Loftis v. Ramos
Citation | 491 F.Supp.3d 753 |
Decision Date | 05 March 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 16cv2300-MMA (MSB) |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Parties | Marissa LOFTIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RAMOS, et al., Defendants. |
Keith Rutman, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Terrence F. Sheehy, Department of Justice, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs Marissa Loftis ("Mrs. Loftis") and her minor child ("Junior") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") bring this civil rights action against four officials at R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Doc. No. 37. Defendants move for summary judgment as to all claims. See Doc. No. 52. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion, to which Defendants replied. See Doc. Nos. 57, 58, 61. The Court took the motion under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 62. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion.
This action arises out of events which occurred on April 17, 2016, at R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") in San Diego, California. Defendant Ramos is a correctional sergeant at RJD. On the date of the events in question, Ramos was supervising staff in the visitor processing room at the facility. According to Ramos, she received a telephone call at approximately 9:00 a.m. that morning from an anonymous individual who claimed to be a regular visitor at RJD. The individual indicated that Mrs. Loftis, "the approved visitor of Inmate Loftis, ... was bringing narcotics into the visiting room every weekend." Ramos Decl. ¶ 2. The individual stated she had witnessed the smuggling of contraband into RJD by Mrs. Loftis and Inmate Loftis in the presence of Junior.2 According to Ramos, the individual further "stated that Mrs. Loftis would be bringing narcotics into the visiting room again that day." Id. Ramos communicated the information to her supervisor, Lieutenant Wilborn. They decided that Ramos would confront Mrs. Loftis in order to determine whether she was in possession of contraband.
At approximately 11:30 a.m., Mrs. Loftis and Junior arrived at the visitor processing room to visit Inmate Loftis. Defendant Ramos approached Mrs. Loftis. The ensuing events, and the nature of the interaction between Ramos and Mrs. Loftis, are disputed by the parties. For example, Ramos states that she "asked" Mrs. Loftis if they could speak privately, and Mrs. Loftis agreed. Ramos Decl. ¶ 4. In contrast, Mrs. Loftis states that Ramos "ordered" her to "accompany her into the office and leave Junior sitting in a chair stationed outside of the office door." Loftis Decl. ¶ 16.
Mrs. Loftis states that Defendant Valadez was also present in the office, and "took up an interior guard position in front of the door, preventing" Mrs. Loftis from exiting. Id. ¶ 17. Defendant Ramos states that when she asked Mrs. Loftis if she had contraband in her possession, Mrs. Loftis "hesitated" and asked "What's going to happen to my son?" Ramos Decl. ¶ 5. Mrs. Loftis denies making any such statement. Mrs. Loftis states that Ramos told her about the anonymous call, and advised Mrs. Loftis that she would have to consent to a cavity search if she wanted to visit Inmate Loftis. Mrs. Loftis claims that she denied possessing contraband, refused to consent to a strip search, and requested that she and Junior either be allowed to continue their visit or be permitted to leave. According to Mrs. Loftis, Ramos threatened her with possible incarceration and loss of parental rights over Junior. Ramos denies threatening Mrs. Loftis.
Defendant Ramos informed the on-call Investigative Services Unit Officer, Defendant Davis, of the events in question. According to Defendant Davis:
Davis Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.3 After speaking to Ramos, Defendant Davis spoke to Mrs. Loftis via speaker phone, and advised her that he suspected her of smuggling contraband into RJD. According to Davis, "Mrs. Loftis immediately replied ‘I don't want my child to go to Child Protective Services.’ " Davis Decl. ¶ 8. Mrs. Loftis denies making this statement. Davis advised Mrs. Loftis that he believed probable cause existed to obtain a telephonic search warrant from San Diego Superior Court. Davis then contacted the on-call San Diego County District Attorney to advise that he and his partner, Defendant Ugalde, would be petitioning for a telephonic search warrant to search Mrs. Loftis. Davis next contacted Ugalde, and asked him to go to RJD and start preparing the paperwork for the search warrant application. Davis arrived at RJD approximately one hour and twenty minutes after speaking to Defendant Ramos and Mrs. Loftis on the telephone.
While Defendant Ugalde prepared the search warrant application, Defendant Davis met with Mrs. Loftis. According to Davis, he urged Mrs. Loftis to voluntarily surrender possession of any contraband on her person. Davis claims that Mrs. Loftis eventually reached into her undergarment, and appeared to be ready to pull something out. Davis states that he instructed Mrs. Loftis to stop so that he could have female officers conduct an unclothed body search. Mrs. Loftis denies that these events occurred. Thereafter, Defendant Ramos presented Mrs. Loftis with a California Department of Corrections Form 888, "Notice of Request to Search." Mrs. Loftis signed her name on the signature line next to a check-marked box indicating that she "voluntarily" agreed to be searched. Pl. Ex. 10. Mrs. Loftis does not dispute that her signature appears on the document, but claims that Defendant Ramos lied and told her it was a search warrant "authorizing the use of force" in order to conduct a court-ordered strip search. Loftis Decl. ¶ 32. Mrs. Loftis denies that she voluntarily consented to an unclothed body search. Meanwhile, Defendant Ugalde did not finish preparing the paperwork for a search warrant application because Davis advised him that Ms. Loftis had "voluntarily" consented to be searched.4 Ugalde Decl. ¶ 8.
Defendants Ramos and Valadez, who are both female, conducted the unclothed body search of Mrs. Loftis in a file room, with a single window that was covered during the search. Neither defendant touched Mrs. Loftis at any time during the search.
Mrs. Loftis and Junior remained separated for the duration of the events that day, which took place over the course of approximately three and a half hours. During that time, Mrs. Loftis states that she observed Junior crying, and she asked repeatedly to be reunited with him. According to Mrs. Loftis, Defendant Ramos first told her that she "no longer had custody of Junior, that [Child Protective Services] was being contacted, and that I could not speak with him." Loftis Decl. ¶ 20. Mrs. Loftis states that Ramos and Davis later claimed that "Junior had been picked up by Child Protective Services." Id. ¶ 31. According to Junior, he cried for "a long time" after being separated from his mother. Jr. Depo. at 19. Junior states that he asked to see his mother and the "cops" told him "no." Id. Defendants contend that none of the officers observed Junior crying at any time. Defendants assert that various correctional officers supervised Junior, provided him with water and toys to amuse himself, and took him outside to walk around. Defendants did not permit Mrs. Loftis and Junior to visit with Inmate Loftis that day. Ultimately, Defendant Ramos permanently prohibited Mrs. Loftis from visiting Inmate Loftis at RJD. See Pl. Ex. 13.
Based on these events, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully detaining them for more than three hours. Mrs. Loftis claims that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting her to a warrantless and nonconsensual unclothed body search. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to familial association. Defendants move for summary judgment on the merits of all claims. Defendants also move for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the basis of its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate absence of a...
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