Logan v. Louisiana Dock Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-C-1506,88-C-1506
• Citation: 541 So.2d 182
• Parties: John LOGAN v. LOUISIANA DOCK COMPANY, INC., et al.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 182

541 So.2d 182

1990 A.M.C. 2625

John LOGAN v. LOUISIANA DOCK COMPANY, INC., et al.

No. 88-C-1506.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 30, 1989.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lemmon Feb. 6, 1989.

On Rehearing April 14, 1989.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Calogero

on Rehearing April 17, 1989.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Dennis

on Rehearing May 4, 1989.

For Opinion of Justice Lemmon concurring in decision on

Partial Rehearing, See 543 So.2d 1336.

Frank A. Bruno, Bruno & Bruno, New Orleans, for applicant.

Charles N. Branton, Fred E. Salley, Salley & Associates, New Orleans, for respondents.

COLE, Justice.

Plaintiff John Logan (Logan) brought this action in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans seeking workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained in the course of his employment with defendant Louisiana Dock Co., Inc. (Louisiana Dock). The trial court entered judgment for Logan and the defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reversed. ¹ The appellate court held the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Logan's claim, finding exclusive federal jurisdiction existed under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), codified at 33 U.S.C. Sec. 901 et seq. We granted certiorari ² to review the jurisdictional issue and now reverse the Court of Appeal.

ISSUES

Because of Louisiana Dock's failure to seek protective writs to preserve its other errors assigned below, a single question is properly before us:

Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Logan's claim under state workers' compensation law or whether his state claim is preempted by the federal LHWCA.

FACTS

The facts pertinent to our jurisdictional inquiry are not in dispute. Logan injured his right knee on November 7, 1985 while employed by Louisiana Dock as a welder. The injury occurred while Logan was performing repairs to a barge on the company's dry docks located in the Mississippi River at New Orleans. He sought and obtained medical attention, including surgery on his knee and was subsequently released to return to work. Logan continued to complain of pain in his knee and was ultimately discharged by Louisiana Dock. He brought this action in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, seeking compensation under Louisiana workers' compensation laws. ³ Louisiana Dock answered, challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court and asserting other defenses. After trial on the merits, the trial court awarded Logan temporary total disability benefits. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit reversed and the matter is now before us on Logan's application for writ of certiorari.

ANALYSIS

A. Federal Jurisdiction

On the facts established below, there is no question Logan's injuries are compensable under the federal LHWCA. At the time he was injured, Logan was working in a dry dock and engaged in ship repair. In 33 U.S.C. Sec. 902(3), the term "employee" is defined to include "any harbor worker including a ship repairman...." The coverage of the Act extends to an "employee" injured "upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock...." 33 U.S.C. Sec. 903(a). Thus, Logan meets both the "status" and "situs" requirements for recovery under the LHWCA.

B. Concurrent Jurisdiction

The availability of a federal remedy does not necessarily foreclose Logan's claim for relief under state law. Absent federal preemption, Louisiana is free to extend Logan the protection of its workers' compensation laws. It is well established that federal preemption of state laws will not be found without a clear expression of Congressional intent, and there is a strong presumption against finding preemption. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985); and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). In Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341, 93 S.Ct. 1590, 1600, 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973), the Court stated: "Even though Congress has acted in the admiralty area, state regulation is permissible, absent a clear conflict with the federal law." The U.S. Supreme Court has also noted that in cases of doubt concerning the applicability of state compensation law relative to the LHWCA, the question should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the state remedy. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 309, 103 S.Ct. 634, 643, 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1983) (hereafter Perini ). With these presumptions in mind, we turn to the applicable law.

1. Statutory Interpretation

We note the LHWCA, as amended, contains no express declaration of Congressional intent to prohibit states from providing compensation to injured workers in lieu of, or in addition to, the benefits provided under the LHWCA. In fact, the 1972 amendments to 33 U.S.C. Sec. 903(a) eliminated existing language in the statute that pointed to exclusivity. ⁴ Referring to this change, the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980): "It would be a tour de force of statutory misinterpretation to treat the removal of phrasing that arguably establishes exclusive jurisdiction as manifesting the intent to command such exclusivity." Id at 720-721, 100 S.Ct. at 2436-2437 (emphasis in original). In addition, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 903(e), which provides for the crediting of amounts paid under "any other workers' compensation law" against an employer's liability under the LHWCA, implies Congress envisioned the existence of parallel state remedies.

More problematic is the language of 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(a) which states: "The liability of an employer prescribed in Section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee...." However, the argument Sec. 905 precludes concurrent state remedies was considered and rejected in Sun Ship. See 447 U.S. at 722, 100 S.Ct. at 2437. ⁵ Finally, the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA reveals no evidence of Congressional intent to preempt state law and create exclusive federal jurisdiction. ⁶

Louisiana Dock contends the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, which extended the act's protection to maritime workers shoreward of the water's edge, were designed to create a uniform compensation system. See Perini, 459 U.S. at 318, 103 S.Ct. at 647. We agree that Congress wished to provide a uniform, minimum level of compensation for injured workers. It also wished to avoid the problem of harbor workers walking in and out of federal coverage in going between a pier and a ship. See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 90 S.Ct. 347, 24 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969); see also H.R.Rep. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4698, 4708. However, the desire of Congress to provide a uniform, minimum level of protection does not require us to imply Congressional intent to preempt the field and to forbid the states from offering injured workers comparable or greater benefits. The absence of preemptive language in the statute and its history militates in favor of finding concurrent jurisdiction, particularly in light of the presumptions against finding preemption noted above.

We find the Court of Appeal clearly erred in finding preemption is mandated by the LHWCA. This holding is contrary to the statutory language itself as well as the intepretation of the statute by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sun Ship. The appeals court erroneously relied on the U.S. Fifth Circuit's opinion in Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406 (1987). (hereafter T.E.I.A.). The panel's decision in T.E.I.A. was vacated by a grant of rehearing en banc and is without precedential authority. 828 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1987); Griffis v. Gulf Coast Pre-Stress Co., Inc., 850 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir.1988) at 1092. In its opinion on rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit retreated somewhat from the sweeping dicta relied on by the Court of Appeal. 862 F.2d 491 (5th Cir.1988). We find nothing in the text of the LHWCA itself to support the broad preemption claims of the Fourth Circuit below: state and federal compensation laws are complimentary, not contradictory; ⁷ there is no evidence in the LHWCA of Congressional intent to preempt state law; and, as noted above, Sec. 905 was designed not to preempt state remedies but to abolish non-LHWCA federal claims by injured longshoremen. Our conclusion that concurrent jurisdiction is the better rule is supported by the scholarship on this question.

2. Scholarship

Scholarly commentators are somewhat divided on the question of whether Congress, in passing the LHWCA, intended to preempt the field of compensation benefits for injured harbor workers and longshoremen. Certain scholars have argued the comprehensive nature of the LHWCA points to Congressional intent to occupy the entire field and impose nationwide uniformity of remedies for injured longshoremen. ⁸ A clear majority of the commentators, however, find concurrent jurisdiction is the better rule for a variety of legal and policy reasons. We agree.

As a policy matter, it would be "undesirable in the highest degree" to return to the notion that federal and state jurisdiction over claims such as Logan's are mutually exclusive. See Gilmore and Black, supra, at 425. Concurrent jurisdiction over certain maritime-related injuries eliminates guesswork as to the injured employee's choice of forum; no injured employee can fall through a jurisdictional crack. ⁹ Louisiana has a very important interest in assuring that its land-based citizens, like Logan, who work in hazardous maritime-related activities, are fully compensated for their injuries. Concurrent jurisdiction avoids the anomalous and undesirable situation of an injured harbor...