Logan v. West Coast Benson Hotel

Decision Date09 September 1997
Docket NumberCivil No. 96-966-JO.
Citation981 F.Supp. 1301
PartiesKelly Sue LOGAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WEST COAST BENSON HOTEL, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Oregon

Kenneth Perry, Portland, OR, for plaintiffs.

Lisa F. Rackner, Lindsay, Hart, Neil & Weigler, Portland, OR, Karen F. Jones, Caitlin J. Moughon, Michael C. Sullivan, Graham & James LLP/Riddell Williams, Seattle, WA, Susan K. Eggum, Portland, OR, for defendants.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

ROBERT E. JONES, District Judge.

In this action, three plaintiffs, Kelly Logan, Kelli Matthews and Michelle Favreau, have brought claims against defendants Westcoast Benson Hotel and Dennis Kirshner for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, and other related state law claims. Plaintiffs' causes of action arise from their employment at defendant Westcoast Benson Hotel's (Benson Hotel) restaurant -Trader Vic's. Defendant Dennis Kirshner (Kirshner) was the manager of Trader Vic's from October 1993 until March 1995.

Specifically, plaintiffs have alleged the following sixteen claims: (1) Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986; (4) negligent hiring and/or retention; (5) negligent supervision; (6) intentional interference with a business relationship/prospective advantage; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) reckless infliction of emotional distress; (9) negligence; (10) gross negligence; (11) aiding and abetting discrimination; (12) assault; (13) battery; (14) slander per se; (15) invasion of privacy — disclosure of private facts; and (16) invasion of privacy — false light publicity.

This case is before this court on four motions: 1) plaintiffs' motion (# 61) to remedy deposition discovery abuses and for sanctions; 2) defendants' motions for summary judgment (Kirshner # 51 & Benson Hotel # 56); 3) plaintiffs' counter-motion for partial summary judgment (# 73); and 4) defendant Benson Hotel's motion to strike (# 86) portions of plaintiffs' statement of facts. For the reasons discussed below, I DENY plaintiffs' discovery motion (# 61); GRANT defendant Kirshner's motion (# 51) for summary judgment in part and DENY it in part; GRANT defendant Benson Hotel's motion (# 56) for summary judgment in part and DENY it in part; and DENY defendant Benson Hotel's motion (# 86) to strike.

I. MOTION FOR ORDER TO REMEDY DEPOSITION DISCOVERY ABUSES & FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiffs have moved (# 61), pursuant to FRCP 30(d)(2) and 37(c), to remedy deposition discovery abuses that arose during the course of defendant Dennis Kirshner's deposition. Plaintiffs' counsel Kenneth Perry alleges that counsel for defendant Kirshner, Susan K. Eggum, was "impermissibly coaching Mr. Kirshner during his original deposition among other things." He asks the court to order Kirshner to submit to a new deposition and to pay plaintiffs' costs of $695.00 incurred for the original deposition.

Defendant's counsel disputes these allegations, stating that plaintiffs' counsel "has made highly serious accusations against ... [her] for `hiding information' and for discovery `abuses.'" Defendant's counsel also turns the court's attention to Mr. Perry's letter, dated March 6, 1997, in which he wrote:

[U]pon receipt and review of the transcript from Mr. Kirshner's deposition, I intend to move the court for sanctions. Specifically, I will seek an order from the court compelling you and/or your client to pay all costs associated with Mr. Kirshner's deposition. I may further move that your client be deposed again (based upon intentionally disruptive conduct that I believe is sufficiently recorded). However, if you and/or your client wish to voluntarily pay the costs associated with Mr. Kirshner's deposition I will not seek any further sanction from the court.

"The district court has great latitude in imposing sanctions for discovery abuse." Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 367 (9th Cir.1996). "The imposition of discovery sanctions ... [is] reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Hilao v. Est. of Marcos, 103 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir.1996). The Ninth Circuit has allowed sanctions for various forms of discovery abuse. See Oregon RSA No. 6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Oregon Ltd. Partnership, 76 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning defendants for not producing a purchase agreement that was already a public document); Telluride Management Solutions, Inc. v. Telluride Investment Group., 55 F.3d 463, 466 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that an award of discovery sanctions for failure to appear at deposition was not an abuse of discretion).

"Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (citations omitted). "These powers are governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Id. (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1389, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)). A federal court has the power to discipline attorneys who appear before it; however, this power "ought to be exercised with great caution." Id.

Although this court condemns both counsels' behavior during the discovery process and indeed their constant bickering over every aspect of this litigation, I do not believe this conduct to be so abusive as to warrant sanctions. Moreover, since both sides have committed abuses, sanctions benefitting only one side would be inappropriate. Therefore, plaintiffs' motion for discovery abuses and sanctions is DENIED.

II. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FACTS

Plaintiffs' causes of action arise from their employment at defendant Westcoast Benson Hotel's (Benson Hotel) restaurant — Trader Vic's. Defendant Dennis Kirshner (Kirshner) was the manager of Trader Vic's from October 1993 until March 20, 1995. As manager of Trader Vic's, Kirshner was in charge of the restaurant and supervised its day-to-day operations.

The Benson Hotel owned and operated Trader Vic's restaurant until the restaurant was closed on April 19, 1996. Every employee of the Benson Hotel is given an Employee Handbook, which includes a sexual harassment policy. All three plaintiffs and defendant Kirshner apparently received this Employee Handbook.1 The policy prohibits sexual harassment at the Benson, describes what "sexual harassment" can be, and directs any employee who believes that he or she has been the subject of harassment to immediately report it to the General Manager. Furthermore, the policy also assures employees that the Benson Hotel will handle all harassment complaints promptly and effectively.

Kelly Logan (Logan) worked at Trader Vic's from November 1993 until June 15, 1994. Kelli Matthews (Matthews) worked at another of the Benson Hotel's restaurants, the London Grill, beginning in September 1993. She worked additional shifts at Trader Vic's from December 1993 until July 9, 1994.2 Michelle Favreau (Favreau) worked at Trader Vic's from June 1994 until the restaurant shut down on April 19, 1996. All three plaintiffs worked as hostesses/cashiers under Kirshner's management at some period during their employment.

Each of the three plaintiffs states in her signed declaration that:

Throughout the time that I worked for defendant Kirshner at Trader Vic's, defendant Kirshner subjected me to repeated physical contact. The physical contact caused by defendant Kirshner was always uninvited and unwanted. Furthermore, the contact was personally offensive to me.

More specifically, Logan recalls in her declaration a specific incident when she stretched her arms toward the ceiling to make a point and Kirshner, while staring directly at her breasts, asked her to "do that again." Matthews recalls in her declaration that Kirshner made repeated requests for her to become his mistress and repeatedly made statements that "her boyfriend was too young and immature, and that [Matthews] needed an older man like him to satisfy [her] sexually." Favreau recalls in her declaration that Kirshner grabbed her breasts during the Christmas season 1994 and he then said, "Don't file sexual harassment on me, okay." Furthermore, she recalls that he also pointed to a holiday ornament on a tree that was somewhat phallic, and said "mine is bigger than that."

The three plaintiffs all recall in their declarations repeated instances where Kirshner would pass behind them at the hostess counter and "his hands would touch [their] waist[s] and his groin would be pressed against [their] buttocks." Each time this occurred, plaintiffs state, Kirshner never simply announced that he needed to get into the hostess area and asked or waited for them to step outside of it. Logan and Matthews both declare that Kirshner would often say, "I hope you're not going to get me for sexual harassment" after passing behind them in the hostess area. Favreau declares that Kirshner would often look at her and smile after passing behind her in the hostess area. In addition, all three plaintiffs recall instances where Kirshner made numerous remarks regarding their breasts, legs, and their "nice shape" in general.

Kirshner, in his deposition, denied ever making any sexually explicit comments to plaintiffs or ever having any contact with the plaintiffs in the sexually harassing manner that they allege. He did recall an incident where he accidentally bumped into Matthews and may have touched her breasts. Also, he stated that he may have...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • T.L. ex rel. Lowry v. Sherwood Charter Sch.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Oregon
    • December 18, 2014
    ...Arena Corp., 333 Or. 401, 412, 40 P.3d 1059, 1064 (2002). Negligent or reckless conduct does not suffice. See Logan v. West Coast Benson Hotel, 981 F.Supp. 1301, 1322 (D.Or.1997).“Because proof of intent is often indirect and evidence of psychic harm is usually self-serving, proof of this t......
  • Campbell v. Knife River Corp..—nw.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Oregon
    • March 8, 2011
    ...that Oregon courts follow the reasoning of federal decisions on Title VII), adopted (D.Or. Feb. 7, 2002)); Logan v. West Coast Benson Hotel, 981 F.Supp. 1301, 1319 (D.Or.1997) (in analyzing Oregon discrimination claims under O.R.S. Chapter 659, Oregon courts have looked to Title VII cases f......
  • Vonderohe v. B & S of Fort Wayne Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • March 11, 1999
    ...with the EEOC. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d at 840 (common practice of sexual harassment against female employees); Logan, 981 F.Supp. at 1314 V. CONCLUSION For all the aforementioned reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal is DENIED. 1. Jurisdiction of the undersigned Mag......
  • Biggs v. City of St. Paul
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Oregon
    • May 5, 2020
    ...the claim must be filed within the period for bringing a defamation claim." Magenis, 103 Or. App. at 560; Logan v. West Coast Benson Hotel, 981 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Or. 1997); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1). The Court finds Biggs' false light and defamation claims are intertwined. Therefore, the o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT