Logan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1898
• Citation: 47 S.W. 948,146 Mo. 114
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: LOGAN v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>

47 S.W. 948

146 Mo. 114

LOGAN v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK.¹

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

July 6, 1898.

LIFE INSURANCE — SUICIDE AS A DEFENSE — ACCIDENT POLICY.

1. Rev. St. 1889, § 5855, providing that, "in all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company doing business in this state, it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide," unless it shall be shown that the insured contemplated suicide when making his application, "and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void," applies to policies which cover loss of life from external, violent, and accidental means alone, as well as those governing loss of life from usual or natural causes.

2. The fact that a policy of insurance covering loss of life from external, violent, or accidental means also contains a provision for indemnity in case of disability not resulting in death does not make it other than a policy of insurance on life.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; E. L. Scarritt, Judge.

Action by Mary A. Logan against the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Warner, Dean, Gibson & McLeod, for appellant. Fyke, Yates & Fyke and Reed & Reed, for respondent.

ROBINSON, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of a beneficiary in a policy issued by the defendant insurance company containing, among others, the following provisions: "If death shall result, within ninety days, from such injuries, independently of all other causes, the company will pay the principal sum of this policy to Mrs. Mary A. Logan, his mother, if surviving, or, in event of her prior death, to the legal representatives of the assured; (a) or if the loss by actual separation, at or above the wrist or ankle, of both hands or both feet, or of one hand and one foot, or the irrecoverable loss of the sight of both eyes, shall so result within ninety days, the company will pay the assured the principal sum before named, which payment shall terminate the policy; (b) or if the loss by actual separation, at or above the wrist or ankle, of one hand or of one foot, shall so result within ninety days, the company will pay the assured one-half the principal sum before named, which payment shall terminate the policy; or if such injuries, independently of all other causes, shall immediately, continuously, and wholly disable and prevent the assured from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupation, the company will pay the assured the weekly indemnity before specified during the continuance of such disability, and for a period not exceeding fifty-two consecutive weeks. If the assured is injured, fatally or otherwise, in any occupation or exposure classed by this company as more hazardous than that before stated, the company's liability shall be for such principal sum or weekly indemnity as the premium paid by him will purchase at the rate fixed for such increased hazard. In case of injuries, fatal or otherwise, wantonly inflicted upon himself by the assured, or inflicted upon himself, or received by him while insane, the measure of this company's liability shall be a sum equal to the premium paid, the same being agreed upon as in full liquidation of all claims under this policy."

The petition in the case set out that on the 18th day of December, 1893, the assured, William E. Logan, received, through external, violent, and accidental means, bodily injuries, which were the direct and immediate cause of, and which, independent of all other causes, resulted in, the immediate death of said William E. Logan, and that said injuries consisted of a gun or pistol shot wound in and upon the head of him, the said Logan. Defendant set up in its answer that the assured died by reason of a pistol-shot wound intentionally and wantonly inflicted upon himself and by his own hand, and that the death of said assured was caused while either sane or insane, in either of which events defendant was not liable except for the amount of the premiums paid. Defendant further pleaded the stipulations and covenants contained in the policy, that, in the event of fatal injuries to said assured resulting from injuries wantonly inflicted upon himself, or inflicted upon himself while insane, the defendant's liability under its policy should be a sum equal to the premiums paid said sum being agreed upon in said policy as in full liquidation of all claims thereunder, which sum, with interest amounting to $20, defendant in its answer tendered to plaintiff, together with all costs to date of tender, and avers its willingness to pay said sum into court, with costs, for plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed her reply, denying each and every allegation of defendant's answer.

During the progress of the introduction of defendant's testimony in the court below, the trial was abruptly terminated by this announcement on part of the counsel for defendant: "We want this case to go up on the question as to whether or not the suicide statute makes suicide a defense in a case of this kind, and applies to a policy such as this, and, if so, then the jury should be instructed to find for plaintiff, and that there may not be any question upon that point, and for the purpose and in order to have the matter clear, we withdraw all objections as to proof of death, and admit, for the purposes of this trial, that the proofs of death were furnished, and that notice of death was furnished; it is a question we are all interested in, and it is a question that ought to be decided, both for the company and for the assured," — to which announcement the trial court then replied: "Your position is that, if section 5855 of the Revised Statutes of 1889 applies to this kind of a policy, then, under the testimony in this case, the plaintiff is entitled to recover; otherwise not," — to which Mr. Warner, of counsel for defendant, responded: "That is it, precisely. That narrows it down so that the case will be stripped of all technicalities as to evidence." Accepting the issue of law tendered by the defendant's counsel, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount of the policy, with interest. From the judgment...