Logan v. City of Schenectady

• Decision Date: 13 August 2019
• Docket Number: 1:18-cv-01179 (BKS/CFH)
• Citation: Logan v. City of Schenectady, 1:18-cv-01179 (BKS/CFH) (N.D. N.Y. Aug 13, 2019)
• Parties: ANTHONY LOGAN, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF SCHENECTADY, CHIEF ERIC S. CLIFFORD, ASSISTANT CHIEF PATRICK LEGUIRE, ASSISTANT CHIEF JACK FALVO, LT. ERIK GANDROW, SGT. JEFFREY McCUTCHEON, SGT. THOMAS HARRIGAN, DET. SGT. PETER FORTH, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

ANTHONY LOGAN, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF SCHENECTADY, CHIEF ERIC S. CLIFFORD,ASSISTANT CHIEF PATRICK LEGUIRE, ASSISTANT CHIEF JACK FALVO,LT. ERIK GANDROW, SGT. JEFFREY McCUTCHEON, SGT. THOMAS HARRIGAN, DET. SGT. PETER FORTH, Defendants.

1:18-cv-01179 (BKS/CFH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 13, 2019

Appearances:

For Plaintiff:

Leo Glickman

Stoll, Glickman & Bellina, LLP

300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor

Brooklyn, NY 11201

For Defendants:

Gregg T. Johnson

Corey A. Ruggiero

Johnson & Laws, LLC

648 Plank Road, Suite 204

Clifton Park, NY 12065 Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I.INTRODUCTION

This action arises from a June 5, 2017 incident during which Plaintiff was shot twice by officers of the Schenectady Police Department("SPD") at his home in Schenectady, New York.(Dkt. No. 2, ¶¶ 9-49).¹In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant SPD Officers Clifford, Leguire, Falvo, Gandrow, McCutcheon, Harrigan, and Forth (the "Individual Defendants") were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (id.¶¶ 57-62), and the New York State Constitution, (id.¶¶ 68-70).Plaintiff further asserts that the City of Schenectady is liable for the wrongs of the Individual Defendants under a theory of "respondeat superior,"(id.¶¶ 68-72), which Plaintiff now argues is a Monell² claim, (Dkt. No. 14, at 14-15).Plaintiff also brings state law claims for negligence, (id.¶¶ 51-56), and intentional infliction of emotional distress, (id.¶¶ 63-67).Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) as to all of Plaintiff's claims, and for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) on Plaintiff's state law tort claims.(Dkt.No. 10-6, at 33).Plaintiff opposes the motion.(Dkt. No. 14).For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II.BACKGROUND

A.Factual Background³

At approximately 10:00 am on June 5, 2017, SPD police officers arrived at Plaintiff's home in Schenectady, New York.(Dkt. No. 2, ¶ 10-11).At that time, "Plaintiff was on the second floor of the building, and went onto an external porch to speak with the officers who were outside at ground level."(Id.¶ 11).The officers, under the command of Defendant McCutcheon, "spoke to [P]laintiff in this position for approximately half an hour."(Id.¶¶ 12-13).At some point "[d]uring this conversation[,][P]laintiff's wife exited the home[,] . . . went with the police," and "informed [them] that [P]laintiff was alone in the home following her exit."(Id.¶¶ 14-15)."At or about 10:37 am SPD officers fired their guns at [P]laintiff," who was unarmed, and "Plaintiff was hit by at least two bullets fired by SPD officers."(Id.¶¶ 16-18).Plaintiff was "knocked to the ground" by "the SPD officer's [sic] gunfire,""began bleeding profusely from the gunshot wounds," and "was in extreme pain and unable to move from the porch as a result of his injuries."(Id.¶ 19-20).Immediately "after the shots were fired,"Defendant McCutcheon "reported 'shots fired' over his SPD radio and requested emergency medical personnel and a police tactical team be dispatched to the area"; shortly thereafter, Defendants"Clifford, Leguire, Falvo, Gandrow, Harrigan, and Forth . . . arrived at the scene, either responding to the ongoing police activity or as part of the tactical team."(Id.¶¶ 21-22).

Upon arrival to the scene, Defendants positioned themselves "around [P]laintiff's home [and] could observe Plaintiff on the porch."(Id.¶ 23).Defendants could see that Plaintiff"had been hit, was bleeding, and appeared unable to move," and they"reported their observations over the SPD radio."(Id.¶ 24).While he was bleeding on the floor of the porch, Defendants"directed various commands to [P]laintiff, including directing him to stand up, raise his hands above his head, and/or come down from the porch."(Id.¶ 27)."[A]s a result of his injuries," however, Plaintiff was unable to comply."(Id.)."Emergency medical technicians arrived on the scene by approximately 10:50 am."(Id.¶ 28).Notwithstanding the fact that Defendants"were aware that [P]laintiff needed immediate medical assistance as a result of the gunshot wounds he suffered,"(id.¶ 26), Defendants"ordered the medical personnel to wait a short distance from the area and did not allow them to access [P]laintiff or his home,"(id.¶ 28).

Although an "SPD tactical team was on the scene" by approximately 11:05 a.m., (id.¶ 30), "SPD officers repeatedly told [P]laintiff that he should not move and that they would be coming to assist him shortly,"(id.¶ 33).During that time, Defendants were aware that Plaintiff was "in agonizing pain as a result of the gunshot wounds and blood loss."(Id.¶ 36)."Several of [P]laintiff's family, friends and/or neighbors," who had become "aware that [Plaintiff] had been shot and was on the porch awaiting" medical treatment, "attempted to go to his assistance."(Id.¶¶ 37-38).Defendants, however, "physically barr[ed] them from accessing [P]laintiff's home."(Id.¶ 39)."[D]espite knowing that [P]laintiff was suffering from multiple gunshot wounds, . . . in agonizing pain, [and] unable to move himself to get help,"Defendants"left [P]laintiff bleeding on the porch for over two hours without any medical treatment."(Id.¶ 42).As he waited, "Plaintiff believed he was going to die."(Id.¶ 46).As a result of the "extended delay in access to medical treatment,"Defendants caused Plaintiff to "suffer agonizing pain" and "worsened his medical condition as he suffered significant blood loss."(Id.¶ 45).At approximately 12:54 p.m., Defendants"finally allowed SPD officers to enter . . . [P]laintiff's home," and "paramedics were finally allowed to enter and treat him" shortly thereafter.(Id.¶¶ 40-41)."Plaintiff was rushed to the hospital where he remained in intensive care for days."(Id.¶ 46).

B.Procedural Background⁴

On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a verified notice of claim with Defendant City of Schenectady, seeking damages for "assault, battery, negligence, deliberate indifference, deprivation of federal and state constitutional and civil rights, violations of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, [and] the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution," arising from the June 5, 2017 incident.(Dkt.No. 10-7, ¶ 3).Plaintiff's counsel had not yet been retained.(Dkt.No. 14-1, at 1)."[P]ursuant to New York General Municipal Law 50-h,"Defendants"served upon Plaintiff's counsel a Demand for Examination on or about October 24, 2017."(Id.¶ 4).At that time, however, Plaintiff"was facing felony charges stemming from" the June 5, 2017 incident.(Dkt.No. 14-1, ¶ 4).As a result, on November 15, 2017, Plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to counsel for Defendants requesting an adjournment of the § 50-h examination, and informing him that "[i]f a[n] . . . examination is held while those charges are pending, we will advise him to exercise his 5th Amendment right to refuse to answer questions related to the date of [the] incident."(Id.¶ 6).Defendants, however, "refused [Plaintiff's]request to reschedule the examination,"(Id.¶ 7).On November 28, 2017, Defendants' counsel responded that they planned "to go forward with [Plaintiff's] 50-h examination as noticed."(Dkt.No. 14-5).

Plaintiff's § 50-h examination was ultimately held on January 4, 2018.(Dkt.No. 10-7, ¶ 5).At the examination, Plaintiff was accompanied by his counsel in the instant litigation, as well as Brendan Keller of the Schenectady County Public Defender's Office.(Dkt.No. 14-1,¶ 12).During the examination, Mr. Keller advised Plaintiff"to exercise his Constitutional right not to answer questions which related to the criminal charges he was facing."(Id.¶ 13).As a result, Plaintiff"did not answer . . . any questions relating to his behavior or interactions with police officers on the morning of June 5, 2017" and several other topics related to various criminal charges pending against him at the time.(Dkt.No. 10-7, ¶¶ 7-10).Defendants' counsel"never indicated—on the record or off—a desire to revisit those questions after the conclusion of the criminal case against"Plaintiff.(Dkt.No. 14-1, ¶ 13).Notwithstanding Plaintiff's counsel's "efforts prior to January 4, 2018 . . . to reschedule the examination for a date on which [Plaintiff] would be free to answer [D]efendants' questions about the claim,"Defendants"never made known a desire to resume the § 50-h examination . . . or any dissatisfaction with its completeness."(Dkt.No. 14-1, ¶¶ 19-20).

On March 1, 2018, following a criminal trial on the charges relating to the June 5, 2017 incident, Plaintiff was convicted of felony possession of a weapon, reckless endangerment, and menacing, among other crimes.(Dkt.No. 10-7, ¶ 12;Dkt.No. 14-1, ¶ 16)."On or about March 8, 2018,"Defendants' counsel"sent a letter stating he was following up on [Plaintiff's]§ 50-h examination" by requesting authorizations for medical records; the letter, however, "did not mention in any way a desire to resume the § 50-h examination, even though [Plaintiff's] criminal trial had . . . concluded."(Dkt.No. 14-1, ¶ 17).Plaintiff argues that "Defendants never indicated to [P]laintiff or his counsel that they had any desire to reschedule/resume the examination, despite their earlier denials of [P]laintiff's request to do so" until after his criminal charges had been resolved.(Id.¶ 21).Defendants, on the other hand, contend that it is "Plaintiff's counsel[who] made no attempt to reschedule Plaintiff's 50-h examination prior to commencing the instant action."(Dkt.No. 10-7, ¶ 13).

III.DISCUSSION

A.Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(c)

1.Standard of Review

The standard of review for a motion under Rule 12(c) is the same as a...