Lollar v. Dewitt
Decision Date | 26 February 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 19176,19176 |
Citation | 255 S.C. 452,179 S.E.2d 607 |
Parties | Arelia LOLLAR, Appellant, v. Harold K. DEWITT, Respondent. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
James P. Harrelson, Walterboro, J. Robert Peters, Jr., of Murdaugh, Eltzroth & Peters, Hampton, for appellant.
W. J. McLeod, Jr., of Jefferies, McLeod, Unger & Fraser, Walterboro, for respondent.
Arelia Lollar, the appellant herein, instituted this action for personal injuries sustained when the mule-drawn wagon upon which she was riding on a public highway was struck from the rear by an automobile operated by Harold K. Dewitt, the respondent herein. It is alleged that the respondent operated his automobile in a careless and reckless manner causing the injuries to the appellant.
The answer of the respondent contained a general denial and by way of a fourth defense alleged appellant's husband, the driver of the wagon, was contributorily negligent and reckless and sought to impute such negligence and recklessness to her under the family purpose and joint enterprise doctrines, thereby barring any recovery by her.
This case came on for trial at the 1967 April Term of the Court of Common Pleas for Colleton County, before the Honorable Clarence E. Singletary, presiding judge, and a jury, and resulted in a verdict in favor of the respondent.
At appropriate stages of the trial the appellant moved to strike the fourth defense from the answer on the ground that the family purpose and joint enterprise doctrines were not applicable under the factual showing made. This motion was denied and the jury was charged as to the family purpose and joint enterprise doctrines. Following the verdict the appellant moved for a new trial for the reason, Inter alia, that the trial judge should have granted the motion to strike the fourth defense upon the ground stated and, therefore, should not have charged imputed negligence.
It is agreed that on November 2, 1964, this being the day of the collision, the appellant, her husband and a foster son had gathered wasted corn on the farm of a neighbor. They were to receive one-half of the corn for gathering it. At the end of the day the appellant and her husband were proceeding towards their home, the wagon being loaded with corn. The husband was driving the mule and the appellant was riding on the top of the corn in the wagon. The husband testified that he owned the mule and wagon and he identified the persons from whom he had purchased such. However, on cross-examination, when questioned as to the ownership of the 'wagon and other stuff', he replied 'I feel like we own everything I have together, we worked for it,' and that 'I feel like anything that I work for and take home that it's me and hers because we worked together.' He further testified, 'I feel like everything I take home that my wife should have something to do with it if it was mine.'
The family purpose doctrine has been adopted in this state. Basically, under this doctrine, where the head of the family owns, furnishes and maintains a vehicle for the general use, pleasure and convenience of the family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it while the vehicle is being so used. Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S.C. 171, 81 N.E. 487; Mooney v. Gilreath, 124 S.C. 1, 117 S.E. 186; Burbage v. Curry, 127 S.C. 349, 121 S.E. 267; Hewitt v. Fleming, 172 S.C. 266, 173 S.E. 808; Norwood v. Coley, 235 S.C. 314, 111 S.E.2d 550; Porter v. Hardee, 241 S.C. 474, 129 S.E.2d 131, and Reid v. Swindler, 249...
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