Logan v. City Council of City of Roanoke, Record No. 070371.

Decision Date18 April 2008
Docket NumberRecord No. 070371.
Citation275 Va. 483,659 S.E.2d 296
PartiesJacqulyn C. LOGAN, et al. v. CITY COUNCIL OF the CITY OF ROANOKE, et al.
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

C. Richard Cranwell, Vinton; T. David Stoner (Randall T. Greehan; Cranwell, Moore & Emick; Greehan, Taves, Pandak & Stoner, on briefs), for appellants.

Steven J. Talevi, Assistant City Attorney (William M. Hackworth, City Attorney, on brief), for appellees City Council of the City of Roanoke, Planning Commission of the City of Roanoke, and R. Brian Townsend.

Gregory J. Haley (Monica Taylor Monday; Kathleen L. Wright; Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, on brief), Roanoke, for appellee Boone Homes, Inc.

Amici Curiae: Virginia Municipal League, Local Government Attorneys of Virginia, Inc., and Virginia Association of Counties (Phyllis C. Katz; M. Ann Neil Cosby; Sands Anderson Marks & Miller, on brief), in support of appellees.

Present: All the Justices.

OPINION BY Justice BARBARAMILANO KEENAN.

The primary issue we decide in this appeal is whether Code § 15.2-2255 permits a local governing body to delegate to a planning commission or other agent the authority under a subdivision ordinance to grant exceptions involving public improvements. We also consider the issue whether certain provisions in the Roanoke City Subdivision Ordinance1 (the Subdivision Ordinance) provided adequate standards, in compliance with Code § 15.2-2242(1), for rendering discretionary decisions granting exceptions under that Ordinance. Finally, we consider whether neighboring landowners may seek a declaratory judgment regarding a locality's application of a subdivision ordinance.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2004, George Leonard Boone, president of Boone Homes, Inc., a land development company, began working with officials from the City of Roanoke (the City) to obtain approval of a subdivision plat providing for the construction of about 60 single-family homes in southern Roanoke. Boone planned to build this housing development, known as "Wilton," on about 50 acres of mountainous land.

Boone worked with R. Brian Townsend, the City's Director of Planning, Building, and Economic Development, to obtain approval of the Wilton subdivision plat. Townsend was the subdivision agent authorized by the City Council and the City Planning Commission, under former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-5(a)2 and 31-65,3 to make decisions regarding exceptions to the Subdivision Ordinance.

In December 2004, Townsend conditionally approved a portion of the subdivision plat for the Wilton development. The approved portion of the plat incorporated the following exceptions to the Subdivision Ordinance requirements: 1) an exception from the 10% maximum grade requirement for local streets, as set forth in former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-70, to allow for a maximum grade of 16% for one local street; 2) an exception from the minimum requirement for local streets of a 30-foot-wide paved surface, as set forth in former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-90(b),4 to permit several streets 22 feet in width; 3) an exception from the maximum length for cul-de-sac streets of 600 feet, as set forth in former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-70, to permit a cul-de-sac street of 1800 feet; and 4) permission to construct street blocks up to a maximum length of 1800 feet, a departure from former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-67,5 which states that blocks longer than 1200 feet, or less than 360 feet, "may be cause for disapproval of the preliminary plat."

Boone requested several of these exceptions in order to construct an access road, named Wilton Park Drive, leading into the Wilton development. Under Boone's plan, Wilton Park Drive would intersect with Peakwood Drive, an existing main road in a residential area of the City known as Prospect Hills. To construct Wilton Park Drive, Boone planned to demolish a house he owned on a one-acre lot that connects the Wilton property with Peakwood Drive and construct the entry to Wilton Park Drive on that lot. The proposed Wilton Park Drive would have a downward grade of 16% and, like all the proposed roads in the Wilton subdivision, would end in a cul-de-sac.

In October 2005, Jacqulyn C. Logan and 15 additional landowners who own homes on Peakwood Drive near the proposed Wilton subdivision filed a bill of complaint for declaratory judgment against the Roanoke City Council, the City Planning Commission, Townsend, and Boone Homes, Inc. (collectively, the defendants). Logan and the additional complainants (collectively, Logan) alleged that Peakwood Drive, a curved road located on a mountainside, would be "unsafe and inappropriate" for the additional vehicle traffic that would result from construction of the Wilton subdivision.

Logan also alleged in the bill of complaint that the Subdivision Ordinance was both facially invalid and invalid as applied to the approval of the Wilton subdivision plat. Logan asserted the following particular claims relevant to this appeal: 1) former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and -90(b) were unlawful because they stated less stringent standards for granting exceptions to the Subdivision Ordinance than the standards provided in Code § 15.2-2242(1); 2) in violation of Code § 15.2-2255, the City Council improperly delegated to its subdivision agent the authority to grant exceptions under the Subdivision Ordinance involving public improvements; 3) former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 65 and -90(b) failed to provide adequate standards to guide the subdivision agent's decisions whether to grant exceptions under the Ordinance; 4) the subdivision agent lacked authority under Code §§ 15.2-2242 and -2255 to grant exceptions relating to public improvements; 5) the subdivision agent acted arbitrarily and capriciously when he granted the exceptions; and 6) the approval of plans for proposed Wilton Park Drive violated former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-86 because the plans would alter the boundaries of lots in Prospect Hills and would alter Peakwood Drive.

The defendants filed demurrers to the bill of complaint. The circuit court sustained the demurrers regarding Logan's claims one, two, and four, as listed above, and granted Logan leave to amend those claims.

After Logan filed an amended bill of complaint, the defendants again filed demurrers. Among other things, the defendants contended that Logan did not have a private right of action to challenge enforcement of the Subdivision Ordinance as applied to the Wilton subdivision plat. The circuit court held that the amended bill of complaint was not significantly different from Logan's original pleading, and again sustained the demurrers regarding claims one, two, and four.

The case proceeded to a five-day bench trial, in which the circuit court heard evidence relating to each of the granted exceptions. Following the trial, in a letter opinion, the circuit court dismissed Logan's remaining claims. The circuit court held that Logan could seek a declaratory judgment under Code § 8.01-184 to determine the adequacy of standards for granting exceptions under the Subdivision Ordinance, and the propriety of the particular decisions Townsend made concerning the Wilton subdivision plat. The circuit court concluded that former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and -90 contained definite and sufficient standards under Code § 15.2-2242(1) to guide the subdivision agent in exercising his discretion under those provisions. The circuit court also held that Logan failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the subdivision agent acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in granting the challenged exceptions.

We awarded Logan this appeal. We also granted the defendants' assignments of cross-error, in which they assert that Logan did not have a right of action to challenge the subdivision agent's application of the Subdivision Ordinance in approving the Wilton subdivision plat.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Delegation of Authority to Subdivision Agent

Logan argues that the City Council was prohibited by Code § 15.2-2255 from adopting a provision in its Subdivision Ordinance that delegated to its subdivision agent the authority to approve exceptions involving public improvements. The statute provides:

The administration and enforcement of subdivision regulations insofar as they pertain to public improvements as authorized in §§ 15.2-2241 through 15.2-2245 shall be vested in the governing body of the locality in which the improvements are or will be located.

Except as provided above, the governing body shall be responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions of the subdivision regulations through its local planning commission or otherwise.

Code § 15.2-2255.

Relying on the Dillon Rule of strict construction, Logan contends that the first paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 removes the category of public improvements from the general authority of a local governing body to delegate matters concerning the application and enforcement of its subdivision ordinance. Thus, Logan contends that only a local governing body, not its designated agent, may grant exceptions pertaining to public improvements as part of the subdivision plat approval process.

In response, the defendants contend that the first paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 addresses situations in which real property is subject to the subdivision ordinances of both a county and a municipality. According to the defendants, in such situations, the administration and enforcement of subdivision ordinance provisions pertaining to public improvements shall be vested in the governing body of the locality in which the improvements are located. Thus, the defendants assert that because approval of the Wilton subdivision plat did not involve public improvements located in more than one jurisdiction, this statutory provision did not prevent the City from delegating to Townsend the authority to grant exceptions relating to public improvements proposed for the Wilton subdivision. We agree with the...

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