Loftis v. Arisco
| Decision Date | 18 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-01266-BAM (PC) |
| Parties | MARQUISE DEANGELO LOFTIS, Plaintiff, v. ARISCO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE ANAMENDED COMPLAINT
THIRTY (30) DAY DEAD-LINE
Plaintiff Marquise DeAngelo Loftis (“Plaintiff') is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has paid the filing fee. Plaintiff's complaint, filed on September 28, 2022, is currently before he Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.)
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff is currently housed at the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California. Plaintiff alleges the events in this action arose while Plaintiff was housed at California State Prison in Corcoran, California (“Corcoran”). Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) A. Arisco, Investigative Services Unit, (2) E. Garza, Sergeant, (3) R. Montano, Lieutenant, (4) R. Talsa, Associate Warden, (5) D. Sanchez, Captain, (7) Tienda, correctional officer, (8) Alvarez, psych tech, IC, (9) Diaz, correctional officer, IC, (10) Rosales, correctional officer, IC, (11) Navarro, sergeant, IC, (12) Vu, psychologist, IC, (13) Lewis, registered nurse, IC, (14) J. Scalia, correctional officer, IC, (15) J. Perez, counselor, IC, (16) M. Oliveira, admin., IC, (17) T. Dunn, admin, IC, (18) Chand, psychologist, (19) Roacha, correctional officer, IC, (20) White, correctional officer, IC, (21) Hernandez, correctional officer, IC, (22) Acosta, correctional officer, IC, (23) E. Magallanes, LT, IC, (24) T. Chao, correctional officer, IC, (25) A. Rodriguez, psych tech., IC, (26) P. Herleman, sergeant, IC, (27) Rakash, psychologist, IC, and (28) Moreno, correctional officer, IC. All defendants are sued in their individual capacities.
In claim 1, Plaintiff alleges a violation of due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff is a participant in the Mental Health Service delivery system and is a Coleman v. Wilson class member. On August 19, 2019, Plaintiff and his cellmate, Standford, were not getting along and agreed to house separately. However, Standford had a different idea and falsely accused Plaintiff of sexual assault, as revenge for having to move. Because of the false allegation, an investigation was initiated under the Prison Rape Elimination Act, by Arisco, Garza, the ISU sergeant, Montano and Talsa. At 11:30 pm, Plaintiff was taken from his cell where Arisco and Garza were waiting for him with recording devices. They told Plaintiff that Standford said Plaintiff sexually assaulted him. Plaintiff fully cooperated with the investigation and gave a recorded statement. Arisco told Plaintiff that Standford had made other false claims against cellmates but that they had to investigate but found it to be “bullshit.” They said they knew Standford was lying but still had to put Plaintiff in administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleges that where officers know that the victim is known to lie to manipulate prison officials, the accused (Plaintiff) should be given less restrictive treatment. Plaintiff could have been housed in medical isolation so he could keep his privileges of family contact until investigation was over, because Arisco, Garza, Montano and Talsa knew the investigation would lead to nothing. They should have been given authority to decide if Plaintiff should be placed in Ad-Seg or less restrictive housing.
Since Plaintiff suffers from severe mental illness, special consideration should have been given to protect him from deterioration. It was apparent to defendants that Plaintiff needed a clinician because the regulations require it, Plaintiff requested it, and Plaintiff was in clear physical distress. The defendant denied due process because they wanted to leave as it was 1 a.m.
Defendants denied Plaintiff written notice of the Ad-Seg placement notice and he did not receive actual notice until a week later. Defendant falsely claims Plaintiff refused to sign the notice. They prevented Plaintiff from being able to present witnesses for why his placement was unnecessary. Plaintiff was in Ad-Seg from August 19 to November 4, 2019, and he was deteriorating. At the conclusion of the investigation, Plaintiff was cleared. As a result of three months detention in Ad-Seg, Plaintiff began having severe panic attacks, loss of appetite and loss of bodily functions, shaking, and became psychotic. Plaintiff was unable to have access to his mental health team on a daily basis. Defendants dragged the investigation out longer than necessary by not investigating witnesses.
On August 20, 2019, Defendant Sanchez did Plaintiff's Ad-Seg placement review to determine whether plaintiff should be retained or released from Ad-Seg. Sanchez was supposed to provide written notice of the charges. Sanchez did not let Plaintiff provide witnesses and would have had Defendant Arisco repeat that Standford was a known liar. Sanchez had the power to house Plaintiff in less restrictive housing. When Sanchez arrived, Plaintiff was tied to a holding cage on suicide watch and waiting for a psychologist, and it was apparent Plaintiff was not going to survive Ad-Seg.
On August 27, 2019, Plaintiff had an Institution Classification Committee (“ICC”) hearing before Perez, Dunn, Oliveira and Dr. Chand who stripped his due process rights. Plaintiff did not have his due process rights of 72 hour advance notice, a chance to speak, a chance to present evidence and call witnesses, and evaluated by a mental health clinician. Perez was the assigned counselor and representative, and Scalia was his staff assistant. Neither met with Plaintiff before the hearing or gave him assistance, as required by the regulations. Had they helped him, he would have been placed in restrictive housing. They consciously decided not to do their jobs which impacted Plaintiffs. They are assigned to Ad-Seg and know the effects it has on mentally ill inmates.
Chand was his assigned clinician to represent Plaintiff's mental needs at the ICC. Chang did not meet with Plaintiff before the hearing, yet represented in his report that he had evaluated Plaintiff and found him stable and suitable to remain in Ad-Seg without decompensation. It was a false report. Plaintiff's mental health needs were not presented, and no reasonable doctor would have allowed Plaintiff to remain in Ad-Seg, rather than medical isolation. Plaintiff's mental health file shows he decompensated in isolation and needs daily interaction with his mental health team.
Defendant Dunn was the chairperson of the ICC hearing. He did not allow Plaintiff to present any documentary evidence, or witness. Dunn and the other members did not allow Plaintiff to speak at the hearing except to ask his inmate number, then Dunn said he is retaining Plaintiff in Ad-Seg pending completion of the investigation hearing. Dunn retained Plaintiff in Ad-Seg for 90 days and Plaintiff was not able to earn good time credits for those 90 days. Plaintiff assumes that Dunn knew or should have known that Plaintiff was released from PIP just a month before he was placed in Ad-Seg and should have known that Plaintiff's mental health could not remain stable in Ad-Seg for three months.
Oliveira was the recorder of the hearing, and he was supposed to allow Plaintiff to present witnesses and evidence to be put on the record. Dunn and the rest of the defendants violated Plaintiff's due process right and violating procedural due process.
In claim 2, Plaintiff alleges violation of the Eighth Amendment. On August 20, 2019, while in Ad-Seg, Plaintiff began feeling like doing self-harm, because he was falsely accused of sexual assault. Plaintiff reported to Tienda that he was feeling suicidal and that Plaintiff felt like hanging himself. Tienda said “I don't see you hanging,” and walked away. During morning medication pass, Plaintiff told Alvarez that he was suicidal and her response was that, “I'm suicidal too,” which delayed Plaintiff...
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