, Local 39, PTF, LLC's (“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 35 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff Charles Loft (“Loft”) opposes the motion. ECF No. 44 (“Opp'n”). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7–1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing for this motion scheduled for April 2, 2015, at 1:30 p.m. The April 2, 2015 case management conference remains as scheduled. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's motion for summary judgment, for the reasons stated below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

Defendant is a charter union of the International Union of Operating Engineers AFL–CIO (the “International Union”), with its principal place of business in Santa Clara, California. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ECF No. 25, ¶ 1. Loft is a member of Defendant, and is currently employed as an assistant chief engineer at Sequoia Hospital in Redwood City, California. Id. ¶ 2; Declaration of Charles Loft in Support of Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 44–2 (“Loft Decl.”), ¶ 4.

On or about October 1, 2013, the collective bargaining agreement between Defendant and Dignity Hospital facilities, which included Sequoia Hospital, expired, and Defendant's members went on strike. SAC ¶ 4; Declaration of Bart Florence in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 36 (“Florence Decl.”), ¶ 4. Loft, who was on leave to care for a relative at the time, manned the strike line on October 3, 2013. Loft Decl. ¶ 7.

During the strike, Bart Florence, the Director of Stationary Affairs for Defendant, received charges filed by union members alleging that Loft worked at Sequoia Hospital during the strike. Florence Decl. ¶ 4. According to a copy of the charges subsequently provided to Loft, Loft “has not manned the strike line and has helped the employer and replacement workers to keep the [hospital] plant in operating order by accepting telephone calls from the employer and walking them through the problems they encountered.” Exhibit A to the Declaration of Robert Baker in Support of Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 44–1 (“Baker Decl.”), at 2. On November 15, 2013, Defendant notified Loft of the charges and informed Loft that he had a right to “respond in writing by filing an answer, defense, or plea” no later than December 13, 2013. Id. at 1. On December 8, 2013, Loft responded in a letter denying the charges. Baker Decl., Ex. B.

On January 24, 2014, Defendant held a pre-trial hearing in San Francisco at which Defendant's board determined that there was sufficient merit to move the accusations against Loft to trial by membership. Baker Decl., Ex. E. The trial was held on February 25, 2014 in San Jose, California. Id.; Florence Decl. ¶ 6. According to Loft, who attended the trial, Defendant prevented Loft from presenting testimony of a witness on the grounds that the witness was not a union member, and further prevented Loft from introducing documents. Loft Decl. ¶¶ 18–20. Loft also alleges that a union official at the trial told Loft that “ ‘if it was up to him,’ he would take [Loft] ‘out to the back alley.’ ” Id. ¶ 15. Defendant's membership found Loft guilty of “working contrary to a declared strike.” Id. ¶ 20. As punishment, Defendant fined Loft twenty-five dollars. SAC Ex. F, at 1. According to an April 1, 2014 letter from Defendant to Loft, Loft had 30 days from the date of the letter in which to appeal the decision to Defendant's General Executive Board. Id.

B. Procedural History

On February 24, 2014, the day before his union trial, Loft filed the instant action in this Court. See ECF No. 1. Also on February 24, 2014, Loft filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking to enjoin Defendant from proceeding to trial on February 25, 2014. ECF No. 2, at 1–2. This Court denied Loft's motion for a temporaryrestraining order on February 24, 2014. ECF No. 12.

On June 12, 2014, Loft filed the Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative Complaint in this matter, bringing four causes of action. See SAC. First, Loft alleged that Defendant violated 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5), the Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), by, inter alia, failing to give Loft notice of the specific charges against him, conducting a pre-trial hearing without sufficient notice, and failing to give Loft reasonable time to prepare for his defense. Id. ¶¶ 15–18. Second, Loft brought a cause of action under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) for breach of contract, based on the theory that Loft was a third-party beneficiary to the union constitution between Defendant and the International Union, and that Defendant's conduct breached the union constitution. Id. ¶¶ 24–30. Third, Loft alleged a cause of action under the LMRDA for breach of duty of fair representation. Id. ¶¶ 31–34. Finally, Loft alleged a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Defendant's conduct. Id. ¶¶ 35–40. Loft sought compensatory, special and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Id. at 7.

On January 14, 2015, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment. See Mot. Defendant also filed a statement of uncontroverted facts and conclusions of law, as well as a supporting declaration. ECF Nos. 36 & 37. On January 28, 2015, Loft filed an opposition, as well as two supporting declarations and seven exhibits. ECF Nos. 44, 44–1, 44–2 & 44–3. Loft also filed an objection to Defendant's statement of uncontroverted facts and conclusions of law.¹ ECF No. 45. On February 3, 2015, Defendant filed a reply. ECF No. 46 (“Reply”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the Court “does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559–60, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where the party opposing summary judgment will have the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; accord Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir.2007). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for summary judgment on three grounds. First, Defendant argues that Loft's failure to exhaust internal union administrative remedies “precludes his suit in civil court,” and accordingly Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all four of Loft's causes of action. Mot. at 1. Second, Defendant argues that Loft's cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation is legally precluded because “the duty of fair representation relates to the collective bargaining obligation of the union on behalf of members of the bargaining unit,” and does not apply to a union member asserting a grievance against the union. Id. at 12. Third, Defendant argues that Loft improperly seeks punitive and emotional distress damages for Loft's breach of contract claim, even though these “are not available as a remedy for breach of contract.” Id. at 11.

Loft, in his opposition, does not dispute that Loft failed to exhaust internal union grievance procedures prior to bringing the instant litigation. However, Loft argues that his failure to exhaust should be excused because, inter alia, Defendant's internal grievance process would not provide Loft with the relief he seeks, specifically monetary damages, and is therefore inadequate. Opp'n at 10–12. Loft also argues that he properly asserts a cause of action for a breach of duty of fair representation. Id. at 12–14. Loft does not address Defendant's argument that Loft cannot recover punitive and emotional distress damages for the breach of contract claim.

The Court will address each of Defendant's arguments in turn.

A. Failure to Exhaust Internal Union Remedies

Where, as here, a plaintiff brings suit pursuant to the LMRDA, “ ‘[a]s a matter of discretion, the district court may require exhaustion of intraunion remedies' ” before the plaintiff “ ‘may pursue an action in district...