Logan v. Carter
| Decision Date | 22 May 1930 |
| Docket Number | 5571 |
| Citation | 288 P. 424,49 Idaho 393 |
| Parties | JOHN LOGAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. GEORGE N. CARTER. Commissioner of Reclamation of the State of Idaho, H. C. BALDRIDGE, FRED E. LUKENS, W. D. GILLIS, EDWARD GALLETT and MYRTLE DAVIS, Commissioners of the State Land Board, and BLAINE COUNTY INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Corporation, BLAINE COUNTY CANAL COMPANY, a Corporation, M. H. WOODS, JOHN DIETRICH, HENRY STAUFFER, C. H. MCDONALD and W. H. KARNS, Defendants |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-CAREY ACT RECLAMATION CONTRACT-FORFEITURE OF - MANDAMUS - WHEN ISSUED - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTES VALIDITY OF-WHEN CONSIDERED.
1. Members of state land board held without authority to forfeit Carey Act reclamation contract (Carey Act; C. S., secs. 350 3006).
2. Mandamus is employed to compel performance, when refused, of ministerial duty.
3. Duty of reclamation commissioner to forfeit Carey Act reclamation contract on failure of party to perform all requirements of contract held not ministerial, so as to authorize mandamus to compel performance thereof. (C. S., secs. 3006, 3007.)
4. Party seeking writ of mandate must have clear legal right to have act done, and it must be clear legal duty of officer to act.
5. Issuance of writ of mandate is discretionary.
6. Discretionary power to issue writ of mandate should not be exercised where there is grave doubt justifying its issuance.
7. Courts will not pass on validity of statute, unless it is necessary to decision of case before it.
Original application for Writ of Mandate. Demurrers to alternative writ sustained and motions to quash granted.
Demurrers to the petition sustained and motions to quash the writ granted.
G. F. Hansbrough and J. H. Andersen, for Plaintiffs.
"Irrespective of the question whether a private person may maintain mandamus to enforce a public right or duty, it seems that all the authorities concur in support of the proposition that an individual may have a particular interest of his own, independent of that which he holds in common with the people at large, in the performance of a statutory duty imposed on some officer or board, and that in such cases he is not simply an indistinguishable unit of the general public, but is the possessor of a separate and peculiar right which enables him to say that he is the party beneficially interested, and so entitled him to the writ."
When mandamus is invoked for the enforcement of a purely private right, it would seem clear, at least under the reformed procedure, that the proceedings may be conducted in the name of the actual parties in interest, and that the state is not a necessary party. (State v. White, 116 Ala. 202, 23 So. 31; Stoddard v. Benton, C Colo. 508; Lord v. Bates, 48 S.C. 95, 26 S.E. 213; State v. Caruthers, 1 Okla. Cr. 428, 98 P. 474; Rider v. Brown, 1 Okla. 244, 32 P. 341; People v. Pacheco, 29 Cal. 210; Pierson v. Loveland, 16 Idaho 628, 102 P. 340; Furbee v. Alexander, 31 Idaho 738, 176 P. 97; East Side Blaine County Livestock Assn. v. State Board of Land Commrs., 34 Idaho 807, 198 P. 760.)
It is a general rule and is well settled that a writ of mandamus may be issued against an officer or board of the state or federal government to compel performance of a purely ministerial duty imposed by law. And this is so even though refusal to perform the act is based upon an erroneous construction of the statute. In these circumstances the litigation is not with the state, since servants of the state by their act of disobedience do not represent or stand for the state. (38 C. J. 657, 658, and authorities there cited; Stethem v. Skinner, 11 Idaho 374, 82 P. 451; Furbee v. Alexander, supra; 18 R. C. L., secs. 118-276, pp. 193, 328; Sauve v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 29 Idaho 146, 158 P. 112.)
Peterson, Baum & Clark, for Blaine County Investment Company et al.
We have heretofore given the statutory definition of a writ of mandate as it is allowed in this state and have shown that it applies only to "an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office or station." (Idaho Independent Tel. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 8 Idaho 175, 67 P. 318; Heitman v. Morgan, 10 Idaho 562, 79 P. 225; Lewis v. Mountain Home Co-op. Irr. Co., 28 Idaho 682, 156 P. 419; Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Board of County Commrs. Latah Co., 29 Idaho 516, 160 P. 260.)
We have also shown that the writ can issue only in cases where there is no adequate remedy at law. The existence of an adequate remedy at law, legal or equitable, will prevent the issuance of the writ. (Beem v. Davis, 31 Idaho 730, 175 P. 959; Furbee v. Alexander, 31 Idaho 738, 176 P. 97; Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 34 Idaho 145, 199 P. 999; Vinyard v. North Side Canal Co., 38 Idaho 73, 223 P. 1072.)
It has also been said by our own supreme court that a party seeking a writ must have a clear legal right to have the act done, and where it appears that it is the clear legal duty of the officers to act. (Brooks v. Edgington, 40 Idaho 432, 233 P. 514.)
Our court has also held definitely that the issuance of the writ is discretionary, and when there is grave doubt justifying issuance, this discretion should not be exercised. (State v. Banks, 37 Idaho 27, 215 P. 468; State v. Malcom, 39 Idaho 185, 226 P. 1083.)
The California statute defining the writ of prohibition is identical for all practical purposes with our own, and in that state the courts have uniformly held "the granting of the writ (mandamus) lies to a great extent within the discretion of the court. (Mandamus is allowed only to protect a clear legal right, and the writ should never be granted where its enforcement will work an injustice or accomplish a legal wrong or operate harshly or introduce confusion and disorder, or to compel the performance of acts which are illegal, contrary to public policy, or which tend to aid an unlawful purpose.
W. D. Gillis, Attorney General, and S.E. Blaine, Assistant Attorney General, for Defendants.
Where an inquiry involves questions of law as well as of fact, and fixes a legal right, and its decision may result in terminating or destroying that right, the powers to be exercised and the duties to be discharged are essentially judicial, and an official action, the result of a discretion of this kind, is a judicial act. (18 R. C. L., secs. 158, 159; 22 R. C. L., sec. 26, p. 392; Payton v. McQuown, 97 Ky. 757, 53 Am. St. 437, 31 S.W. 874, 31 L. R. A. 33; Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 54 Am. Rep. 65.)
The commissioner of reclamation in the performance of the duties vested in him by C. S., sec. 3006, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and cannot be controlled in the exercise of his discretion by mandamus. (18 R. C. L. 118; Evans v. Swendsen, 34 Idaho 290, 200 P. 136; Furbee v. Alexander, 31 Idaho 738, 176 P. 97.)
A ministerial duty is one in regard to which no discretion is left in the officer on whom the duty is imposed, or, as it has been stated more at length, when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving the mere execution of a set task, and when the law which imposes it prescribes the time, mode and occasion of its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion. (22 R. C. L., p. 392, sec. 26.)
Ministerial offices are those which give the officer no power to judge of the matter to be done. A ministerial officer has been defined as one whose duty it is to execute the mandates lawfully issued by his superiors.
A writ of mandate cannot be issued to compel a public officer to perform an official duty where the statute vests in such officer a discretionary power to act. (Board of Commrs. v. Mayhew, 5 Idaho 572, 51 P. 411; Pyke v. Steunenberg, 5 Idaho 614, 51 P. 614; Connolly v. Woods, 13 Idaho 591, 92 P. 573; Saint Michael's Monastery v. Steele, 30 Idaho 609, 167 P. 349; Laird v. Terrell, 32 Idaho 734, 187 P. 1081; Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, 107 P. 493; Darby v. Pence, 17 Idaho 697, 107 P. 484, 27 L. R. A., N. S., 1194; Blomquist v. Board of County Commrs., 25 Idaho 284, 137 P. 174; Furbee v. Alexander, supra.)
A writ of mandate cannot be invoked to enforce contract obligations. (18 R. C. L. 121-128.)
Under C. S., sec. 3006, the commissioner of reclamation is vested with very wide discretionary powers in the execution of contracts in regard to the provisions which may enter into a contract with a Carey Act construction company. (Furbee v. Alexander, supra; State v. Twin Falls-Salmon River Land & Water Co., 30 Idaho 41, 166 P. 220.)
The court will not, by injunction, interfere with the exercise of discretion granted by law to administrative boards, unless the board is proceeding in violation of statute, or is acting in bad faith or has abused its discretion. (Fritchman v. Athey, 36 Idaho 560, 211 P. 1080; Balderston v. Brady, supra; Town of Afton v. Gill, 57 Okla. 36, 156 P. 658; 1 Joyce on Injunctions, p. 108, sec. 54; 2 High on Injunctions, p. 1247, sec. 1241.)
This is an original proceeding in this court for a writ of mandate...
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