Lofty v. Cohen
Decision Date | 20 March 1970 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 30916. |
Citation | 325 F. Supp. 285 |
Parties | Barber LOFTY, Plaintiff, v. Wilbur J. COHEN, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Morton E. Schneider, Kelman, Loria, Downing & Schneider, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.
Robert J. Grace, U. S. Atty., by, Franklin G. Koory, Asst. U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for defendant.
Plaintiff brings this suit to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). Briefly stated, it is plaintiff's position that the decision is erroneous in four respects. First, plaintiff contends that his disability dates from a period prior to June 1965 (the effective date of certain reduction provisions of the Social Security Act, as amended). Second, plaintiff contends that the lump sum settlement entered into in lieu of periodic payments to which he became entitled under the provisions of the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act was not such a "commutation of, or a substitute for, periodic payments" (42 U.S.C.A. § 424a (b)) as to be subject to the reduction provisions of the amended Act. Third, plaintiff contends that the reduction or crediting provisions of the Act for workmen's compensation benefits are unconstitutional. Fourth, plaintiff contends that if such reductions are to be made the formula applicable should be different from the one here employed.
The factual background of this case is succinctly set forth in the Hearing Examiner's Decision. We quote verbatim the paragraph from that decision setting forth such background:
The application for disability was filed March 29, 1966, alleging inability to engage in "substantial gainful activity" from January 19, 1966. This was allowed. In computing the benefits to which plaintiff thereby became entitled, the reduction provisions of the 1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act were applied because of benefits plaintiff had received from workmen's compensation. Plaintiff then sought and received a hearing before the Hearing Examiner contesting the application of the 1965 Amendments to his Social Security benefits. At that hearing plaintiff amended his application to allege that the onset date of his disability was December 1963, rather than January 19, 1966. This brings us to a consideration of plaintiff's First contention.
In order for plaintiff to successfully establish the onset of disability date as December 1963, it must be established that from that date on he was unable to engage in "substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(i) (1) (A). The fine lines that have been drawn by those courts which have been confronted with the determination of ability to engage in "substantial gainful activity" in the plethora of reported disability cases are hardly relevant to the circumstances present here. Plaintiff here denies the existence of that which is. No amount of rationalization that we may employ can render negative that which is positive. Plaintiff testified that from January 1964 to January 1966 he had worked forty to fifty hours a week. The fact that he worked on small parts since he could not lift heavier ones does not affect the "substantiality" of his activity in light of a forty- to fifty-hour work week. His earnings record from 1962 through 1965 reflects not only gainful activity but upwardly gainful activity. For the four years 1962 through 1965 his earnings, respectively, were: $4,280.93, $5,965.77, $6,926.71 and $8,117.27. His contention that he was unable to engage in "substantial gainful activity" in 1964 and 1965 is so patently ridiculous as to be meritless on its face. "Thus, even though an enumeration of the medical findings might initially lead to the conclusion that impairments have been established of such proportions that engagement in work activity is highly unlikely, if in fact a claimant has engaged in employment which can reasonably be classified as `substantial gainful activity,' he is thereby precluded by the definition of `disability' from obtaining benefits under the Act." Marshall v. Gardner, 298 F.Supp. 542, 545 (S.D.W.Va. 1968), affirmed 408 F.2d 883 (C.A.4, 1969). Plaintiff is, therefore, not a pre-1965 amended Social Security Act claimant. The decision of the Secretary in this respect is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff's Second contention is that the settlement of his workmen's compensation rights was a "redemption settlement" not a commutation or a substitute for periodic payments within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 424a(b). A copy of the State of Michigan Workmen's Compensation settlement order of May 19, 1966 is included in the Certification of defendant, attached to the Answer herein—Exhibit No. 11, page 118 of the Certification. It is denominated Redemption Order, and it is to the effect that the employer's entire liability is redeemed by the agreement "by a single payment in lieu of weekly payments and all medical benefits." The net sum payable to the plaintiff was $10,722.00. The Michigan statute pursuant to which the lump sum award was made clearly contemplates that such a lump sum payment is a substitute for plaintiff's claim for future periodic payments. See Walters v. Flemming, 185 F.Supp. 288 (D.Mass. 1960); see also Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 377 Mich. 176, 139 N.W.2d 733 (1966). The defendant's determination in this respect is supported both by law and reason, and is not erroneous.
We now reach plaintiff's Third contention which he states, in his February 2, 1970 brief, as follows: "We maintain that Section 2241 which imposes a formula for reducing social security disability benefits when the claimant is receiving workmen's compensation is demonstrably repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." The statute reads as follows:
Section 224 (42 U.S.C.A. § 424a).
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Richardson v. Belcher 8212 53
...income were highest. . . .' 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a). 2. E.g., Gambill v. Finch, 309 F.Supp. 1 (E.D.Tenn.1970); Lofty v. Cohen, 325 F.Supp. 285 (E.D.Mich.1970), aff'd sub nom. Lofty v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 1144 (CA6 1971); Bartley v. Finch, 311 F.Supp. 876 (E.D.Ky.1970); Bailey v. Finch, 312 F.S......
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