Logan v. City of S. Bend

• Citation: 50 F.4th 614
• Docket Number: 21-2922
• Decision Date: 03 October 2022
• Parties: ESTATE OF Eric Jack LOGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SOUTH BEND, INDIANA, and Ryan O'Neill, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

50 F.4th 614

ESTATE OF Eric Jack LOGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.CITY OF SOUTH BEND, INDIANA, and Ryan O'Neill, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-2922

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 12, 2022

Decided October 3, 2022

Brian W. Coffman, Attorney, Coffman Law Offices, P.C., Chicago, IL, Kenneth N. Flaxman, Joel A. Flaxman, Attorneys, Law Office of Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Peter J. Agostino, Stephanie L. Nemeth, Attorneys, Anderson, Agostino & Keller, PC, South Bend, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before Easterbrook, Scudder, and Jackson-Akiwumi, Circuit Judges.

Easterbrook, Circuit Judge.

Police officer Ryan O'Neill shot and killed Eric Jack Logan after Logan walked menacingly toward him. During a 3:30 am encounter, while O'Neill was investigating reports that someone was stealing items from parked cars, Logan picked up a hunting knife and approached O'Neill. The officer told Logan to stand still and put down the weapon. Logan did neither, held the knife up, and came within three steps of O'Neill. Logan threw the knife, hitting O'Neill in the arm, and O'Neill fired his gun, hitting Logan in the torso. Only after being shot did Logan obey the command to get on the ground. O'Neill called for an ambulance, but Logan died at a hospital. His estate filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing O'Neill of violating the Fourth Amendment (applied to state actors by the Fourteenth) by using deadly force when he was not in danger. See Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of O'Neill and his employer, the City of South Bend. 564 F. Supp. 3d 719 (N.D. Ind. 2021).

The facts we have recited come from the affidavit and deposition of Officer O'Neill, the only surviving witness to the events. The Estate does not deny that Logan had a hunting knife; ignored commands to drop the knife, stand still, or get down; advanced on O'Neill; and threw the knife at him. But the Estate contends that one of O'Neill's multiple descriptions of these events implies that Logan threw the knife a second or so before O'Neill pulled the trigger. If that is the sequence, the Estate submits, then O'Neill was safe (Logan was no longer armed) and could not use deadly force. Moreover, the Estate contends, a jury might doubt O'Neill's version of events because he did not activate his body camera until he had fired, and he has been convicted of ghost employment, a felony in Indiana. If O'Neill is not credible, the argument goes, then a jury could find that he used unreasonable force.

Litigation must be resolved on the evidence that exists. When an officer who used deadly force is the only possible witness, a decedent's estate is unlikely to succeed unless physical evidence contradicts the officer's account. So we have said in multiple decisions. See, e.g., King v. Hendricks County Commissioners , 954 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 2020) ; Gysan v. Francisko , 965 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2020). The physical evidence, such as the bullet track, is consistent with O'Neill's account.

Disbelief of the only witness is not proof that the opposite of the witness's statements is true; disbelief would mean that the record is empty, and on an empty record the plaintiff loses, because the plaintiff has the burdens of production and persuasion. See, e.g., Waldon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 943 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2019) ("Criticizing the credibility of the movant's affiants, alone, is not enough to avoid summary judgment. ‘[W]hen challenges to witness’ credibility are all that a plaintiff relies on, and he has shown no independent facts—no proof—to support his claims, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is proper.’ Springer v. Durflinger , 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original); see also Dugan v. Smerwick Sewerage Co. , 142 F.3d 398, 406 (7th Cir. 1998) (‘[T]he prospect of challenging a witness' credibility is not alone enough to avoid summary judgment.’).") See also United States v. Zeigler , 994 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

O'Neill...