Lohman v. Morris

• Decision Date: 21 August 1986
• Docket Number: No. 3-86-0058,3-86-0058
• Citation: 497 N.E.2d 143,100 Ill.Dec. 263,146 Ill.App.3d 457
• Parties: , 100 Ill.Dec. 263 David LOHMAN, Plaintiff, v. Dale MORRIS, Defendant(Dale Morris, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant); Peoria Speedway, Inc., A Foreign Corp.; Peoria Raceway, Inc., et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellees).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 143

497 N.E.2d 143

146 Ill.App.3d 457, 100 Ill.Dec. 263

David LOHMAN, Plaintiff, v. Dale MORRIS, Defendant(Dale Morris, Third-Party

Plaintiff-Appellant); Peoria Speedway, Inc., A

Foreign Corp.; Peoria Raceway, Inc., et

al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellees).

No. 3-86-0058.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Third District.

Aug. 21, 1986.

Phillip H. Palmer, Richard D. Price, Jr. & Associates, Ltd., Peoria, for Dale Morris.

Rex K. Linder and Edward T. Habecker, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, for Peoria Speedway, Inc., Peoria Raceway, Inc. and Arthur Sebens.

Presiding Justice SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court:

Third party plaintiff-appellant, Dale Morris, appeals from an interlocutory order entered by the circuit court of Peoria County on November 1, 1985, which granted third party defendants-appellees' (hereinafter referred to as Peoria Speedway) motion to dismiss an amended third party complaint with prejudice.

The underlying facts which gave rise to this appeal are as follows. In October, 1976, plaintiff Lohman was struck by a racing vehicle driven by the third party plaintiff-appellant, Morris. Lohman was removing debris from the racetrack at Peoria Speedway in Peoria County when he was struck by Morris' vehicle. Prior to the accident, Lohman and Morris executed a document releasing Peoria Speedway from " * * * any and all claims and liability * * * " arising out of their activities at the Peoria Speedway Racetrack. Peoria Speedway required the release be signed and an entrance fee be paid by all racing participants as a condition precedent to gaining entry to the racetrack's restricted race area. Lohman participated in the racetrack activities as a pitcrew member and Morris participated as a racecar driver. The release reads in pertinent part:

"I * * * DO HEREBY:

1. RELEASE, DISCHARGE AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE the track operators, track owners, land owners, racing association, and each of them, their officers agents and employees (all hereinafter collectively referred to as "releasees") from any and all claims and liability arising out of strict liability or ordinary negligence of releasees or any other participant which causes the undersigned injury, death, damages or property damage. I hereby covenant to hold releasees harmless and indemnify releasees for any claim, judgment or expense releasees may incur arising out of my activities or presence in the restricted area.

2. UNDERSTAND that my entry into the restricted area and/or participation in racing events contains DANGER AND RISK OF INJURY OR DEATH, that conditions of the racing surface change from time to time and may become more hazardous, and that there is INHERENT DANGER in racing which I appreciate and voluntarily assume, because I choose to do so. I have observed many races of the type that I seek to participate in, I have inspected the racing surface, access roads, shoulders, equipment, barriers or lack thereof, lighting or lack thereof, and the weather conditions. I further know that other contestants and participants pose a danger to me, nevertheless, I VOLUNTARILY ELECT TO ACCEPT ALL RISKS connected with my entry into the restricted area and/or participation in any racing events.

3. * * * I am not an agent, servant or employee of releasees and no oral representations or inducements have been made to me to sign this agreement * * *."

Lohman instituted a negligence action against Peoria Speedway in 1978 which was dismissed with prejudice on the basis of the release executed by Lohman prior to the accident. The dismissal was appealed to this court and was subsequently dismissed on the court's own motion and no further action has been taken with regard to that dismissal or appeal.

Morris requests reversal of the trial court's order contending that the exculpatory release should be held invalid because it was executed under a mutual mistake of fact and not according to the parties' intentions. Further, Morris maintains that the issue of whether the parties were operating under a mutual mistake of fact in regard to the release is one for the trier of fact to determine.

Our courts have upheld consistently the validity of exculpatory releases which specifically attempt to protect raceway owners and operators from future liabilities when they are executed by raceway drivers and participants prior to having entered a restricted raceway area. These exculpatory releases have been held to be an effective bar to liability where an injured driver or participant has brought suit against the raceway owner and operator. Schlessman v. Henson (1980), 83 Ill.2d 82, 46 Ill.Dec. 139, 413 N.E.2d 1252; Rudolph v. Sante Fe Park Enterprises, Inc. (1984), 122 Ill.App.3d 372, 78 Ill.Dec. 38, 461 N.E.2d 622; Sexton v. Southwestern Auto Racing Ass'n., Inc. (1979), 75 Ill.App.3d 338, 31 Ill.Dec. 133, 394 N.E.2d 49; Scheff v. Homestretch, Inc. (1978), 60 Ill.App.3d 424, 18 Ill.Dec. 152, 377 N.E.2d 305; Morrow v. Auto Championship Racing Ass'n, Inc. (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 682, 291 N.E.2d 30.

As a general rule, exculpatory contracts are valid as long as they are not violative of public policy or there does not exist a unique relationship between the parties which militates against enforcement of the agreement such as the common carrier-passenger or employer-employee relationship. (O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co. (1959), 15 Ill.2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545.) Unlike legislatively enacted statutes which void, as against public policy, exculpatory clauses in leases involving real property (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 80, par. 91), construction contracts (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 29, par. 61) and bailment agreements (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 26, par. 7-204), exculpatory clauses in contracts as found in the instant case have not been expressly prohibited by statute. Our courts have declined to find exculpatory clauses per se to be violative of public policy and have affirmed the right of parties to freely contract about their own affairs in regard to relieving themselves from the consequences of their own negligence. Morrow v. Auto Championship Racing Ass'n. (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 682, 291 N.E.2d 30; Erickson v. Wagon Wheel Enterprises, Inc. (1968), 101 Ill.App.2d 296, 242 N.E.2d 622; Owen v. Vic Tanny's Enterprises (1964), 48 Ill.App.2d 344, 199 N.E.2d 280; Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Buildings (1958), 20 Ill.App.2d 1, 155 N.E.2d 372; McClure Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Reuben Donnelley Corp. (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 1109, 57 Ill.Dec. 471, 428 N.E.2d 1151, aff'd (1983), 95 Ill.2d 68, 69 Ill.Dec. 183, 447 N.E.2d 400.

In interpreting whether a contractual indemnity clause protects a party against its own negligence, the trial court must apply the "rule of interpretation which requires that the agreement be given a fair and reasonable interpretation based upon a consideration of all its language and provisions." (Tatar v. Maxon Const. Co. (1973), 54 Ill.2d 64, 67, 294 N.E.2d 272, 274.) It is within the province of the trial court to determine, as a matter of law, that a release was not unconscionable nor executed under a mutual mistake of fact. Willis v. Reum (1978), 64 Ill.App.3d 146, 21 Ill.Dec. 111, 381 N.E.2d 46. In the instant case, the language of the exculpatory release entered into by Lohman and Morris clearly states that the parties release Peoria Speedway and its employees from " * * * any and all claims and liability * * *." The trial court's interpretation of this contract that it encompasses liabilities occasioned by one's own negligence, as well as those arising from...