Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company

• Decision Date: 24 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80-5950,80-5950
• Parties: Laverne L. LOGAN v. ZIMMERMAN BRUSH COMPANY et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

455 U.S. 422

102 S.Ct. 1148

71 L.Ed.2d 265

Laverne L. LOGAN

v ZIMMERMAN BRUSH COMPANY et al.

No. 80-5950.

Argued Oct. 14, 1981.

Decided Feb. 24, 1982.

Syllabus

The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) barred employment discrimination on the basis of physical handicap unrelated to ability. To obtain relief, a complainant had to bring a charge of unlawful conduct before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (Commission) within 180 days of the occurrence of such alleged conduct. The statute then gave the Commission 120 days within which to convene a factfinding conference to obtain evidence, ascertain the parties' positions, and explore the possibility of a settlement. Appellant, an employee of appellee, was discharged purportedly because his short left leg made it impossible for him to perform his duties as a shipping clerk. Appellant filed a timely charge alleging unlawful termination of his employment, but apparently through inadvertence the Commission scheduled the factfinding conference for a date 5 days after expiration of the 120-day statutory period. The Commission denied appellee's motion that the charge be dismissed for failure to hold a timely conference. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the failure to comply with the 120-day convening requirement deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to consider appellant's charge, and rejected appellant's argument that his federal due process and equal protection rights would be violated were the Commission's error allowed to extinguish his cause of action.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

82 Ill.2d 99, 44 Ill.Dec. 308, 411 N.E.2d 277, reversed and remanded.

Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court, concluding that appellant was deprived of a protected property interest in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 428-437.

(a) Appellant's right to use the FEPA's adjudicatory procedures is a species of property protected by the Due Process Clause. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865. The hallmark of property is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except "for cause," and appellant's right shares this characteristic. The 120-day limitation is a procedural limitation on the claimant's ability to assert his rights, not a substantive element of the FEPA claim. Pp. 428-433.

(b) A consideration of the competing interests involved—the importance of the private interest and the length or finality of the deprivation the likelihood of governmental error, and the magnitude of the governmental interests—leads to the conclusion that appellant is entitled to have the Commission consider the merits of his charge, based upon the substantiality of the available evidence, before deciding whether to terminate his claim. The State's interest in refusing appellant's procedural request is, on the record, insubstantial. Pp. 433-435.

(c) The availability of a post-termination tort action does not provide appellant due process. It is the state system itself that destroys a complainant's property interest, by operation of law, whenever the Commission fails to convene a timely conference; appellant is challenging not the Commission's error but the "established state procedure" that destroys his entitlement without according him proper procedural safeguards. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420, distinguished. The Fourteenth Amendment requires " 'an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner' . . . 'for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,' " Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, and here appellant was denied such an opportunity. Pp. 435-437.

Justice BLACKMUN, in a separate opinion, joined by Justice BRENNAN, Justice MARSHALL, and Justice O'CONNOR, concluded that under the "rational-basis" standard, the Illinois statute, as interpreted and applied by the Illinois Supreme Court to establish two categories—those processed within the prescribed 120 days and thus entitled to full consideration on the merits, and otherwise identical claims not processed within the prescribed time and thus terminated without a hearing—deprived appellant of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. Pp. 438-442.

Justice POWELL, joined by Justice REHNQUIST, while not joining all the broad pronouncements on the law of equal protection in Justice BLACKMUN's separate opinion, also concluded that the challenged classification, as construed and applied in this case, failed to be rationally related to a state interest that would justify it, and thus violated appellant's right to equal protection of the laws. Pp. 443-444.

Gary H. Palm, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Jay A. Canel, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.^*

The issue in this case is whether a State may terminate a complainant's cause of action because a state official, for reasons beyond the complainant's control, failed to comply with a statutorily mandated procedure.

I

A.

The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA or Act), Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 48, ¶ 851 et seq. (1979), barred employment discrimination on the basis of "physical . . . handicap unrelated to ability." ¶ 853(a). It also established a comprehensive scheme for adjudicating allegations of discrimination. To begin the process, a complainant had to bring a charge of unlawful conduct before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (Commission) within 180 days of the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory act. ¶ 858(a). The statute—in the provision directly at issue here—then gave the Commission 120 days within which to convene a factfinding conference designed to obtain evidence, ascertain the positions of the parties, and explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement. ¶ 858(b). If the Commission found "substantial evidence" of illegal conduct, it was to attempt to "eliminate the effect thereof . . . by means of conference and conciliation," ¶ 858(c), and, if that proved impossible, to issue a formal complaint against the employer within 180 days after the expiration of the 120-day period. ¶ 858(d). A formal adversary hearing was then to be held before a commissioner or duly appointed adjudicator, who was to make findings and who was empowered to recommend reinstatement, back-pay, and reasonable attorney's fees. ¶ 858.01. If the commissioner or adjudicator did not find substantial evidence of discrimination, he was to recommend dismissal of the charge. Ibid.

The findings and recommended order were to be filed with the Commission. A complainant was entitled to obtain review by the full Commission of any of the possible dispositions of his charge, including an initial determination that the evidence did not justify a complaint. The Commission was to file a written order and decision. ¶ 858.02; Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, Rules and Regulations, § 4.5 (1979). If still not satisfied, the complainant could seek judicial review of any Commission order. ¶ 860.¹

B

On November 9, 1979, appellant Laverne L. Logan, a probationary employee hired one month previously, was discharged by appellee Zimmerman Brush Company, purportedly because Logan's short left leg made it impossible for him to perform his duties as a shipping clerk. Five days later, Logan, acting pro se, filed a charge with the Commission alleging that his employment had been unlawfully terminated because of his physical handicap. App. 3. This triggered the Commission's statutory obligation under ¶ 858(b) to convene a factfinding conference within 120 days; in Logan's case, this meant by March 13, 1980. Apparently through inadvertence, the Commission's representative scheduled the conference for March 18, five days after expiration of the statutory period. Notice of the meeting, which was mailed to both parties in January 1980, specified the hearing's date and location and declared that attendance was "required." It, however, did not allude to the FEPA's 120-day time limit. App. 5. The Commission also asked the company to complete a short questionnaire concerning its employment practices, and directed that it submit its answers by March 10. Ibid. The company did this without objection.

When the conference date arrived, the company moved that Logan's charge be dismissed because the Commission had failed to hold the conference within the statutorily-mandated 120-day period. Id., at 12. This request was rejected. Id., at 16. The company thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court of Illinois for an original writ of prohibition. That court stayed proceedings on Logan's complaint pending decision on the request for a writ. Id., at 24. Logan meanwhile obtained counsel, and—because 180 days had not yet passed since the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory act—filed a second charge with the Commission. Id., at 26.

Before the Illinois Supreme Court, Logan argued that terminating his claim because of the Commission's failure to convene a timely conference—a matter beyond Logan's, or in- deed the company's, control—would violate his federal rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. But the court noted that the statutory provision at issue, ¶ 858(b), declared: "Within 120 days of the proper filing of a charge, the Commission shall convene a fact finding conference. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The Illinois court found this legislative language to be mandatory, and accordingly it held that failure to comply deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to consider Logan's charge. Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 82 Ill.2d 99, 44 Ill.Dec. 308, 411 N.E.2d 277 (1980).

The court found controlling its decision in Springfield-Sangamon County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 71 Ill.2d 61, 15...